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A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE 
AND 
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION 1 
DAVID PERKINS 
PART I 
A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE 
The existence of caricatures has proved something of a 
nuisance to philosophers and psychologists bent on analyzing 
pictorial representation {Gibson 1971 ). The contrast between 
caricature and customary "realistic" representation poses 
part of the problem. A portrait caricature clearly represents a 
certain layout of spatial form, a face-like layout with nose so 
long, mouth so wide, and so forth. This spatial layout 
typically diverges substantially and in calculated ways from 
the true form of the subject's head. What sort of picture is 
this? It is deliberately inaccurate, yet the subject is often 
quite recognizable- perhaps more recognizable than in an 
accurate portrait or photograph. It lies about its subject's 
shape, but in doing so often comments delightfully on that 
shape. If conventional picturing is to be analyzed in terms of 
the picture conveying information to the viewer about its 
subject, then caricature is not strictly part of, but builds on, 
~hat _co~vention, bending it to special purposes. What exactly 
1s gomg on? 
Another part of the puzzle is the variety of pictures 
sometimes called caricatures, but which deviate in obvious 
respects from the most typical usage of the term. Political 
cartoons in general need not represent any known political 
figure. Grote~ Da Vinci's famous set 
{Gombrich 1961 :95) need depict no actual individual or class 
of individuals. A child's cartoon monster labelled "teacher" 
may offer a funny face without satirizing that teacher's 
specific physiognomy. Mergings of human and animal fea-
tures as in Figure 1 by Levine (1969) are a bonus: caricature 
allows but does not demand such a mix. 
The natural attack on these problems is a quest for 
definition, a framing of conditions for caricature which 
would on the one hand specify its relation to realistic 
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portraiture, and on the other admit or exclude, and in any 
case elaborate the relation of caricature to, the various sorts 
of pictures which sometimes are so named. 
Two concepts merit special attention in the search for 
definition. One is exaggeration: a caricature typically ex-
aggerates features of its subject. The second is individuation: 
a caricature typically exaggerates so as to differentiate the 
subject from his fellows. Exaggeration and individuation 
alone promise some unscrambling of the problems sketched 
above. Exaggeration seems a meaningful concept only in a 
symbol system where one can also tell the truth. This might 
illuminate caricature's dependence on and relation to a 
tradition of realistic portraiture. Individuation commands 
that the caricature remain true to the subject's physiognomy 
at some level, reflecting the intuition that mere distortion, as 
in the child's cartoon monster, is not caricature. 
Such factors prompt a preliminary and very traditional 
definition: a caricature is a symbol that exaggerates in-
dividuating characteristics of its subject. Indeed, a refinement 
of this will provide the final formulation. But along the way 
some major difficulties demand attention. First, prior writers 
have proposed other conditions in addition to exaggeration 
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION 
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Figure 2 - Nazi caricatures of jews 
and individuation; for instance, a caricature must be 
humorous. On what grounds are these additional constraints 
dismissed? Second, individuation and exaggeration are them-
selves concepts hardly clearer than caricature. The definition 
becomes little more than a game of word substitution unless 
these terms themselves can be explicated, particularly as they 
relate to realistic representation. Third, it is not enough that 
a definition simply stake out roughly the class of pictures 
usually called caricatures. Many definitions could do about 
equally well statistically, including the above, the above with 
"humor" also required, or "grotesque drawings which repre-
sent real subjects." The discussion will argue that the above 
definition and its elaboration, far from being arbitrary, 
illuminate the essential psychology of perceiving caricatures. 
FURTHER CONDITIONS? 
Prior definitions of caricature are mainly introductions, 
asides and ornaments to a body of work with quite a 
different focus. Most of the surprisingly extensive literature 
on caricaturing deals with the evolution of the form, 
biographies of caricaturists, and presentation of examples 
without technical discussion. The range of art treated is 
generally wider than portrait caricature, encompassing also 
the political cartoon or grotesque figures. "Caricature" is 
sometimes used synonymously with either of these. The 
details of the relation between drawing and subject are 
persistently neglected. Rarely does one even find a portrait 
and a caricature of an individual side-by-side. For some 
happy exceptions, see Berger (1952), Gombrich (1963), 
Rother ( 1966). 
Definitions, when attempted at all, have their favorite 
vocabulary. Besides "individuation" and "exaggeration," key 
words are "humor," "idealization," "defects," and "person-
ality" as well as near synonyms of these. Whether such terms 
can add to the conception of caricature sketched above 
demands appraisal. The concl11sian will be that they cannot. 
Humor. 
Hum9r stands · J+-i.o.!imate relationship to caricature, 
often figuring in the definitions put forth by various writers. 
Proposals that caricature is the exaggeration of an individ-
ual's characteristic features to comic effect, or the like, 
appear frequently (American Heritage Dictionary 1969; 
Murray, quoted in Ashbee 1928:1, 25; Berger 1952: 7; Davies 
1928:1). But hum~ubious as a condition for 
caricature. 
First of all, there are dr_awings which clearly deserve the 
label but are of doubtful humor. Figure 2 from Gombrich 
(1963) illustrates caricatures of Jews devised by the Nazi 
propaganda effort, caricatures which are too vicious to be 
funny. Commonly, one finds political cartoons incorporating 
portrait caricatures which in themselves are at best very 
mildly humorous. They primarily serve as reference mechan-
isms for the real joke of the caption or whole cartoon. It 
seems strange to place the humor of the caricatured face so 
much in the center of things by definition when it is often 
rather peripheral to the entire comic effect. Figure 3 points 
up another problem. Some artists such as James House 
(Figure 3), and Oscar Berger (1952) often emphasize likeness 
of personality rather than humor; the product is not 
intended to prompt a laugh. Finally, there are contrast 
enhancement techniques in photography and caricature-style 
drawings of complex machinery (Ryan and Schwartz 1956). 
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Figure 3 - Fritz Kreisler 
These are hardly comic subjects, but the term caricature, if 
humor is not a condition, seems an illuminating name for 
such pictures. 
If one's area of interest is portrait caricatures, the added 
condition of exaggeration "to comic effect" would narrow 
very little the class of drawings satisfying the requirements; 
exaggeration and individuation fix the range of the term 
adequately. And a requirement of humor would connect 
caricature logically with the snarl of philosophical and 
psychological issues surrounding the topic of humor. It seems 
prudent to stay as much on the periphery of that as possible. 
Furthermore, there is a certain tension between the aim of 
humor and the aim of individuation. The political cartoonist 
Paul Szep, of the Boston Globe, has emphasized to me the 
particular difficulty of producing a caricarture in which the 
human face is merged with an animal form. The combination 
can be marvelously appropriate, but the amount of dif-
ferentiating information available is certainly reduced. Worse, 
a long nose for an inquisitive but short-nosed person may be 
in keeping with his behavior, but can injure the likeness. All 
the above considerations sum to the conclusion that humor is 
best considered a contingent property of some caricatures. 
If humor should not be a necessary condition for 
caricature, then what accounts for its undeniable close 
association with the form? A historical answer is in part 
legitimate: caricature has in fact been persistent!~ used t~ 
humorous ends. But such a reply is incomplete if it does not 
confess that caricature lends itself to just such use. The point 
is that exaggeration, a prime tool of the caricaturist, is also a 
key device of the humorist. This does not mean that all 
exaggerated faces are funny, any more than it means that all 
exaggerated faces are identifiable. Exaggeration in various Jr 
cases may serve a humorous end, an individuating purpose, 
both, or neither. That it so often serves both, reflects the 
psychology and the individual culture of the human perceiver 
and the caricaturist's happy exploitation of both psychology 
and culture. "' 
Idealization and Defects 
Idealization seems intuitively the very contrary of carica-
ture. Both depart from faithful portraiture, but somehow in 
opposite directions. Roughly speaking, idealization means 
producing a picture of a subject so as to emphasize various 
canons of beauty, masculinity, or whatever, established in 
the artist's society. As such, idealization is one form of 
exaggeration. This encourages the complementary view that 
ugliness is as central to caricature as idealization is counter to 
it. Caricature is seen as the exaggeration of the defects of a 
physiognomy {Davies 1928; Baldinucci, quoted in Gombrich 
1961 :344; Grose, quoted in Lynch 1927:9; Bergson, quoted 
in Lynch 1927:5; Random House Dictionary 1968). 
But such a formulation reflects a philosophy in which 
any departure from an ideal counts as a defect. The usage of 
these terms is more tolerant today. Individuality itself carries 
certain positive values. There is a large middle ground 
between what counts as ideal and what counts as defective. 
Exaggeration of individuating features may not produce ideal 
types, but need not produce ugliness. Oscar Berger {1952) 
presents a number of benign caricatures of various public 
figures, done in sittings with their cooperation. In sum, 
exaggeration of defects is simply too specialized a require-
ment to be called a necessary condition for caricature; there 
are too many pictures called caricatures that would not be so 
described. 
Furthermore, ugly caricatures are not really needed to 
satisfy our hunch that caricature runs contrary to idealiza-
tion. Another symmetry besides beauty and ugliness serves as 
well. Idealization is a transformation that blurs the distinc-
tiveness of the particular face; a range of individuals all 
idealized are depicted as sharing many features that comprise 
the ideal standard and hence are less differentiated. Thus 
while caricature individuates, idealization disindividuates. 
Personality 
Many caricaturists often emphasize conveying person-
alities through their art {Low 1932). In their work, this aim 
accompanies or replaces humor. Those that take this ap-
proach must gather information about a subject's character; 
the personal interview and/or sitting is a favorite device 
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(O'Connell 1970; Berger 1952). But Paul Szep has explained 
that personal contact is often impossible where major 
political figures are concerned. First of all a physiognomic 
likeness is the goal. Next, the political cartoonist must 
generally work from his target's public character, not his 
"home" character- both because that is what is accessible 
and that is what the public knows. Finally, the aspects of 
character to be emphasized naturally turn on the particular, 
and generally critical, function of the cartoon. Thus the 
extent to which conveying personality is a primary aim varies 
considerably from artist to artist and from circumstance to 
circumstance. Personality is not the focus consistently 
enough for it to serve as a further necessary condition for 
caricature. 
Indeed, expression of personality competes considerably 
with physiognomic individuation. Topffer and numerous 
other artists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
systematically explored variations in cartoon and normal 
portraits that yield various personality impressions (Gom-
brich 1961, ch. 1 0). More recently, psychological research 
employing photographs and sometimes composite line faces 
reveals that observers will readily- and often consistently 
across observers- attribute personality traits to strange faces 
(Shoemaker, South, and Lowe 1973; Hochberg 
1964:105-110; Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955). But 
these personality attributions do not accurately reflect the 
true personalities of the photo's subjects; that is, a subject's 
face will likely suggest a personality not in keeping with his 
actual personality. A caricature or portrait which is both 
recognizable without labels or context and also a faithful 
expression of the subject's true personality (not the super-
ficial personality projected by his face) must be counted as 
an especially fine achievement. 
REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION 
If humor, ugliness and expression of personality are 
inessential to caricature, then exaggeration and individuation 
by themselves must resolve this art form's paradoxes. Two 
symbolic functions of special concern are reference - a 
caricature is of a person - and description - a caricature 
delivers certain shape information about the subject's face. 
In order for the caricature to speak about its subject, the 
subject must be designated. Sometimes audaciously direct 
means are employed: human figures in pictures are simply 
labelled with their names, or relatively unambiguous con-
textual cues are provided- a white house in the background. 
Another major means is to provide a picture recognizable 
from the face as representing a particular individual. Indeed, 
some caricaturists hold it an obligation of their art to eschew 
other techniques, especially when a familiar, plausibly 
recognizable, public figure is the subject. 
Nonabstract pictures, the sorts of concern here, will be 
said to describe. This will simply mean that they provide to 
the viewer information specifying spatial forms and surface 
properties- the shapes, textures, colors of chairs, houses, 
faces, or whatever. This quite deliberately ignores the often 
important distinctions between pictorial and linguistic means 
of symbolizing discussed by Goodman (1968, ch. 4). It 
should be mentioned that in general a description, linguistic 
or pictorial, need not be a description of any actually 
existent thing; whether the description is ascribed to a 
referent is an independent matter. 
That description should be an important function of 
caricature appears implausible, considering that a caricature 
of a person is manifestly and necessarily inaccurate (if it is an 
accurate portrayal we do not normally call it a caricature). 
But the problem disappears once one recognizes that a 
caricature is two descriptions in one. A caricature can be read 
as picturing a face-like spatial form with, for instance, a nose 
three inches long, an absurdly weak chin, and so on. On the 
other hand, that same caricature can be read as providing 
information about the person it stands for, a person 
therefore whose nose is long as noses go, though not that 
long, a person whose chin is weak as chins go, though not 
that weak. In fact two different systems of description are 
involved. One specifies a spatial form - but not the form of 
the subject- with metric accuracy; the other, relevant to the 
form of the subject, need speak only of trends. Exaggeration 
necessarily involves just these two levels of description. 
The interaction between description and reference is 
varied. Sometimes, description may be the means of refer-
ence. The descriptive trend information in the drawing is 
assimilated by the viewer's face recognition system, which 
accomplishes identification of the face. Sometimes, the 
descriptive role of a caricature may not begin until reference 
is accomplished. If the letter T is displayed with the caption 
"Charles Atlas," then clearly the T does not assume its role 
of caricaturing Atlas' physique until the reference is 
established. And more complex situations abound. For 
instance, a drawing prompts recognition, and then descriptive 
aspects of the drawing which were not involved in recogni-
tion become meaningful in the light of knowledge of the 
subject. 
The descriptive powers of caricature should not be 
considered just narrowly appropriate to pictorial comedy. 
For example, a study by Ryan and Schwartz (1956) 
compared accurate line drawings, photographs, shaded draw-
ings, and caricature-like "cartoons" as means of picturing 
complex spatial layouts, including machinery. The pictures 
were exposed tachistoscopically and the caricatures most 
successfully conveyed the general organization of the spatial 
layouts at shorter exposures. 
Furthermore, caricature-like techniques of exaggeration 
are actually employed in a number of communications 
contexts. Relief maps amplify the vertical scale. Photo-
graphers utilize contrast enhancement methods. Examples 
occur among pictograms used in international traffic warning 
signs, although however clear and emphatic these may appear 
to the acculturated viewer, Kolers (1969) warns us to be 
wary of any claim that such signs are universally readable. 
TRUTH AND REVELATION 
A true description is simply a description that specifies 
properties true of a referent. Portrait caricature, involving 
exaggeration as it does, is never a true description as far as 
metric accuracy is concerned. But a caricature may be a true 
trend description of its subject. Indeed, if a viewer remarks 
that a caricature doesn't look like its subject, he is not likely 
to mean that the drawing lies about the subject's exact 
metric shape; that is taken for granted. Similarly, if a drawing 
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depicts a political figure with a bulldozer body, it would 
probably be superfluous to complain that the bulldozer does 
not resemble the subject's body. Whether a picture, carica-
ture or not, offers true descriptions must always be judged 
relative to an analysis of the multiple kinds of descriptions it 
might offer. 
The aesthetic functioning of a caricature depends 
critically on the viewer's evaluation of its truth and falsity as 
description. (A corollary of this is that a caricature cannot be 
fully appreciated unless one is familiar with its subject's 
physiognomy). Humor in caricature serves as an example. If a 
caricature is not taken as a true trend description, then it 
becomes simply a funny face, lacking a manifest kernel of 
physiognomic truth. But if only the trend description is 
noted, there is no perceived overstatement to laugh at. 
A viewer's assent to a caricature as a trend description is 
not just a piecemeal matter, the nose approved but the 
cheeks not, and so on. Judgments of that sort can often be 
made, of course, but overall assent may depend as much on 
an interplay of features, a gestalt which itself cannot appear 
unless all or most of the contributing trends are themselves 
correct. Furthermore, a description false in some respects is 
brought into question as a whole. Those other propositions it 
offers which seem true, seem no more than accidentally true 
and lose their merit as commentary. None of this applies to 
the falsity of caricature as metric description; this falsity is 
recognized as part of the art form, is systematically separable 
from the trend description and does not bring it into 
question. 
When a viewer assents to a caricature's description, his 
assent lends credence to ascriptions of the drawing that the 
viewer does not have the knowledge to judge. This is entirely 
natural; one estimates the overall truth of the message from 
those parts of it that one can evaluate. But this phenomenon 
allows such misuses of caricature as the Nazi cartoons of 
Jews. The caricaturist may couch lies in the very visage itself, 
by selectively exaggerating his subject's features so as to 
suggest some personality trait such as meanness. If the viewer 
knows the subject, but has seen in his face or behavior no 
contrary personality indications, the viewer, recognizing the 
face, is likely to take the meanness as an aspect of the true 
face he had not noticed before, exposed by the art of the 
caricaturist. On the other hand, the sophisticated viewer will 
have learned to distrust ascriptions of personality in carica-
ture. That is a part of being sophisticated. 
In sum, the viewer's assent to, dissent to, or inability to 
evaluate a caricature's trend description plays an intimate 
role in his whole reaction to the work. In many cases of 
humor in caricature, the viewer's judgment of the falsity of 
the picture as metric description plays just as important a 
role. Further, the viewer's reaction is highly individual, 
depending on the prior knowledge and the habits of 
categorizing that he brings to his encounter with the picture, 
on his familiarity or lack of familiarity with the subject's 
face, his preconceptions about the subject's personality, the 
degree to which he separates physiognomic, political, 
personality, and other ascriptions, and separates metric from 
trend descriptions. The viewer's response is as much bound 
up in the information he has available and his general habits 
of information processing as it is in any exclusively aesthetic 
capacities he might have (if exclusively aesthetic capacities 
exist at all). 
This theme can be carried further yet. The fine caricature 
of Beckett as a buzzard, done by Levine and displayed in 
Figure 1, exemplifies "relevation." Levine has delivered a 
construction that reveals an unexpected visual affinity 
between Beckett's physiognomy and that of a buzzard, an 
affinity that gains depth because of Beckett's morose literary 
works. The example will be discussed further later, but 
certainly revelation is not limited to cases of representing a 
person as an animal, or as anything else at all. I particularly 
recall a caricature of Pushkin by Levine, where the ex-
aggeratedly large and limpid eyes led me suddenly to realize 
how those eyes dominated Push kin's face in realistic portray-
als. In sum, a caricature reveals when it exposes unnoticed 
physiognomic relationships, or the unrealized influence of 
particular features on the whole face, or the like. 
Accordingly, revelation is a frequent achievement of, but 
not a requirement for, caricature. In political cartoons, the 
same public figure may recur again and again in the same 
style. His reappearances, offering little further physiognomic 
revelation, accomplish other functions within the cartoon 
such as reference or expression. ' 
Some requirements of revelation can be specified in terms 
introduced earlier . . First, revelation is part of caricature as a 
description; that is, a caricature offers a proposition about a 
subject's physiognomy, such as, that it is like a buzzard's in 
certain respects. Second, the viewer must affirm the proposi-
tion; he does not reserve judgment or accept the proposition 
on faith as one might do when viewing a caricature of an 
unfamiliar subject. And third, the affirmation is not of an 
often entertained and tiresomely familiar proposition, but of 
freshly revealed truth. In sum, the caricature entices the 
viewer into affirming a novel proposition. 
Why is a novel proposition affirmed? Relating the 
proposition to accumulated knowledge is required: for 
instance, the proposition may complete a pattern of other 
propositions; it may neatly sum up a co llection of sub-
ordinate propositions, as does the Buzzard-Beckett equation; 
it may bring into focus a series of half-realized prior 
observations, as with my reaction to Pushkin's eyes. What-
ever the relation to prior knowledge, it is a characteristic of 
revelation that the very organization of the viewer's per-
ception is changed. Just as, after identifying a camouflaged 
figure, it is very difficult to recover one's original naive 
perception, so Pushkin and Beckett will never appear as 
they did, or not for a long time. In its very rapid, but 
long-term, reorganization of the viewer's perceptions, revela-
tion contrasts with more gradual and painful means of 
shifting one's perceptions of the world. 
Revelation, important throughout the arts, is related to 
discovery as the word would be used in science or 
philosophy. Both revelation and discovery involve ap-
prehending a new structure or coherence in a body of 
accumulated information. Revelation emphasizes some 
agent's role in serving up the novel proposition, whereas 
discovery emphasizes the creative role of the apprehender in 
devising his own coherence. A discovery "comes as a 
revelation" just when the creator is largely unconscious of his 
own constructive role. Recent research (Muller, Kennedy, 
and Tanimoto 1972) has demonstrated that persons prefer 
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viewing sequences of pictures where initially distorted, 
unrecognizable letters become recognizable over viewing the 
reverse sequences, even though they judge the unrecognized 
distorted letters as by themselves more interesting than 
undistorted but readily identifiable letters. Discovery, that is, 
is valued for itself, independently of the value attached to 
the content discovered. Each of us can echo this subjectively; 
discovery and revelation are rewarding, often exciting ex-
periences. This is one source of affect in caricature and in art 
in general. 
In considering revelation, there is no need to confine the 
viewer to a passive role. If he does not invent the proposition 
that the caricaturist lays before him, at least he must read it 
out of the caricature, and furthermore he must relate it to his 
own knowledge and perceive that the proposition does lend 
that knowledge coherence or structure. These operations of 
the viewer are themselves active, constructive, and creative. 
Every revelation by an agent is to that extent a discovery by 
the recipient. Again, a viewer's response to a caricature 
emerges as a highly judgmental process very concerned with 
fact and logic; his prior information and information 
processing habits will determine whether he discovers what 
the caricaturist aimed to reveal. 
EXAGGERATION AND INDIVIDUATION 
In discussing how caricatures are "read," the previous 
sections have underscored the central roles of exaggeration 
and individuation. In employing exaggeration, caricatures 
provide a trend description but not a metric description of 
their subjects. And by providing a true trend description, 
caricatures individuate. 
At once it is clear that exaggeration must not be taken 
narrowly, for instance, to mean "making larger., Caricatures 
of aggressive chins may be larger, but weak chins are 
--......_rendered weaker yet. Some general techniques of ex-
aggeration are: making darker or lighter, larger or smaller, 
longer or shorter, and accentuating contours- special cases of 
this include rendering hair curlier or the profile more 
pronounced. Non-physical traits, as of personality or expres-
sion, can also be exaggerated. 
In all these cases, exaggeration involves displacement 
along a scale measuring (if crudely) some property. More 
generally, exaggeration could be defined in terms of a partial 
ordering relation on mutually exclusive classifications of 
some classification system. If a symbol exaggerates, it refers 
to a certain subject, but read according to convention, it also 
implies a measurement (classification) of the subject not in 
fact cqrrect, but greater than or less than the correct mea-
surement. 
But merely distortion is involved if for the same subject 
and circumstances "greater than, and "less than, are not 
differentiated. Overstating the role of alcohol in accidents is 
exaggerating that role, but an understatement does not 
exaggerate the role. Neither is what counts as exaggeration a 
question of conventional "greater than" scale directions for 
various scales; as mentioned above, exaggerated strong chins 
are stronger, exaggerated weak chins are weaker. Rather, 
exaggeration seems to involve implicit reference to a "normal 
point" on a scale; the exaggerated symbol indicates a 
measurement for a subject which is, starting from the normal 
point, beyond the subject's correct measurement. When the 
scale has an endpoint (e.g., zero on a length scale), in some 
contexts this endpoint serves as the norm and there is only 
one direction of exaggeration. In other contexts exaggeration 
is relative to interior normal points suggested by population 
averages, or by conventions of beauty or health, or the like. 
Exaggeration aside, how can scales and normal points 
individuate? Common usage provides a clue. We speak of 
people as tall or short, fat or thin, and so forth, with implicit 
reference to an average height or build. In this way, a scale 
like height and a normal point like the average height allow 
us to individuate members of a population. Of course, many 
scales and norms have no individuating value. In a cartooning 
context where all noses get longer, the normal point for 
exaggeration is zero nose length. But no one has less than 
zero nose length, the scale and norm do not divide the 
population, and the cartoons exaggerate without truly 
caricaturing. From a standpoint of general informational 
efficiency, the population median provides the most in-
dividuating norm. But for any number of reasons, other 
normal points may be used in sorting: the basketball coach's_ 
professional standards for "tall" versus "short" will be high. 
Caricature involves a triad: the cartoon itself, the subject 
caricatured, and scales and individuating norms (often 
determined by a standard population) against which the 
subject is measured. The caricaturist selects cert'ain of these 
~scales and exaggerates along these scales the departure of his 
subject from the normal points. Accordingly, the same 
subject against a different population might be caricatured 
quite differently; Gulliver is a giant among the pygmies and a 
pygmy among the giants. Another consequence is the 
traditional remark that people with especially ordinary 
features are hard to caricature; many of their measurements 
fall on the norm points and no proper direction for 
exaggeration is defined. 
Even for other subjects, the circumstances may not 
unambiguously suggest the scales and norms against which an 
artist should work; he may have to choose. For example, 
suppose an artist aims to caricature a profile which is rather 
flat as profiles go (Figure 4, center). Among many alterna-
tives, he might choose to work from the human average, and 
render the profile flatter yet (Figure 4, right). Or he might 
take a straight line- the average of all wavy lines- as his 
origin, and accentuate the contours (Figure 4, left). It seems 
plausible that either manipulation, in its own way, might 
contribute to a recognizable caricature. 
The viewer as well as the artist has problems and options. 
In seeing how a caricature is exaggerated, he faces the task of 
determining the scales and norms with respect to which 
exaggeration was attempted. Does a certain drawing depict a 
nose exaggerated in length, an ear-nose distance exaggerated, 
a tip-of-nose exaggerated, or what? Such questions are 
resolved (with an element of arbitrary choice perhaps) by 
cues in the pictures themselves, by knowledge of conventions 
of picturing and caricaturing, and through intuitions about 
what sorts of scales and norms are psychologically likely. To 
say just that much is to touch a complex matter lightly. 
Although "reading" a picture as exaggerated is a largely 
automatic and unconscious accomplishment, substantial 
cognitive activity is clearly involved. 
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Figure 4 -Exaggeration relative to different norms 
But just that much is enough for the present purpose, 
illuminating caricature. The thrust of this section can be 
condensed into two definitions. A scale and norm, relative to 
a given population, are individuating just when the members 
of the population do not all have measurements on the scale 
less than, equal to, or greater than the norm. And a symbol 
referring to an individual, describing a measurement along a 
scale, and relative to a given norm, exaggerates just when the 
individual's true measurement on the scale lies between the 
described measurement and the norm. Of course, this is an 
abstract from the realities of the human condition, where 
judgments of degree are uncertain and normal points 
indefinite intervals. 
DEFINITION 
The prior sections lend support to a formal definition. A 
symbol referring to an individual and relative to a given scale, 
norm, and population is a caricature just when the scale and 
norm relative to the population are individuating and the 
symbol relative to the individual scale and norm exaggerates. 
Of course, a symbol is called a caricature not just because of 
one- perhaps coincidental-measurement. Therefore, a 
symbol referring to an individual and relative to a whole set 
of scales, norms, and populations is a caricature just when it 
is a caricature with respect to some of those scales, norms, 
and populations and accurate with respect to the others. For 
a capsule statement and leaving some terms implicit, a 
caricature is a symbol that exaggerates measurements relative t 
to individuating norms. This definition is not new; an 
essential equivalent was given by Samuel Johnson (Lynch 
1927:1 ). Nor is it a radical departure from the trend of prior 
proposals. It simply says a little less than some, for instance 
in omitting humor, and a little more than others, for instance 
in insisting on the central role of exaggeration for individua-
tion's sake. 
The definition functions by paring away pretenders to the 
name "caricature," to reduce the concept to its most central 
core. First of all, the definition requires reference. Certain 
sorts of pictures are at once excluded: grotesque faces, 
gargoyles, harpies, monsters of various breeds, and so forth. 
Referring to no subject, they cannot ascribe properties to 
that subject and hence cannot deliver humor, revelation, or 
expression of personality in the manner of true caricature. 
Of course, realistic pictures and photographs refer to and 
describe their subjects. But such pictures are not usually 
called caricatures, and the exaggeration requirement excludes 
these. Also, exaggeration emphasizes that caricatures occur in 
the context of an established system of "more accurate" 
representation. Caricature is not simply a trend description, 
but a trend description by means of exaggeration, a means 
which uses as its instrument the metric descriptive powers of 
picturing. 
Exaggeration by itself leaves some problems, however. 
Portraying a person of average or smaller nose length and ear 
size as having a long nose and large ears might prompt a 
laugh, but cannot gain the viewer's affirmation of true 
description that is so intimately involved in humor in 
caricature, as discussed earlier. Such exaggeration does not 
provide description differentiating between that particular 
subject and any other, information necessary for most of the 
other functions of caricature as well as humor. The insistence 
that caricature exaggerate with respect to individuating 
norms excludes drawings which to not attempt such dif-
ferentiation. 
Just as caricature denies transformations which exaggerate 
without individuating, so it denies transformations which 
individuate without exaggerating. For instance, an artist may 
eliminate details of a face in order to throw the broader 
. structural features into prominence. True, the manipulation 
packages some individuating properties of the subject for 
easy perceptual access. But the means of packaging is 
critically different. Many portraits which would never be 
called caricatures use such simplification, and though carica-
turists often simplify as well as exaggerating, everythinga 
caricaturist does need not be strictly caricature. 
Finally, the relation between caricature as an abstraction 
and caricature in a human context must be explored. In light 
of the formal definition, the casual question "Is such-and-
such symbol a caricature?" is badly formed, incomplete 
unless symbol systems, scales, norms, and so forth are 
specified. Most any symbol will be a caricature with respect 
to some trumped up specifications. But informally asking 
whether a symbol is a caricature makes implicit reference to 
our system of pictorial representation, the populations out of 
which subjects must be differentiated, and the scales and 
norms we routinely employ in perceiving and making 
judgments about pictures or real world scenes. 
Certainly to be avoided is an oversimple conception of 
seeing a picture as a caricature, where a visual system 
methodically and exhaustively checks through some list of 
norms and scales to see whether the picture fits the 
definition. A prime concern of the viewer is to make sense of 
the picture, to determine its referent, and the relation 
between referent and subject. If the viewer can discover 
several scales and norms with respect to which the picture is 
a caricature, and notices few other scales and norms where 
the picture seems merely distorted (though there are almost 
bound to be many} then he will construe the picture as 
caricature. Therefore, whatever scales, norms and so forth a 
psychologist might list as "usually attended to," some 
pictures would formally be caricatures with respect to this 
list without always being recognized as such, some pictures 
would not formally be caricatures without the discrepancies 
always being noticed, and some pictures would be caricatures 
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with respect to scales not on the list, but brought to the 
attention of the viewer by the caricaturist's skill. 
ANIMAL CARICATURES AND CARTOONS 
The definition of caricature, abstracted from several 
crucial examples, should now prove its ability to analyze 
cases not figuring in its conception. Previously, various sorts 
of pictures were placed relative to caricature: portraits refer, 
describe their referents, but do not exaggerate; grotesques 
may exaggerate norms of ugliness but do not refer to or 
exaggerate an individual; and so on. Now the definition may 
be tried on a fresh domain, the cluster of problems 
surrounding the use of animal-like figures in caricatures and 
cartoons. Levine's buzzard caricature of Beckett has already 
been introduced, but the logical status of such a mix of 
human and animal characteristics was not discussed and 
remains puzzling. 
Drawings wherein a recognizable subject is presented 
wearing the clothes-as it were-of an animal, are often 
especially engaging. Such drawings are generally called 
caricatures, but whether or not they merit the name in the 
technical sense proposed here is a subtle issue. A further 
example appears in Figure 5 from Gombrich 
(1963: 213-214), who comments on its economy. Establish-
ing reference with such a drawing depends on (1) a few 
effective clues- the cigarette holder, the smile, the tilt of the 
chin, (2) a context of current events and conventional 
symbols-the donkey, and (3) absence of counterevidence. 
The interplay between (1) and (3) is worth stressing. 
Recognition can take place with very few clues so long as 
features in the picture serving solely humor or other purposes 
(e.g., the ears of the donkey) are not taken to be attributes 
of the subject's real face. 
Cartoons of this sort have at their heart a pun-like double 
reference, both to Beckett and buzzard, to Roosevelt and 
donkey, and so forth. In Goodman's terms (1968:27-41), 
Figure 1 denotes Beckett but is also a buzzard picture, and 
pictures may represent individuals not only as animals, but as 
buildings, volcanos, machinery, and so on. But how does 
such double-reference relate to caricature, construed as the 
exaggeration of measures relative to individuating norms? 
Clearly "double reference" and "exaggeration of mea-
sures ... " are logically different formulas, inviting a search 
for instances of one without the other. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in the "double reference" notion about a natural 
resemblance between the two entities referred to. Figure 5 is 
an apt example. For the second point, the characteristics of 
the picture that identify Roosevelt are not those that 
identify donkeys. The Roosevelt features are grafted on, so 
to speak, and the drawing turns on no particular natural 
resemblance between donkeys and Roosevelt. Returning to 
the first point, the Roosevelt features themselves are little 
exaggerated, at least as compared to the accompanying 
photograph. There is the lengthened cigarette holder, but on 
the whole the picture is not much "caricatured" in our sense. 
Levine's Beckett-as-Buzzard (Figure 1) is a contrasting 
case. Here several characteristics of the drawing perform 
double duty, describing both buzzards and Beckett. The 
beak-nose, the neck and chin, the facial wrinkles, and even 
the collar, are examples. Further, the portraying of the 
buzzard, accomplishing the animal reference, goes hand in 
hand with exaggeration of individuating trends of Beckett's 
face. Finally, implicit in the choice of buzzard is the 
exaggeration of personality characteristics of Beckett as 
reflected in his work. 
In qualification, it is worth noting that the ears, so 
emphasized in the caricature of Beckett on the right of 
Figure 1, are reduced in the buzzard-Beckett so as to avoid 
an absurdly large-eared buzzard; the buzzard's ears seem even 
smaller than Beckett's true ears. Further, the buzzard version 
is certainly less recognizable all in all than the other, and 
functions particularly well when placed beside it. As always, 
there is this tension between manipulations for the sake of 
humor or personality comment and manipulations for the 
sake of individuation. As remarked earlier, many drawings 
caricaturing several measurements would merely distort 
others. But in the balance, the Beckett-buzzard caricatures a 
Figure 5 -F. D. Roosevelt 
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number of scales we are likely to attend to, while missing on 
but a few. Applying the definition with the recommended 
tolerance, the cartoon is a caricature. 
The fact remains that established practice would label the 
Roosevelt-donkey a caricature. This simply says that we have 
two alternative standards for caricature: individuating ex-
aggeration and double reference. This paper restricts the term 
"caricature" to the first standard as the more commonly 
applicable one. But that is ultimately a matter of philo-
sophical strategy and choice. However the word is used, the 
puzzling case of animal caricatures is resolved by recognizing 
that history has established two alternative standards rather 
than one. 
Animal cartoon characters fail both standards; usually 
they do not involve double reference, nor are they usually 
caricatures in the present sense. A drawing of Donald Duck is 
no.t intended to be identified as anybody but Donald Duck (a 
fictional construct created by a series of such pictures) and is 
certainly an accurate, not an exaggerated, portrayal of him. 
True, Donald and many other cartoon characters exhibit a 
mixture of various animal and human features, often 
distorted - web feet and too-wide bill, the frontally located 
eyes, and arms with four-fingered hands. The result of course 
is a creature that is neither much of a duck or much of a 
human, as Mad cartoonist Bill Elder points out in Figure 6. 
T~~ .:~~~WJ'';f~eove~ 
AND FUNNY THING! ... IT MAIHA6E.~..I!..-
ALMOST .SOUNDeD LII<E IT 
WAS TALKING... I. If<~ IT WAS 
SAYING 11GET N\f: SACK MY 
aOTHES ~ OR SOM!lHJN6 .1 
Figure 6 -Donald and other ducks 
But Donald in shape is no effort to caricature either a duck 
or a human, though his actions may caricature human 
foibles. The distortions and mixing of human and animal 
features must be attributed to different aims. One of these is 
clearly the anthropomorphizing of the animal form, so that it 
will appear less alien (the frontal eyes are important here!}, 
can manipulate objects with hands, and so on. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The context so far has been the pictorial caricaturing of 
individual physiognomies. But the term caricature has a 
wider application than that. First of all, a caricature need not 
be pictorial. A mimic may offer an overblown version of his 
subject's voice and gestures; a writer may satirize another's 
work by exaggerating his idiosyncracies of style. Such efforts 
can certainly be called caricatures. And the usage does not 
reveal limitations in the present definition, because that 
definition nowhere requires pictorial symbols. The general-
ization is already there. 
Caricatures of fictive individuals-Clark Kent, for in-
stance-also occur. A generalization to accommodate this 
case comes fairly easily. If pictures of Clark Kent denote 
nothing, at least they are still descriptions of three-
dimensional shapes which collectively and pretty consistently 
establish what the Clark Kent face shape is. Accordingly, that 
shape can be caricatured much as any other face shape. Such 
a caricature, of course, can't be said to denote Clark Kent 
any more than a "realistic" picture of Clark Kent does. But 
both can be treated as fictive representations, for instance, in 
the manner discussed by Goodman (1968:21-26). 
However, some fictive individuals-Donald Duck, per-
haps-may be quite difficult to caricature in any strict sense. 
With Clark Kent, the usual norms of human appearance may 
be invoked. But what norms apply to Donald Duck, when he 
is one of a kind? Certainly one can make distorted pictures 
of Donald Duck, but the distinction between individuating 
exaggeration and mere distortion tends to collapse. 
This leaves the present formulation constrained to carica-
tures of individuals, real or fictive. But caricatures of classes 
are commonplace. The Nazi caricatures of Jews from 
Gombrich (1963) have already been mentioned. Today blue 
collar workers, hippies, intellectuals, and dozens of other 
groups are routinely lampooned by the caricaturist's art. 
Figure 7 offers a contemporary example. Ideals like 
''beauty" or concepts like "cold war" can also be carica-
tured. Unfortunately, the easy substitution of "class" for 
"individual" in the present definition does not yield an 
adequate generalization. Caricatures of classes simply involve 
more complex symbolic relationships, and require a more 
general construal of the concepts exaggeration and individua-
tion. 
" ... SON ... I" " ••. DAD •.• I" 
Figure 7 - A caricature of classes 
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These concepts, as well as those of describing, revealing, 
truth judgments, and so on discussed earlier, have been the 
instruments for drawing a fairly sharp line around the notion 
of caricature of individuals. Certainly that line's placement 
has been guided by a personal intuition, but not an arbitrary 
one. The aim has been to systematically respect evident gulfs 
between the T which is not a description and the hulking T 
labelled Charles Atlas; between grotesques depicting no 
subject and equally monstrous images lampooning a victim; 
between the mere lie of the child's monster picture labelled 
"teacher" and the truth-in-lie of caricature; between draw-
!ngs that in simplifying characterize and drawings that in 
exaggerating caricature; between pictures merely half-animal, 
half-man-the Roosevelt-donkey- and pictures with parts 
simultaneously animal and man-the Beckett-buzzard. The 
logic of the analysis hopefully does not blur or ignore, but 
rather delineates and explains, caricature as a unique art 
form. 
PART II 
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION 
With all their distortions, we recognize caricatures. The 
puzzle is how. But perhaps the emphasis on caricature as the 
thing to be accounted for is wrong. Caricature recognition 
need not be explained as some adaptation, adjustment or 
success-in-the-face-of-adversity of the normal recognition 
process. One can turn the issue upside down and suggest that 
caricature recognition is a full manifestation of the normal 
recognition process, which is itself to be explained. And 
caricatures provide a means of investigation. The caricaturist 
is a natural experimenter, exploring distortions for the sake 
of satire, expression of personality, and so forth, while also 
meeting the need to deliver an identifiable image. In 
diverging from accuracy but preserving identity, his works 
provide a measure of which facial properties are important 
to identification. 
The aim here is to explore these physiognomic invariants, 
these constancies between caricature and subject and 
between one caricature and another of the same subject. The 
approach is analogous to that of J. J. Gibson ( 1950, 1966) 
who bases his analysis of visual processes on invariants in the 
optic array. But the sources of perturbation across which 
constancies are sought are not only the shifting perspectives 
of the viewer and changing illumination. The transforma-
tions are provided by the caricaturist, and the search for 
constancies encouraged by his need to supply an identifiable 
work in spite of these transformations, or even by means of 
them. 
E. J. Gibson's work (1969:102-105) provides a framework 
for restating the subject in another way. She, like myself, 
feels that the recognition of caricatures can be explained vi a 
the normal face recognition process. Caricaturists exaggerate 
"distinctive features" of the human face , those features by 
means of which viewers discriminate face from face and 
identify individuals. Choosing its own terminology, this 
paper will speak of individuating "properties" or "attributes" 
of the face, taking the terms in the broadest sense and as 
synonymous. 
Like sonnet or sonata, this approach is a form needing 
explicit content to be meaningful. Of necessity, recognition 
depends on individuating properties of the stimulus. On what 
else could it depend? The essential questions are which and 
what sorts of attributes contribute to identification. Many 
alternative sets of properties may be logically adequate bases 
for discrimination over a given range of stimulus materials. 
Which properties are psychologically relevant must be deter-
mined. These could vary from culture to culture, or even 
from perceiver to perceiver. But the very phenomenon of 
caricature recognition suggests that at least within a culture, 
constancies prevail and await discovery. 
Any such quest must acknowledge that a caricature 
incorporates many devices irrelevant to recognition . Certain 
features of caricatures are better accounted for as purely 
comic devices, as conventions of cartooning, as means of 
expressing personality, or in like ways. Furthermore, some 
apt caricatures require the assistance of labels and other cues, 
because the subject is not well known or because the 
caricature abstracts too far from the subject's appearance-
consider a large capital T labelled "Charles Atlas." If 
recognition from the image itself plays an important role in 
caricature, there is no pretense that it is the only role. But 
that role is the focus of this study. 
A search for individuating attributes also demands respect 
for the alternative hypothesis, that caricature recognition 
occurs in spite of, and not because of, the selective 
transformations wrought by the caricaturist. Perhaps a viewer 
must become familiar with the distortions caricaturists 
generally employ, so that he may discount this false 
evidence. Perhaps the viewer must learn that certain informa-
tion is generally absent, in order not to be confused by that 
absence. Perhaps he must learn that caricatures often tell lies 
in ways not involving exaggeration, such as displaying the 
wrong number of wrinkles on a forehead. In short, possibly a 
successful reading of caricatures depends on a sophisticated 
familiarity with the genre . 
The argument will be that this is not true to any great 
extent. The circumstantial evidence points strongly to this 
conclusion. However, the gleeful exploration of the carica-
turist is not the methodical manipulation of the scientist. 
Neither is the response of his audience carefully surveyed and 
quantified. Perfectly rigorous findings must emerge from 
more engineered circumstances, in which both the drawings 
presented and the responses of viewers are subject to 
systematic control and analysis. The present paper will 
perhaps point directions into such research, and anticipate 
some of its conclusions. 
AN EXAMPLE 
As leader of the United States government, the President 
seems always to acquire the uncomfortable status of "most 
caricatured person." When this work began in 1970, cartoons 
representing President Richard Nixon proved far more 
available than those of anyone else, and a large collection of 
these provided the basis for the study. Later on, some 
tentative generalizations will be made from consideration of 
this one case ; the reader may judge their plausibility for 
himself. But one point deserves emphasis: this study con-
cerns recognition of very well known faces and hence 
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concerns highly practiced acts of identification. Results will 
require at least minor adjustments if applied to recognition 
of less familiar or just learned faces. The caricaturist is well 
aware of this difference. Paul Szep, political cartoonist for 
the Boston Globe, has remarked to me that he can exercise 
much more freedom in his treatment of a very well known 
face. Less prominent public figures allow less latitude and 
require more care if the caricaturist's effort is to prompt 
recognition. 
Mapping the relationships between caricature recognition 
and the recognition of normal faces requires first of all 
answers to two questions: which attributes of caricatu res of 
the President distinguish them from caricatures of other 
individuals, and do those attributes represent exaggerated 
properties of the President's true face? The treatment of the 
nose is particularly interesting here. Figures 8(a-l) are in most 
respects typical. First of all, the nose is long, but also quite 
narrow. Such a shape is remarkably uncommon in caricature 
in general, the usual "big nose" being much broader at the 
base, large but not as thin. But the properties of thinness and 
elongation are common to almost all caricature presentations 
of President Nixon's nose. There is a further attribute, 
common again to nearly all caricatures of the President, but 
also not infrequent in caricature in general: the nose slopes 
downward from the root. 
The swelling toward the tip of this example and the 
upward curl of the bridge are properties not as persistent as 
the above, but nevertheless common devices occurring in 
somewhat better than half of the cartoons examined. A final 
feature frequent in caricatures of the President is the vertical 
seam in the tip of the nose. 
These observations argue that the treatment of the nose 
does not merely invoke general conventions like an eye 
represented by a dotted circle. Rather, several properties of 
the nose are relatively specific to caricatures of the President. 
The next section will pursue how important these properties 
are to recognition. Here, the question remains whether the 
attributes are simply conventions specific to the President, or 
whether the caricatures reflect features of the real face. If 
they do, this supports the interpretation that caricature 
recognition borrows the normal recognition process. 
Figures 9a through 9f present profile, three-quarter, and 
full-face photographs of the President. The representation-
in-caricature of the nose as long and narrow seems amply 
justified by the profile and three-quarter views. These 
properties are not as evident in the full face photographs, 
which instead display the rather broad structure of the nose. 
More on this later. Most views show that the bottom edge of 
the nose slopes markedly down toward the lip, a feature 
common to most of the caricatures investigated. The 
occasional vertical seam in the tips of caricature noses is 
evident in Figures 9d, though few of the photos examined 
were sharp enough to contain this detail. An upward curl is 
also apparent in the photographs. The bridge of the nose near 
the eyes is distinctly more vertical than near the tip. 
Examination of photographs of other men reveals that this is 
not generally so. 
However, the bulb end is dubious as a caricatured feature 
of the real face. Photographs 9a and 9d offer no signs of such 
a physiognomic structure. Photographs 9b and 9c might be 
t:;:)~~~::i: 
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Figure 8a -by Haynie 
Figure 8b - by Szep 
Figure Be - by Feiffer Figure 8d - by Feiffer 
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thought to do so. But this is an illusion, a consequence of the 
dark nostril denting the profile of the nose. Just the same 
effect is apparent in photographs of other men with varying 
types of noses. Whether the bulb end contributes at all to 
recognition still remains somewhat uncertain. The bulb might 
express some property other than shape- a fleshy quality for 
example. But of course, there is no need to account for 
everything in terms of recognition. Comedy is reason enough 
in caricature. Such features as the seam, the elongation, the 
downward slope, the curl, are on the face of it aspects 
Figure Be - by Oliphant 
Figure 8f 
Figure 8g 
- by Drucker 
common to caricature and man. If this is not so of the bulb, 
or at least not obviously so, then the feature can readily be 
ascribed to objectives other than recognizability . 
Full face caricatures of President Nixon pose an in-
teresting problem for cartoonists. Above, it was remarked 
that the long nose, a nearly universal feature of the 
caricatures, was not apparent in the full face photographs. 
Logically it should not occur in full face caricatures. The 
natural expectation is that the cartoonist would caricature a 
view as seen, indicating the wide nose with the tip dipping 
well below the sides, but sacrificing indication of length. But 
only one cartoonist to my present knowledge has taken this 
course, Jules Feiffer (Figure 8c}. 
What is the alternative? An obvious ploy is for the 
caricaturist to avoid the full face view, and indeed the full 
face view proves quite uncommon. But there are other 
means. Figure 8g displays a caricature that is unquestionably 
full face except in one respect. The artist, Mort Drucker, has 
cocked the nose slightly to the right in order to portray its 
length. Challenging the geometry of the viewpoint, he insists 
on displaying an attribute he thinks to be important for his 
caricature. 
Feiffer does much the same in reverse. Just as Drucker 
brings his particular conception of the nose, suggested by 
three-quarter or profile views, to full face caricature views, so 
does Feiffer employ his wide nose style in three-quarter 
caricature views as well as full face. Figure 8d is an example. 
Thus each artist emphasizes different properties of the nose, 
and extends this emphasis to viewpoints where, in a 
photograph, these properties would not be as apparent. 
Figure 8h - by Hungerford 
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Figure 8i -by Lurie 
Figure 8j -by Drucker 
Figure 8k -by Szep 
Figure 81 - by Herb/ock 
The hairline and hair also appear to contribute to 
recognition. The photographs present the contour of the 
hairline clearly. A very distinctive lock runs back along the 
center of the forehead, a lock surrounded on either side by 
bays. Viewing photos of other men of similar age reveals that 
such a hairline contour in this pronounced degree is quite 
unusual. Almost all cartoonists drawing the President have 
capitalized on the uniqueness of the hairline by rendering it 
in their cartoons. A deepening and rounding out of the bays 
is the most prevalent means of exaggeration. Almost all 
caricaturists do this. Slightly narrowing the center lock is 
another common device. Fairly often cartoonists will also 
represent waves in the hair, glossiness, and highlights (Figure 
8a). Indeed properties of the real hair as photographs 9c and 
9d illustrate, often are not indicated at all. 
Well worth stressing is that the hairline with the nose, or 
even by itself, seems remarkably distinctive of the President. 
Caricaturist Haynie offers us in Figure 1 Oa President Nixon 
clearly recognizable from just the nose up. Concealing either 
the hair or the nose with a finger gives some idea of the 
relative importance of the two features, suggesting that the 
hair, for a single feature, provides the viewer with a 
considerable amount of distinguishing information. 
The modest jowls evident in the photographs are treated 
by virtually all caricaturists. The jowls, like the nose, are 
subject not only to accentuation for recognition's sake, but 
for humor's sake as well. In the popular three-quarter view, 
the jowls are rendered by indicating the bulge in the profile 
of the cheek, and, near the mouth, by proper manipulation 
of the facial creases from the nose to the tip of the mouth 
and from the tip of the mouth down toward the chin. 
Sometimes one of these creases is omitted, or the two are 
combined into one. Essentially the same technique serves in 
full face views (Figure 8g). The degree of exaggeration varies 
from the relatively benign Figure 8a, to the utterly grotes-
que, as in Figures 8e or 8f. 
Earlier the awkwardness of portraying the elongate nose 
in full face caricatures was discussed. Problems of full face 
versus three-quarter versus profile views arise again with the 
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION 13 
a b 
c 
cheeks. In photographs, neither the full face nor the profile 
view displays the jowls distinctly. In full face, this situation 
has dismayed caricaturists not at all. They proceed to employ 
their normal techniques for the cheeks as mentioned above, 
ignoring the fact that the jowls are less visible in full face. 
The profile photographs, however, suggest difficulties; in 
these the jowls though visible are apparent largely through 
shading, a device not so much in the cartoonist's repertoire as 
is pure line. Near omission (Figure 8j) or extreme exaggera-
tion so that the cheek profile shows (Figure 8k), are two 
resolutions. Caricaturist Herblock offers a third of particular 
interest. The lacing of wrinkles apparent in Figure 81 serves 
to indicate the jowls even in a profile view. These wrinkles 
are not at all evident features of the real face. In a few of the 
photographs examined, there was the hint of a single crease 
dropping from the eye along the side of the cheek. Even in 
those cases, there was only one. The truth-in-1 ie nature of 
caricature was never so bald. These creases, lying as they do 
about themselves as specific features, nevertheless succeed in 
conveying the slump of the cheek. 
Figures 9a-f 
- Photographs of 




However, the general trend is that caricaturists employ a 
three-quarter view, ::1nd part of the reason surely is that the 
nose is difficult in full face and the cheeks awkward in 
profile. Of some 38 caricatures of the President examined for 
this work, only five were full face or nearly full face, and 
only six were profile views. Paul Szep has told me that in 
general a three-quarter likeness is usually easier than one in 
profile or full face. Rother (1966), in a "how-to-do-it" article 
promotes the three-quarter view. Berger says that the profile 
comes easiest- a. minority opinion (Berger 1952). At least in 
examples presented here, advantages of the three-quarter 
view relate to particular difficulties in representing specific 
properties of the face. 
A further attribute common to almost all caricatures of 
President Nixon is a "box chin." Figure 8g exemplifies, 
portraying the tip of the chin as protruding below the basic 
line of the jaw. The effect is often quite pronounced in the 
caricatures, so that as in this example, the borders of the box 
chin become vertical before touching the jawline. A look at 
the photographs supports the box chin as a property of the 
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Figure 70 -A partial view 
true face. The tip of the chin in the photographic profiles 
clearly depends below the jawline. In the three-quarter and 
full-face views, the seams dropping from either side of the 
mouth, and a slight shift in the angle of the jawline, serve to 
set off an area in the front of the jaw. 
Several attributes of Nixon's face in caricature and 
in fact have been considered in some detail. Several others 
deserve brief mention. Prominent in the former President, as 
in many others, are the creases running from the sides of the 
nose to the sides of the lips. Caricaturists generally represent 
these, and use them to emphasize the cheeks as remarked 
earlier. A less common pair of creases can be observed in the 
photograph of Figure 9d falling from the sides of the lips 
toward the chin. Caricaturists often, but not always, offer 
these lines as well. Occasionally these two lines are combined 
into one- Figure 8f. 
The horizontal crease, or near-crease, falling between 
Nixon's lower lip and chin is often depicted in caricature; 
this again is a feature common to many human faces. The 
cartoonists further generally supply crow's feet and furrows 
in the forehead. These are rarely apparent in photographs, 
but are real enough and can be seen in the particularly sharp 
photograph of Figure 9d. There seems little effort to 
replicate the exact patterns of these creases. 
Further features near the eyes are of interest. The 
eyebrows are dark, and have a distinctive shape, rising from 
the middle toward the sides, peaking and then hooking down 
again. A number of caricaturists represent this contour (see, 
for example, Figure 8g). But better than half do not, even 
though it would seem a plausible contribution to recogni-
tion-indeed, Rother (1966) claims that the eyebrows are 
often an especially effective point of identification. Almost 
all photographs reveal distinct bags under the eyes. Some 
caricaturists represent these, but just as often not. Again this 
is somewhat surprising, since this feature like the eyebrows 
seems a priori fully as evident and characteristic as the nose 
and perhaps more so than the box chin. Thus there are 
various potentially distinguishing features of the President's 
physiognomy that are just as often omitted as used by 
caricaturists. 
THE QUESTION OF NECESSITY 
The four attributes, elongate nose, jowls, contoured 
hairline, and box chin, occur persistently in caricatures of 
President Nixon and not in caricatures of others. The 
features reflect real properties of his face. These observations 
suggest that the attributes make a genuine contribution to 
recognition. But a more careful test is in order. In logical 
terms, to what extent are these attributes necessary for a 
portrait caricature to be recognized as the former President, 
and to what extent are they sufficient for a portrait 
cariacture to be so recognized? The first half of this question 
is the concern just now. 
An interesting observation, but not an answer to the 
question, is that among the professional caricatures ex-
amined, having most of the four properties mentioned above 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a portrait 
caricature to be an effort (however successful) at caricaturing 
President Nixon. This is simply a rephrasing of the fact that 
all the samples of Nixon caricatures do have most of these 
properties and no samples of non-Nixon caricatures have 
most of them. But fundamentally this is a statement about 
the behavior of the artists. In spite of their habits, perhaps 
fewer of these attributes would do. 
Then what is the effect of eliminating one or all of the 
four "key" properties from various "good" caricatures of the 
President? Figure 11 is a sample. There, 11 a represents a 
tracing of the original caricature (Figure 8a). Figure 11 b 
copies the original except that is has been redrawn to alter all 
four attributes. Further 11 c, d, e, and f copy the original 
except that, respectively, jowls, hairline, box chin, and 
elongate nose have been redrawn. Clearly the modifying of 
all four in 11b utterly destroys its recognizability. For a 
single attribute, absence of jowls in 4c perhaps most degrades 
the resemblance, and the hairline in 4d the least impairs it. In 
all cases, there is a marked detriment. Similar manipulations 
of other caricatures bear out these observations. 
Simple absence of one or more. of these four properties is 
not the degrading factor. Recall the success of Figure 10. It is 
not the invisibility of the key properties, but their replace-
ment by counter-properties that degrades the resemblance by 
providing inappropriate clues. But some other properties 
logically just as distinctive (e.g., the eyebrows) may be 
completely misrepresented with little if any effect on 
identification. 
What is the conclusion about the necessity of these four 
properties? One might say casually that they- and perhaps 
others- are "rather necessary" or "mostly necessary ." The 
equivocation is essential. A cartoon may indicate an at-
tribute, contra-indicate it (i.e., indicate something incom-
patible with it) or give no information about it. If each of the 
four features is necessary in any ser,se, the sense is not that 
each must necessarily be present. Rather, no feature must be 
contra-indicated. 
Of course, even this is too strong. Contra-indication of 
one or two attributes may leave a substantial resemblance 
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION 15 




and permit recognition. The mechanisms of recognition 
operate with a certain tolerance for and awareness of 
contra-indication. The four attributes are "rather necessary" 
in the sense that contra-indication of any one of them 
degrades resemblance (and presumably recognition) much 
more than simple absence, and contra-indication of many of 
them destroys resemblance and recognition. 
The tracings that yielded conclusions about "rather 
necessary" conditions also point to a definitely unnecessary 
condition: the exact shape of the caricature. The tracing 
process inevitably introduces minor metric deviations from 
the proportions of the original caricature. But the traced 
caricature remains recognizable, as Figure 11 a illustrates. Yet 
such minor distortion can be significant; the effect on 
photographs is quite different. Figure 12 displays tracings of 
~~ L*, "'''"· 'It ~~·~ 
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Figure 7 7 
- Caricature 8a with modified features 
f 
photographs 9c and 9d. The resemblance to the President is 
slight indeed. Two more considerations complete the point: 
tracings of large photographs are readily recognizable, and 
even a freehand copy of a caricature is generally quite 
recognizable. Then as far as recognition is concerned, the 
caricature is much less sensitive to minor random metric 
distortion than the true photograph or presumably the true 
face. Exact metric proportion is not a critical aspect of a 
caricature. 
This finding should not be surprising. Exaggeration is the 
central technical device of caricature. The caricaturist pushes 
the distinguishing trends of a subject's proportions toward 
extremes. If recognition depends on or is enhanced by these 
overstated trends, then minor metric variations should not 
alter the overstatement nor therefore reduce recognition. 
Figure 7 2 
- Tracings of Figures 9c and 9d 
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THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY 
The exploration of necessary conditions leaves unsettled 
the matter of sufficient conditions. Are the four attributes 
stressed above sufficient for a caricature to be recognizable as 
the President? The point of course would be to list attributes 
at once necessary and sufficient. For sufficiency alone, all 
one need do is select a recognizable carica ture and to 
announce that duplicates of this are sufficient. This tells us 
nothing. Strictly speaking, the bid for both necessity and 
sufficiency is already lost, since the attributes under discus-
sion are only "rather necessary" in t he e laborate se nse 
discussed earlier. However, perh aps at least there is a concept 
of "rather sufficient" to match. 
But the game really is lost. Neither the four key 
properties, no r these together with various ancillary features 
mentioned earlier, are sufficient or even approach suf-
ficiency. A convincing demonstration of this is an effort to 
caricature according to the recipe of these properties. Failure 
is remarkably easy. In the course of this study, I have learned 
to make recognizable caricatures of Nixon with fair reli-
ability (Figure 13) but also have learned how easy it is to 
miss. Figure 14 exhibits a deliberate miss. The evidence is 
there: jowls, hairline, nose, box chin, and more. But the 
visage remains unrecognizable. In this case, reasons are not at 
all elusive. The line of the profile is too concave and the 
entire head too squat. Thus there are properties "rather 
necessary" to a caricature of the President not among those 
already discussed. 
Such failures are not the exclusive province of the 
amateur. There are a number of quite inadequate profession-
al attempts. This emerged in a striking way after much of the 
analysis reported here had been completed. Searches through 
periodicals uncovered caricatures which formerly would not 
have been collected. A deliberate check of their features 
revealed that they were efforts at caricaturing the President, 
efforts which had formerly prompted no recognition. A 
careful look at the context (captions, White House in the 
background, etc.) confirmed these judgments. This remark-
able circumstance demonstrates once again that the four 
attributes fall well short of sufficiency. On the positive side, 
it stresses again how persistent these attributes are, occurring 
as they do in both successful and unsuccessful professional 
efforts. 
Why do these properties fall so far short of sufficiency, 
and what chances are there for improvement? An examina-
tion of less effective caricatures reveals on the one hand 
definite directions for refinement, and on the other some 
extreme difficulties. First, the descriptive predicates used are 
after all rather vague; they allow too much room for 
variation. For example, jowls which descend too far but 
bulge · little seem to detract. One course therefore is to 
narrow definitions of the present properties. Second, there 
are further "rather necessary" conditions inviting specifica-
tion, as illustrated above. Some caricatures suffer from a 
head too squat, or a profile too concave or convex. In 
general, it is often easy to point to a particular aspect of an 
inadequate caricature and suggest a specific improvement. A 
tracing of the caricature, with the aspect then appropriately 
modified, is more effective. But just as often the failing is an 
enigma. No approaches for improvement occur, or those that 
do are ineffective when tried. 
A more subtle barrier to refining this approach is that the 
shape predicates used here are framed in words. Words are 
singularly inadequate for conveying shape information. One 
would prefer some sort of notation for shape, a notation in 
terms of which such conditions as "long nose" or "jowls" 
could be defined in a narrower and more precise sense. But 
Goodman (1968) gives reason to doubt that such a notation 
is possible. His analysis stresses that the infinitesimal varia-
tion possible in pictures is incompatible with certain formal 
requirements for a notation. Perhaps for this purpose, 
something short of a notation in his sense would do. 
Certainly, a truly elegant theory of caricature recognition (or 
) 
') 
Figure 7 3 - Caricatures by the author 
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Figure 74 -A deliberate miss 
of recognition in general) would seem to require some 
language more appropriate than English. 
Although the properties discussed offer no certain 
formula for recognizable caricatures, most professional cari-
caturists are persistently successful in their renderings of the 
President. Each artist has developed his own recipe, his own 
"sufficient" but not "necessary" approach to caricaturing 
the President. There is a great variation from artist to artist, 
but the cartoons by the same artist are very much alike; 
Figure 15 illustrates. It is not difficult to learn to draw 
caricatures of the President in the manner of the various 
artists discussed here. Much harder, even with the help of a 
list of important properties, is to invent a suitable technique 
of one's own. 
In the light of these remarks, the relevance of the four 
properties to learning to caricature might be questioned. But 
recall that these properties were found to be ''rather 
necessary"; omitting them assures failure. Neither do begin-
ners usually include them from the first. In a casual 
experiment, about ten college students were invited to 
caricature the President from photographs 9c and 9d . They 
then heard a lecture and saw illustrations explaining many of 
the points presented here. Finally, they were again called 
upon to try a caricature, and were urged to use the several 
properties that had been stressed in the course of the lecture. 
The result was not, of course, a set of perfect caricatures. But 
in almost every case the student included in the second 
important properties he had formerly omitted. Almost all 
initial efforts were quite unrecognizable, but in several cases 
the second attempt began to bear distinct resemblance to the 
President. Figures 16 (before and after) offer an example. 
A MODEL OF RECOGNITION 
The study of caricatures of the President suggests a 
number of generalizations. The recognition of a caricature as 
representing a particular subject appears to depend in large 
part upon a few ' ' key" properties of the subject's physiog-
nomy, properties presented in exaggerated form in the 
caricature. Recognition as that subject is blocked if a few of 
these key properties are contra-indicated. Some properties 
weigh more heavily than others in this respect. If not so 
Figure 75a 
Figure 7 5c 
Figure 7 5e 
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-by Zsep 
Figure 7 5b - by Zsep 
-by Zsep 
Figure 7 5d - by Oliphant 
- by Oliphant 
Figure 7 6 -Caricatures by a student, before (left) and 
after (right) a lecture on caricatures of the President 
blocked, recognition can often take place in spite of the 
pictured spatial form's divergence from the shape of the 
subject's face, in spite of the omission of numerous details, in 
spite of the inclusion of false detail, in spite of concealment 
of several key properties (as opposed to contra-indication of 
themL and in spite of the inclusion of properties inconsistent 
with the viewpoint. 
These considerations are reminiscent of identifying an 
item through a logical conjunction of conditions. Several 
positive findings may suffice to discriminate that item from 
other items. But one negative finding suffices to disprove 
that identification. The same logic appears to underlie the 
caricature recognition process, a process however which is 
cautious enough of circumstantial evidence or counter-
evidence not to reject an hypothesis on the basis of just one 
negative finding. 
Figure 7 7 -The effect of blurring on 
recognition; pictures blurred as on the 




This leaves two questions: whether the same general 
model of pattern recognition applies to face, as well 
as to caricature, identification; and further whether the 
properties caricature and face recognition depend upon 
are the same. Most broadly, face recognition like cari-
cature recognition can be viewed as a process of checking 
for certain "key" attributes. To put flesh on that skeleton 
requires saying something about what kind of attributes. The 
situation with caricature suggests that in normal face 
recognition also: (1) precise metric information and fine 
detail about the face is irrelevant; (2) the key attributes are 
relatively few; (3) the disposition of non-key attributes, 
whether presented, concealed, or contra-indicated, is ir-
relevant to recognition; (4) recognition may take place on 
the basis of very partial evidence; (5) recognition will be 
blocked by contra-indication of key attributes. 
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Metric Precision and Fine Detail 
Recent experiments of Harmon {1973) establish clearly 
that metric precision and fine detail are unnecessary for face 
recognition. Harmon tested subjects' recognition of images of 
faces treated in ways that destroyed fine detail and exact 
contour to varying degrees. He found that recognition could 
survive substantial mistreatment of the image, as in Figure 
17 for instance. 
Superficially, this finding appears contrary to the dis-
covery mentioned earlier that tracings of small photographs 
of the President did not yield good resemblances. The 
resolution lies in recognizing two points. First of all, the 
amount of blurring a given face can stand and still remain 
recognizable will certainly vary with the particular attributes 
that are distinctive of that face, as Harmon has noted. But 
second and more important, this paper argues that recogni-
tion of real faces, like caricatures, depends on the trend, 
rather than the exact measure, of features- whether noses are 
long or short as noses go, chins are weak or strong as chins 
go. On this interpretation, for face and caricature recognition 
alike, accuracy per se would have no value; but inaccuracy to 
the degree of changing trends would block recognition. 
Indeed the traced features of the President in Figure 12 do 
not deliver particularly well three of the four properties 
isolated: jowls, box chin, and elongated nose. 
Few Key Attributes 
This issue presupposes that recogn1t1on depends on 
various measures, accurate or crude, of the face, measures 
such as nose length, nose angle, eye placement, eyebrow 
thickness. Obviously one could list an enormous number of 
dimensions which varied across individuals and logically 
could be used to differentiate them. But the analysis of 
caricatures suggests that, there at least, relatively few dimen-
sions suffice. The four attributes identified earlier might 
break down into ten or so dimensions- the nose might 
involve length, thickness, and upward curl, for instance. 
Although the attributes proved insufficient for recognition, 
their obviously important role suggests they reflect ten or so 
out of 20 or 30 crucial dimensions, not ten buried among 
100. Does the same principle apply to recognition of real 
faces; are key dimensions for a particular face relatively few 
in number, say 20 or 30? 
The question has not been directly studied, but indirect 
evidence suggests an affirmative answer. Harmon {1973) in 
another study found that 21 dimensions sufficed to sort very 
effectively a population of 256 portraits of white unbearded 
males without glasses from 20 to 50 years old. Some 
examples of the dimensions are hair from full to bald, 
forehead receding- vertical - bulging, nose short-medium-
long. Indeed subjects' estimates of the ten measures most 
prominent or differentiating for a particular photograph 
served quite reliably to single it out from the population, 
despite the contamination of frequent errors in estimating. 
Without speaking directly to the process of reflexive recogni-
tion of individuals, the findings demonstrate that relatively 
few attributes suffice to single an individual out of a large 
population, and also that such attributes can be perceptually 
judged. 
Irrelevant Attributes 
This category asks whether in recognition of true faces as 
in caricature recognition, large numbers of non-key attributes 
are simply irrelevant to recognition, which will succeed 
whether those attributes are represented or misrepresented. I 
know of no literature addressing this issue. If one accepts the 
thesis that caricature recognition simply borrows the normal 
face recognition process, caricature itself is the best example 
of this happening. 
Partial Evidence 
A study by Goldstein and Mackenberg {1966) established 
that normal face recognition can succeed on the basis of 
partial evidence. Goldstein and Mackenberg employed a 
variety of masks obscuring parts of the face and studied face 
recognition in kindergarten, first, and fifth grade children. 
The task was to recognize masked photographs of classmates, 
photographs which, unmasked, were all recognized two 
weeks prior to testing. Exposure from the middle of the nose 
up permitted 95% recognition by the fifth graders. Even 
exposure from the eyebrows up allowed fifth graders to 
recognize 70% of the photographs. The stress laid earlier on 
the hair and the hairline as a cue for recognition receives 
some support here. Exposure below the center of the nose 
yielded only about 45% recognition, as did exposure of a 
horizontal bar-shaped region including the eyes and the 
bridge of the nose. In summary, it would appear that the face 
from the eyebrows up offers a great deal of information for 
recognition; both the muzzle area and the face from the 
eyebrows to the bridge of nose offer markedly less informa-
tion and about the same amount, in isolation. Recognition 
evidence from the nose is difficult to assess here, as almost all 
the masks partly obscured it. 
Counter-Evidence 
Some encouragement for the role of counter-evidence in 
perception of faces comes from a study by Bradshaw and 
Wallace {1971). They utilized stimulus materials assembled 
with an lndentikit-a collection of transparent overlays 
providing a variety of noses, eyes, and other facial features 
for the compilation of complete faces; the kit is normally 
used in criminal identification work. Subjects were presented 
with pairs of faces, the two of each pair sometimes being 
identical, or sometimes differing by varying numbers of 
features. Subjects were to report as quickly as possible 
whether the faces were identical or not. Bradshaw and 
Wallace found that responses were more rapid the greater the 
number of differing features. This supports a serial feature-
checking analysis of the matching task at the expense of a 
parallel "gestalt" analysis, where processing time would not 
decrease with an increase in differing features. In particular, 
the data best fit the hypothesis that the process was 
"sequential, self-terminating, without replacement"-
meaning that the process was one of sequentially testing for 
matching features, that it terminated upon finding a dis-
crepancy, and that features once tested were never tested 
again for that example. 
These results are compatible with the view of face 
recognition proposed here; the serial finding underscores the 
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importance of individual attributes and the self-termination 
is equivalent to the heavy weight accorded counter-evidence. 
However, this matching task involved pairs of strange faces 
whereas the paradigm task of the present study is the 
recognition of extremely familiar faces. Bradshaw and 
Wallace recognize this difference themselves. Their study, 
nevertheless, demonstrates that the human pe rceptual system 
is highly sensitive to, and accords considerable weight to, 
mismatches in comparing faces. This sensitivity and weight 
plausibly carries over to face recognition, where the stimulus 
must in some sense be compared to stored information about 
familiar faces. 
A GESTALT ALTERNATIVE? 
T he argument for an attribute-checking model of face 
recognition seems to stand in opposition to a gestalt view of 
recognition, where the perceptual mechanisms respond not 
to a collection of attributes, but to the holistic pattern of 
their interrelations. In fact, the two perspectives do not 
compete nearly as much as they seem to. A little thought 
reveals that the attribute-checking model allows perfectly 
well for a gestalt interpretation. 
First of all, no specific restrictions have been placed on 
what may count as a key attribute. True, the four properties 
stressed in the example, jowls, nose, hairline, and box chin, 
are spatially localized in certain parts of the head and might 
be called individual features. But this accident of the present 
analysis does not disallow properties with ~ mQ_re gestalt 
flavor, properties such as the ratios of distances between the 
eyes and from eye to mouth, or approximate positions of 
features in the oval of the head, or the general shape of the 
head dimensionalized in some manner. Indeed, the contour 
of the whole seemed to be part of the problem with the 
"deliberate miss" in Figure 14. 
On this interpretation, the attributes, however gestalt-like, 
still describe the physical shape of the face. But perhaps faces 
might be encoded in memory and recognized in holistic 
terms not directly descriptive of shape, in terms of person-
ality for instance. One person might have a spiteful but lazy 
face, another a visage cloyingly .friendly, and so forth. That 
faces can be encoded reliably in such terms has been 
demonstrated (Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955; 
Shoemaker, South, and Lowe 1973). Observers are generally 
asked to classify the faces presented in terms of a given 
vocabulary or along dimensions such as sincere-insincere. The 
classifications are often "objective" within the culture, that 
is, much the same from judge to judge. However, there is no 
evidence of correlation between attributed personality and a 
depicted person's actual personality (Hochberg 
1964:105-11 0). 
Such a means of encoding faces may not be especially 
effective. Yin (1970), in a study where observers tried to 
describe faces in writing and later match faces to. descrip-
tions, found that description of personality did not work 
well. In any case, far from being contrary to an attribute 
checking process, readings of personality appear to depend 
on just the sorts of facial attributes under discussion. For 
example, Secord and Muthard, in a study of judgments of 
women's faces, found a frequent clustering of three person-
ality attributions, "conceited," "likes men's attention," and 
"demanding," which they termed the "gold-digger syn-
drome." The making of these judgments proved to be highly 
correlated positively with a photograph displaying high 
eyebrows, bowed lips, visible eyelids, tilted head, and narrow 
eyes, and correlated negatively with square face, widened 
eyes, untilted head, and straight lips. 
A more serious challenge comes from E. H. Gombrich 
(1972:26-28) who points out that the particular measures a 
face appears to have depend on the whole shape of the face. 
For instance, how close together the eyes seem-and there-
fore how lively or dull the face appears-turns not only on 
their objective distance but on how widely the whole face 
and hair extends. This stance really presents a synthesis of 
the gestalt and attribute-detecting spirits. Acknowledging the 
relevance of measures of the face, Gombrich's account points 
out that such measures are influenced by the shape of the 
whole. Such an interpretation sits comfortably with the 
attribute-checking process explained here because that 
attribute-checking is done by the human eye. Recognition 
research depending on objective measures of human features 
would not allow for the gestalt influence. But in research 
such as Harmon's or Secord's, or for instance in the use of an 
ldentikit, the human eye judges the relevant dimensions and 
gestalt influences come into play automatically. 
In summary, no genuine conflict obtains between the 
gestalt viewpoint and the present description of recognition 
as a process of checking certain physical attributes of the 
face. Indeed, the gestalt perspective enriches the concept of 
how such attributes checking works. This is not to say that 
differences never emerge between attribute-checking and 
gestalt theories of recognition, but at least such differences 
make little trouble for the present argument. 
RESEMBLANCE AND RECOGNITION 
The available evidence encourages the position that face 
and caricature recognition are similar processes, depending 
on the presence of some among a few key attributes, and on 
the absence of contra-indications of key attributes. The 
natural step is to conclude that face recognition employs just 
those same properties that the caricaturist chooses to 
emphasize; he selects these in order to borrow the normal 
recognition process. 
An alternative interpretation is that caricatures are con-
ventionalized symbols established by the practice of cari-
caturists within the culture. Indeed, this occasionally 
happens. Gombrich (1972: 12-13) has cited a case where 
Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's financial wizard, gradually became 
represented solely by a high stiff collar. In general, though, a 
convention for every person does not allow for recognition 
in-caricature of individuals one has never before seen 
caricatured, a common event. 
A weaker but more plausible version of the convention 
theory is that observers have learned - at -a reflexive auto-
matic level-what information caricatures generally provide 
and what they leave out. Normal face recognition would use 
many more properties than caricatures are careful about. For 
a naive viewer, those "extra" properties not captured in 
caricatures would act as counter-evidence, blocking recogni-
tion. This suggests an experiment. Would naive viewers, 
familiar with picturing in general but unfamiliar with 
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caricatures, fail or succeed in identifying familiar faces from 
caricatures? Such an experiment has not been done. Even so, 
my bet is that extended adaptation would not be required. 
Economy of means in psychological functioning argues that 
the extra information provided by accurate depictions over 
caricatures is simply extraneous to the recognition process. 
The trouble with this tack is that it seems to imply a 
discrete, categorical perception of the world. Can it be true 
that out of the richness of visual information offered the eye 
we draw only a few trends- long noses versus short, weak 
chins versus strong. Do we see simply by pigeon-holing? 
Surely any such stand contradicts our everyday experience 
with the fineness and subtlety of visual discrimination. 
Indeed, we know a good deal more about a face than a 
caricature would offer. For one thing, we do not mistake 
caricatures for accurate conventional portraits; we can 
readily point out the exaggerations. Even given a convention-
al portrait, if we are asked (without the model present) 
"what do you think of this resemblance," we can sometimes 
point out subtle divergences- the hair too curly, the forehead 
a little high, and so forth. From this standpoint, a trend-
oriented categorical recognition process seems implausible. 
The solution lies in realizing that recognition is one thing 
and resemblance something else again. Nuances of resem-
blance are at issue when one already knows the identity of 
the depicted face, by being told or by recognizing it. 
Recognition involves a rapid reflexive "look-up" system for 
identifying faces. Streamlined for function, the system 
operates with relatively few categorizations which taken 
together differentiate one person from another quickly and 
effectively, and without requiring extremely precise scanning 
of the stimulus. When recognition is achieved, one may then 
find one has available considerable further information about 
the face, even information contrary to the stimulus. 
Accordingly, we may reflexively recognize a caricature of 
the President with straight hair, no bags under the eyes, and 
curved eyebrows, even though we know his hair curls a 
bit, his eyebrows peak, and his eyes have bags. This is part of 
our knowledge, but not part of that knowledge used by the 
look-up system. Likewise, we may discover an old friend on 
the street, only to realize on second glance that it is someone 
else; the results of the reflexive look-up are checked against 
the further knowledge made available by the look-up. 
In this context, the paradox of caricature recognition 
disappears. Though relative to our full perceptual capacities, 
caricatures are grossly inaccurate in depicting the shapes of 
their subjects, the look-up subsystem exercises much more 
generous standards. The caricaturist chooses his exaggeration 
not to achieve a convincing resemblance, but to trigger the 
look-up system, perhaps to trigger it even more effectively 
than the real face. He has the freedom to do this, and to 
pursue aims such as humor and interpretation of the 
personality at the same time, exactly because there is so little 
the look-up system really cares about. 
On August 24 Associate Editor Larry Gross brought the following 
news story from the Philadelphia Bulletin (8/23/74) to my attention. 
Because of its obvious relation to the preceding paper on caricature, 
I am taking the liberty of adding it as an extra illustration to the paper 
by Perkins. - SW 
PRESIDOOGERALDR.FORD 
Ford Gives Nightmares 
To Political CartC)onists" 
_,. fl'he writer is .a political car• 
toonist for the Springfield 
'(Mass.) Daily News. 
By JAMES TRELEASE 
Newhouse News Service 
Springfield, Mass. - Politi-
cal cartoonists are going to . 
have trouble with President -
Ford. 
There may be something he. 
as President can do to curb 
inflation, but there is :noth-
. ing he can do to curb the cax\. 
·: Jtootlists~ growing wra~ -
; short of bavmg hiS lace alter• 
ere(L. . 
He is what we call a ~•no­
body.,- ThM, ds, there. is noth- . 
ing distinguishing about his 
face. If he robbed a bank 
the teller would be hard- -
pressed to come up with a de-
scription. Outstanding ears? 
Nose? Hair? Clothes? Noth-
ing! 
A 'Nightmare' 
By comparison with our 
three previous Presidents, Mr. 
_ Ford ds a cartoonist's night· 
· mare. It only he had ~FK's 
hair and plnstripe $Ults; ~ohn~ 
~ son's ~ and cow.boy, boots,. 
Mr. Nixon's nose and s-agging 
jowls. 
For the next six months, the 
President's every move will 
be closely studied by the So--
viets, General Motors, the 
J\FL-CIO, congressmen, · gov .. 
ernors and .mayors. 
But the most detailed s:cru~ 
\ tiny will be by the nation's 
cartoonists, in -seatch of a 
prop - ~ Truman horrihurg, 
an FDR cigarette holder, an 
LBJ beagle, a JFK cowlick, 
-a squint, a soowl- 'anything. 
- Fast Aging 
There are those-who con• 
tend . that _th~ pi'esfdenc~ _is 
sucli' a burden th~t a Pres!~ -~ 
dent ages five times kstet. ~ 
in the Oval· OffiCe.. . But the ~ 
fastest agmg is Imposed. b~ , 
:the nation's cartoonists, add'C!' 
ing a wrinkle here. a crow's, 
foot there, bending a shoulder 
and .fowling a chin-all in 
search of a caricature. · 
My guess is that Mr. Ford's · 
. balding for'ehead will loom 
larger and larger, his eye& 
will grow baggier, the nose . 
shorter and · the upper · Hp 
longer and longer. -
His smiling face already; 
has proved to lbe more . ~.cog .. i 
nizable ithan his· serloua · ex• : 
. pressl~ n may; In fact, be- ; 
-~ come his broad toothy trade- · 
mark. But not until we car .. 
toonists ·do a [ot of work at 
our work. 
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Graduate School of Education, operating under National Science 
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Grant G-003-0169. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily 
reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education, 
and no official endorsement should be inferred. 
I thank Howard Gardner and Nelson Goodman for their perceptive 
comments on an earlier version; Paul Szep, political cartoonist for the 
Boston Globe , for an enlightening interview on the ins and outs of his 
art; Graham Roupas for several useful conversations; and John 
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Figure 7 7- from "The Recognition of Faces," Leon D. Harmon, 
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lor PROXEMIC RESEftRCH 
by EDWARD T. HALL 
Includes computer programs, illustrations about the placement 
of cameras and observers, and an extensive bibliography. It is 
available to members at $3.00 per copy and to non-members 
and institutions at $5.00 per copy. Bookstores, teachers and 
others wishing to place bulk orders should write to Sol Worth, 
editor of Studies, for special instructions. All others wishing to 
obtain copies should write directly to SAVICOM. 
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TOWARD A RESEARCHABLE FILM LANGUAGE 1 
STEVE FELD 
CARROll WilliAMS 
In the course of reading and tal king about the numerous 
publications concerning anthropology film, a constant prob-
lem has been apparent to us. This is the tendency to confuse 
various filmic styles and techniques with an anthropological 
methodology of research film. In order to shift gears 
considerably and move away from this "cookbook" level of 
discussion, we have written a paper whose character is 
principally epistemological and conceptual, rather than 
methodological and stylistic. The concern of this paper is to 
facilitate a system of thinking by positing a particular 
interrelationship of ideas. It is not a radical or visionary 
exegesis, but a discussion which proceeds from the point at 
which we now find our~elves, utilizing what "knowns" 
already exist. 
With this in mind, a few short caveats are offered: This is 
a position paper, an exposition of thinking in progress. It is 
neither a scholarly review of particular accomplishments nor 
an attempt to define or delimit a field of work. Hence we 
have excluded the usual scholarly references. Further, be-
cause we are synthesizing considerably and writing to a broad 
readership, sections of the paper will appear suggestive but 
substantially lacking to readers of certain orientations. Much 
background material and detail has been omitted; we 
encourage correspondence in the pages of this journal 
regarding such issues that our readers think invite fuller 
discussion. 
* * * 
This paper is essentially a discussion of three filmic 
paradigms: the locked-off camera (LOC), conventional film 
language {CFL), and researchable film observation (RFO). By 
three filmic paradigms we mean three distinct process-to-
product systems which take in conceptual organization 
(before filming and editing), image collecting and ordering 
(editing), and filmic interpretation. The starting point of the 
paper is the LOC paradigm, currently fashionable as a social 
science research film methodology. 
Steve Feld and Carroll Williams are currently researching the 
epistemology of generating and analyzing social science film, 
and preparing to shoot extended samples of interaction for a 
sociolinguistics multiple analysis project. Steve is writing a 
thesis on filming naturally occurring speech and social 
interaction; Carroll is director of the Anthropology Film 
Center in Santa Fe, where he regularly teaches courses in 
social science film. 
Our first argument is that a positive association between 
LOC filming and the generation of reliable research footage is 
unprincipled. We will show that the LOC paradigm, con-
ceived as a set of working instructions for research filming, is 
founded on dubious assumptions about the film perception-
translation-communication2 system, human observational 
process and observable realities, and scientific process 
generally. In addition, we are concerned that questionable 
ethics are involved. 
In arguing the weaknesses of the LOC paradigm we do not 
propose that it be substituted by conventional film language. 
We believe that CFL is artificial and has little to offer the 
researching filmer. 
An alternate paradigm, beyond the event-chopping 
artificiality of CFL and the naivete of LOC, is discussed. The 
RFO approach is evaluated as it relates to the other two in 
terms of the central criterion raised in this paper, that of 
"maximized researchability." 
The thrust of our thesis is that generating researchable 
film depends on a sophisticated research problem, on 
maximizing the seeing/hearing potentials of the film tech-
nology observation system, and on the translation-
communication skills of the researching filmer. Therefore, 
RFO is not a static process but a creative one, relying on 
intuitive as well as improvisational skills. 
lOCKED-OFF CAMERA 
AND CONVENTIONAl FILM lANGUAGE 
The concern of this section is a description and a 
comparison of the LOC and the CFL paradigms. For 
purposes of graphic comparison, we will use a typical social 
science filming situation, the psychological interview. 
Physically, the LOC apparatus consists of an immobile 
camera or cameras, fastened in one position to a tripod so 
that it/they will not tilt or pan (i.e., move vertically or 
horizontally). The lens is set at a single focal length for a 
single angle and makes no optical movements ("zooms"). 
The two essential aspects of this methodology are: (a) the 
camera is hidden, be it behind a curtain, one-way mirror, or 
special shooting booth with a peep-hole for the lens. While 
the subjects may or may not be informed of their being 
filmed, the camera is obscured from their view; much like the 
TV "candid camera," it is invisible by its location. And (b) 
the camera does not have an operator who is introducing 
human choice or selection into the filming situation beyond 
selecting the angle, focal length, camera height, f-stop, and 
sound taking positions. In other words, no new qualifiers are 
being introduced by the filmer; in fact, the start/stop 
function of the camera may even be programmed by an 
intervalometer. The LOC product is an essentially secret 
record made through time with a constant frame being held 
by a hidden, non-humanly operated camera. 
Human choice is, of course, minimally involved. Frame, 
angle, and focal length are consciously selected by the 
researcher in coordination with his needs for a specific data 
level for his after-the-event film examination. In some 
scientific work this means an extremely microscopic frame 
area. In social science filming (and particularly the case of 
the psychological interview), we are, however, generally 
speaking of extreme wide angle coverage, showing full figures 
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and contexts for all of the partiCipants. See Figure 1 for 
some typical angles of inclusiveness in such framing. 
At this point we shall turn to the assumptions that 
underly the usage of the locked-off camera. (1) First, it is 
assumed that the human observational system is inadequate 
for some chosen observational tasks; that it can't get "all the 
data all the time." Human memory and sensory inputs are 
thought to be overloaded by the amount of significant data 
that exists in a situation; thus, another recording system is 
imperative. (2} In order to create laboratory-like objective 
recording, film must be used. Film is thought to be a 
non-biased recording device capable of adequately imaging 
"reality" when, and only when, it is conceived and produced 
not as an "art form" but as a research tool that can perform 
para-human tasks. (3} Film is also thought in this paradigm 
to be essential because research requires total data across a 
total time base. All behavior is assumed to be signal - there is 
no noise. Therefore, the only way to get the total signal, 
while at the same time eliminating all human filtering is to 
film with no compression or expansion of the time base: a 
one-to-one record. 
To further clarify the nature of the LOC paradigm, a 
comparison with conventional film language will be helpful. 
First, what do we mean by "conventional film language"? By 
"conventional" we are referring to the theatrical mode of 
filmic translation that is definable in terms of the film-
maker's ability to "shoot to cut" (edit} and the audience's 
--....,-t----·-----··· 
Figure 7 l\ ~>' 
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competence to "read" (interpret} the sequence of images. In 
other words, the acceptable mode of temporal and spatial 
condensation and ordering of an event, or message about an 
event, such that, when projected, it will be comprehended 
easily. By "film language" we will make a limited analogy. 
Essentially, we are referring to the fact that the formal 
structuring of filmed units can be described roughly in a way 
similar to that of the syntactic component of a language. 
Film images are collected in order to be concatenated in a 
meaningful way. Two processes are involved: the conjoining 
of units and the embedding of lower order units within 
higher order units. The interplay of these factors is what 
creates recursivity in the structure of film. For instance, a 
sequence opens with an establishing shot (ES}, moves to a 
medium shot (MS), then to a closeup (CU}, to a reverse point 
of view closeup (CU-R}, then back to a medium shot (MS), 
returning to a fuller establishing shot (ES}. Within a skeletal 
ES to MS to CU to MS to ES format there are infinite 
possibilities of lower order insertions. Within the segment 
MS-CU-MS there is a smaller set of possibilities, using 
extreme closeups (ECU}, reverse point of view closeups 
(CU-R}, and cutaways or reaction shots (CW}. The point is 
that there is an already established "film language" which 
allows the filmmaker, through translation, to break down 
and reconstruct aspects of an event to construct a com-
munication about the whole event. 
With the use of synchronous sound, the time component 






of the event may be kept intact while the spatial orientation 
and point of view is changed or alternated by intercutting 
two or more camera angles. The collecting of the images and 
the editing process are governed by rules and conventions of 
acceptability within genres and codes. Only so much varia-
tion in the concatenating of shots can take place before the 
viewer decides that he is watching some sort of avant-garde 
film where the filmmaker is "saying something" in an 
unconventional manner. Such judgments make up a viewer's 
' _(~(n ~ \ ' .~ · ( 1 I - ·(t ,. / /t' . 
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film interpretation competence. Similarly, the filmmaker's 
competence involves knowing how to "shoot to cut," i.e., to 
collect the images so that their montage will "read" to the 
viewer as he intends it to and that his idea will be 
communicated. 
To compare this paradigm to the LOC approach described 
earlier, here is a storyboard illustrating how CFL would 
"cover" the same psychological interview that the LOC 
records with the single angle frame (see Figure 2) . 
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In the storyboard we have an eight-shot pattern which 
gives an idea of how CFL breaks down and then reconstructs 
the natural flow of the action using various focal lengths) 
angles) points of view) and spatial orientations. The sequence 
begins with a wide establishing shot (ESL moves in for a side 
angle medium frame (MSL to a close up (CUL switches 
angles and "mirrors" the closeup with its reverse (CU-RL 
pulls back and reverses angle for another medium frame 
(MSL goes to the reaction shot cutaway (CWL then to 
another type of medium shot (MSL and finally back to the 
establishing shot orientation marker (ES). 
A typical CFL approach to interview material is found 
here in the embedded MS to CU to CU-R to MS-R pattern 
(numbers 2) 3) 4) and 5 of Figure 2). This is the "ping-pong" 
effect where camera A gives a medium shot from the side 
angle) combining profile and full faces. Camera B then inter-
cuts a cross shot CU of the profiled speaker. The reverse 
angle CU is then ping-ponged using either composition. Then 
camera B pulls back for the reverse medium shot. The ping-
pong closeups within the MS angles can be repeated ad 
infinitum) although in long sequences reaction shots are 
usually added for various purposes. 
It is important to note that we are not only describing a 
system for shooting to cut hard-matched action shots) i.e.) a 
sequence filmed by two cameras for intercutting the angles. 
In fact) the MS to CU to CU-R to MS-R sequence and all of 
its variants can be filmed in a single continuous take) with 
the moves being made totally by the walking) panning) and 
zooming of one cameraman. In other words) we are not 
equating CFL with cameras on tripods. In fact) much of what 
nowadays is inappropriately labelled as "cinema-verite" is no 
more than theatrical CFL without the hard cuts. Many so-
called "non-conventional" cameramen are obeying the same 
"shoot to cut" rules as the two camera storyboard team) 
even when shooting long uninterrupted takes and moving 
about freely with lightweight crystal sync handheld equip-
ment. 
While many have come to label any piece of grainy) 
poorly exposed) handheld) shaky-frame) first-take piece of 
"live" news footage as cinema-verite) one can see that we are 
talking of the same filmic structuring that governs daily TV 
soap operas. The moves) the angles) and the rhythms are 
equally predictable in either case and) upon close notice) 
show I ittle deviation from the rules cited above. 
Finally) we should note that we have made very general 
characterizations. Although we have approached film's 
syntactic structure using linguistic jargon) this is not the 
place to expound a theory of cine-semiotics) if such a thing 
exists. The fact that we are anthropology filmmakers forces 
us to say that we have deliberately not dealt with cultural 
differences in film structuring. While we believe this to be an 
essential question) it is beyond the scope of this preliminary 
statement. What we have described as CFLJ then) is no more 
than European-American CFL; we do not suggest that there 
is a pan-human predisposition to structure and organize film 
sequencing in the same way. 
Before continuing with a discussion of film paradigms) 
other factors regarding the relation of film to research needs 
and potentials must be pointed out. It is only after these 
factors have been discussed that we can critically evaluate the 
uti! ity of the LOC and CFL approaches to film research. 
RESEARCH AND RESEARCHABILITY 
IN HUMAN AND FILM OBSERVATIONS 
The aim of this section is to discuss research using film) 
and the researchability of film footage. Basically we will 
argue that the filming observer must be the human observer 
who knows and understands the differences and similarities 
of the filmic and human perception systems. Moreover) 
maximizing the researchability of footage is dependent upon 
imagining an event in a way that you look at it) so that you 
can look at it on film (over and over) and hence do research 
with it. 
First) what do we mean by "research with film"? V/e mean 
using film in some way to solve a problem. In this process 
film is neither a research method nor a technique- but an 
epistemology; it is a design for how to think about and hence 
create the working conditions for exploring the particular 
problem involved. 
Anything that one collects on film can be researched. In 
large measure) however) recent examples of social science 
"research film" appear to be attempts to mimic hard science 
through linear cause-effect thinking. The researcher/scientist 
thinks he knows what the film will show because he doesn't 
believe that the filming process has anything to do with 
creating the conditions through which he will deal with a 
chosen problem. Research then becomes a planned closed 
circuit) oblivious to the levels of information the filmer and 
filming situation are or are not adding) and much less aware 
of what film's potential role might be. Film is thus seen as a 
research recording tool which makes a record of something 
you already know) and already know how to study. It is no 
more than a black box whose product is available for re-
search. 
This is far different from our conception of researchable 
film. For us) researchable film means maximizing the re-
search potentials of a problem) in terms of both its 
"knowns" and "unknowns" by using the film observation/ 
translation process as a creative input related to the research 
design. For a film to be researchable one must be able to 
look at it; being able to look at it means being able to see in 
it what was seen in the event itself by the researcher. By 
researchability) we mean observation as seen through the 
camera) primed by how the skilled observer would see the 
event without the camera. 
The first set of skills in this process involve indepth train-
ing in the research area. The ability to generate sophisticated 
research is the result of a long period of orientation) aware-
ness) sensitivity) and sharpened intuitions in the chosen 
discipline. 
The second set of skills requires the acquisition of justi-
fied self-confidence in handling motion picture technology. 
Only at this point can one integrate the capabilities of film 
with the needs of research design. Learning film translation 
skills explicitly means learning CFL as a baseline competence 
system) and LOC as an alternative to it. In order tci film the 
way you want) you must know what kind of film you don't 
want. 
The skill family that links these first two involves percep-
tion) specifically) the different workings of the eye-seeing 
and the camera-seeing systems. What pulls it all together for 
maximizing researchability is the filmer's understanding of 
28 STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
how to use film-seeing to translate what the human seeing 
system is responding to in the observation process. 
The eye sees with one focal length, optically similar 
to a 25mm lens on a 16mm cine camera. The camera lens, on 
the other hand, can exist in a variety of focal lengths, either 
fixed ("prime" lenses) or variable ("zoom" lenses). The eye 
resolves data at a higher level than any camera lens system 
and has a single point of sharp focus. Simultaneously the eye 
is always receiving soft focus inputs. The camera lens images 
an entire frame in sharp focus, whatever the lens system. The 
area of peripheral data that can be taken in by the camera is 
always less than the peripheral input of the eye, although the 
camera's resolution of the area is much higher. 
The eye's ratio of sharp to soft focus is a product of the 
shifting signal-to-noise sorting process in the brain. The eye is 
coupled to a variable focal length brain, while the camera has 
no autonomous brain attachment. Four examples can clarify 
the differences: (1) The brain allows the eye to shift to wide 
angle viewing, lowering sharp focus, so that an increased level 
of coding of all input can occur. (2) Conversely, the brain 
allows the eyes to shift to sharp focus on another (possibly 
high level) signal, reducing the level of every other input. 
Two other possibilities are illustrated by an interaction triad: 
(3) When person A shifts from sharp focus in the area of 
person B to sharp focus in the area of person C and then 
back to sharp focus in the area of person B, often (depending 
on the spatial situation of the triad) person A still has input 
from the peripheral soft focus vision of person B. Or (4), 
persons A and B are interacting and conducting appropriate 
eye contact, but person A is really perceiving and inter-
preting person C. All four of these situations (and obviously 
many more) are beyond the capabilities of any lens system 
hooked into a brainless camera. 
In actual experience, there are choices of point of focus, 
intensity of focus, rate of focus shifts, and attention paid to 
soft focus. On the screen, choice is far more limited. Soft 
focus peripheral vision cannot be produced by an optical 
camera system; screen focus is all sharp, usually the result of 
the cameraman preadjusting for hyperfocal distance. In film, 
the frame is present, the movements you see are not your 
own, and the lack of frame movement is also uncontrollable. 
The lens system must adjust for framing; the eye adjusts only 
to create a sensing system pathway. 
The eye has an incredible ability to move in and out of 
space very rapidly. Initially, the eye's search pattern estab-
lishes context, marking the parameters of the space it is in. 
Further search clarifies this immediate instant marking 
system. Then a more semi-randomized pattern sets in, with 
the eye triggering on the signal to noise flow in the event. As 
a result of this process, the search settles into rhythmic pat-
terns. This does not amount to a stringing together of the 
different "holds" and "moves" the eyes make; rather, it is a 
rapid sorting process. 
The camera lens system cannot replicate the search pat-
tern of the eye or reproduce in extenso the exact signal-to-
noise ratio the eyes triggered on. And the camera lens cannot 
search at the rate the eye searches, shifting soft to sharp 
focus ratios instantly. This is why it is possible to sit in a 
chair and observe an action from one place, but impossible to 
shoot a film of the same observation from the same single 
sitting position. The camera must move flexibly in order to 
maintain the framing that includes the information that the 
eye is triggering on. 
Up to this point we have spoken as if the image were the 
entire film. It should be clear that everything said about 
collecting visual information applies equally to auditory in-
formation. Microphones and our ears exhibit differences of 
the same order as camera lenses and our eyes. This is why it 
is imperative that the soundman understand the relation 
between acoustic energy and space. Otherwise, it is impossi-
ble to record sound with both the spatial and the psycho-
logical dimensionality that matches the image. 
A final aspect of these sensing systems remarks concerns 
scale and the process of after-the-fact viewing. Viewing a 
piece of 16mm film on the screen is different than viewing it 
on a Moviola picture head. (Think of the experience of seeing 
the same film in a theatre and then on TV; the difference is 
not just one of resolution.) Both the relation of the size of 
the filmer to the size of the subjects, and the height of the 
angle to the size of the shots, involves framing the image so 
that the distance of the film watcher to the viewing surface 
can be interpreted appropriately. 
We have shown that the differences between the human 
eye and the camera lens system critically affect the way one 
can see an event with and without the camera. Moreover, the 
experience of watching the event on the screen is different 
from either that of observing the event with the naked eye or 
observing it through the viewfinder. We have obviously left 
out numerous often-made trait I ist differences between film 
and the eye; e.g., the latitude of film's sensitivity to light, 
shadow, and color as compared with the eye, and the in-
ability of film to handle high contrast ratios, low light levels, 
and so forth . We conclude that an awareness of the limita-
tions and potentials of film in relation to the naked eye are 
crucial skills for the research filmer. 
We know that film cannot replicate what we see with our 
eyes; film is not real. Yet it is capable of recording what 
some of our sensory systems trigger on in the observational 
process. Researchability, then, means thorough usage of the 
existing human sensing-measuring systems, conscious aware-
ness of the ongoing sensing process, and the ability to trans-
late this in the way film is able to see. The researchable film, 
as an image of what was seen in the event, is not a collection 
of a priori knowns, but is deliberately instrumental in the 
discovery process of revealing significant unknowns. 
At this point we will turn to a third film paradigm, what 
we call researchable film observation. We believe that RFO is 
a non-black box way to use film in the research process, a 
way to use film to see. In the next section we will outline 
why RFO is a more principled research paradigm than CFL 
or LOC. 
TOWARD RESEARCHABLE FILM OBSERVATION 
In order to explicate RFO, we will first turn to an evalua-
tion of the LOC and CFL approaches. Our discussion is 
framed in terms of the notion of researchability previously 
presented. Our principal remarks are directed to the compari-
son of the LOC and RFO paradigms, in that LOC is explicitly 
conceptualized as the research alternative to CFL. 
The first level for reviewing LOC filming concerns the 
fallacies of its underlying assumptions. One assumption is the 
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inadequacy of the human observational apparatus. This is 
methodologically hopeless. Despite the degree to which one 
considers our sensing systems as limited, they are the best 
and only measuring tools we have. One can use film in a way 
that allows the footage to reflect our own measuring systems, 
rather than operate on the pretense, as LOC does, that film is 
independent of them. 
The human perception system, with its selectivities and 
biases, is far superior to any attempt to eliminate it through 
brainless instruments. What and how we see is more im-
portant than what and how we don't see. When you opt for 
LOC, you opt for a way that you cannot possibly see. Hence, 
the LOC reduces rather than enhances the importance of 
human observational skills. Starting with the inadequacy of 
the sensing systems, rather than with their potentials, is 
givrng up before you begin. 
A second assumption is the idea that film is a non-biased 
recording device, capable of adequately imaging reality for 
research purposes. This is equally ludicrous. By its very light-
opt i ca 1-c hem i cal-mechanical-acoustical-electrical-electronic 
nature, film has its own peculiar limitations of selectivities 
and biases. But again, it is the human process that is crucial. 
Bias (stripped of its usual negative connotations) results from 
what the filmmaker does with the technology. 
Cameras do not "tell the truth." With a lens system that 
makes an image optically reduced in size and that projects it 
onto a material with a limited sensitivity to light, shadow, 
and color at a chosen and fixed frame rate per second, the 
reality of film is only a function of the physiology of the 
eye. Remembering that film transport systems (both camera 
and projector) are collecting/displaying still image samples of 
the event, there is thus no data collected/displayed during 
transport (holes). 
A third assumption is that the full frame is necessary in 
order to get total data on the film; all events are signal and 
there is no noise, and the full frame eliminates human filters. 
Again, these notions are unfounded. Total data is not defin-
able by a framing system or pattern in any a priori sense; it is 
only a function of the research problem at hand. The idea 
that the widest frame equals the most data is based on the 
idea that the wide frame is the closest approximation of 
human peripheral vision. This, too, is naive. There may be 
instances where a wide frame is the right one for the data 
being filmed, yet in terms of significance, the unquestioned 
assumption of the utility of locking-off the wide frame tends 
to minimize rather than maximize data. This is because of 
the optical resolution in the frame, the inability of the eye to 
resolve both the central and peripheral in sharp focus simul-
taneously, and the fact that we do not have single freeze-
frame brains. Blocking out the actual experiential quality of 
event perception is not a way to maximize the data level of 
film for research. 
The approach to behavior as "all signal, no noise" is an 
oversimplification. All behaviors may have significance im-
puted or attributed to them, and it is obviously important to 
understand the patterns in which behaviors co-occur (X is 
happening while Y is happening while Z is happening). But it 
is untrue that everything that happens is always significant. 
Significance is social; it does not derive from the a posteriori 
categories of the researcher as he attempts to explain what is 
in the film. Meaning is the result of cultural and social as-
sumptions, conventions, and strategies that human beings 
bring with them into interactional settings. 
Clearly, insignificant information may be imaged in the 
film frame. In addition, information outside of the frame 
may be contributing noise to the event itself. By their nature, 
cameras image less noise and microphones collect more noise 
than the interactants themselves actually experience. Film 
cannot show where people's heads are at when they enter a 
situation. But it can respond to the immediate signal-to-noise 
stream that the interactants create. A filmic approach that 
seeks to be researchable starts from the human observational 
base, understanding the signal-to-noise flow in the event, and 
translating this to a high signal, low noise film. 
Whatever the signal-to-noise ratio of the actual event, LOC 
filming cannot give an "all signal, no noise" picture of what 
is happening. A non-moving, non-responding camera cannot 
shift with the constantly shifting signal-to-noise ratio of the 
event being filmed. Only the flexible camera, operated by the 
observer whose intuitions and response patterns are locking-
in to the signal-to-noise ratio of the event itself can produce a 
researchable film. 
A final aspect of this last assumption involves the desir-
ability (assuming the possibility) of eliminating human 
filters. This appears absurd. All experience is filtered in some 
way; the idea of filtering as a negative bias is naive here. The 
camera itself is a filter; it interacts with the human observa-
tional filtering of the event. Filters can be used to advantage 
in research. This is why it is essential that the researcher, who 
has been trained in the observation of his subject, is also the 
filmer. The idea that filters- cognitive or technological - can 
be eliminated is the idea that it is desirable to generate 
footage with no point of view. To the contrary, we believe 
that research using any footage is a function of filtering 
through the observational training and sophistication of the 
filmer. 
We have indicated that the underlying assumptions of the 
LOC approach are unjustified. In addition, we wish to point 
out that the issue of "objectivity" has been falsely construed 
here. When compared to the arbitrariness of CFL, LOC may 
appear a more realistic and more objective approach to film 
for research. Yet, when one considers that the baseline of the 
LOC paradigm is the attempt to eliminate human perception, 
human creativity, human understanding, and human filtering 
from the data gathering process, we are left with the fact that 
LOC shooting hardly heightens objectivity. Rather, LOC is a 
reflection of the idea that the camera can be a robot and 
perform independently of human volition. 
Moreover, LOC is less objective, in that it actually in-
creases the possibility of lost data. In the realm of knowns, 
this includes fine-grain motion level cues and the general 
resolution of micro-data. In the realm of unknowns, numer-
ous meta-communicational information can be lost. 
Although LOC fashions itself as scientific filming, its 
mechanical working instruction approach to methodology 
has little in common with science. Science is not an accumu-
lation of meter readings and formulae, for methodology 
depends heavily upon chance, creativity, and guesswork, as 
well as the sharpened intuitions of the researcher. Thus, in 
reducing the potential of film to a non-seeing, non-transla-
tion black box approach, the only scientific reliability of 
LOC might be in filming a wax museum! 
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We believe, moreover, that there are ethical as well as 
epistemological objections to LOC filming. Invoking science 
as a justification for stealing footage is antithetical to a 
humane approach to research. Attempts to justify LOC 
filming based on the idea that the camera's presence is dis-
ruptive are also untenable. Whatever the methodology, every 
researcher must deal with rapport problems that arise; 
cameras are not a special exception. We do not believe that 
the camera's presence ruins data; on the contrary, the skilled 
film researcher should be able to catalyze the event as it is 
being filmed. Filming involves human contact and human 
sensitivities in the process of interaction. Part of the research 
filmer's skills involve his ability to maintain rapport while the 
camera is in his hands. Hiding the camera is a deniai of the 
need for an appropriate relationship between those who film 
and those who are filmed. If the "live" filming process alters 
behavior significantly- and we don't believe it does- we 
would prefer to deal directly with possible behavior altera-
tion as a film research problem, rather than to resort to 
hidden cameras. 
One might object that the preceding discussion is loaded; 
that there are instances where those being filmed are inform-
ed that they will be secretly observed and recorded. We do 
not see this as a more successful way to get unbiased or 
unacted footage. Peep-holes inspire no kind of confidence at 
all, whether or not the subjects are informed that they are on 
camera. 
It is clear that LOC is neither a seeing film language nor a 
principled methodology (much less epistemology) for doing 
research with film. Hence we do not see it as a viable alterna-
tive to CFL. At the same time, we would not argue that CFL 
presents an alternative to LOC. 
As noted, CFL is based on principles of artificial spatial 
and temporal condensation which inhibit researchability. The 
selectivity of CFL is derived only minimally from the struc-
ture of the event itself; for the most part, its structure comes 
from the traditional "shoot to cut" or narrative and causal 
rules of our culture which insure angular, temporal, and 
matched action continuity. 
Even when CFL is framed within a cinema-verite shooting 
style involving first takes of non-staged actions, the constant 
zooming, emphasis on the verbal, and restructuring of the 
event for storyline reportage and statement-making mitigates 
against the research use of the footage. What is absent in 
cinema-verite filming is an explicit comprehension and trans-
lation of the event as internally structured, and the presence 
of the researcher-cameraman, whose unique skills result in a 
unique imaging of the event. Thus we propose that beyond 
the naivete of LOC and the arbitrary restructuring of CFL 
lies another approach - researchable film observation. 
Researchable film observation is the generation of footage 
that shows the filmer's through-the-camera experience of the 
event. RFO shows how a researcher within a specific research 
context chose to see an event as it happened. The crucial 
argument here is that what we do see, not what we never see, 
is what should be on the film in order to maximize its re-
searchability. 
For us, RFO is a new film "language." It begins with two 
axioms: the structured integrity of entire events and the 
epistemological bases of the human observational process. 
Hence, RFO has no need to artificially present images either 
through the non-seeing of LOC or the reconstructed rhythms 
of CFL. Filmically, this may result in long uninterrupted 
takes of the ongoing flow of interaction, angle and focal 
length changes justified by the triggering pattern of human 
response and intuition in relation to the structure of the 
event, and handheld crystal sync shooting for optimum flex-
ibility and optimum interaction between the filmer and his 
subjects. This simplification of technological procedures 
likens RFO to cinema-direct. It differs in that the person 
behind the camera is not making a film-statement but is a 
researcher with a specific research problem 3 in mind. 
The new film language of RFO means reducing the dis-
tinction between footage and finished film. The product of 
RFO shooting is a record of human experience and inter-
action in a particular cultural and research context. Some 
might insist that this is "mere" footage because it lacks titles, 
credits, background music, storyline, and so forth. Our think-
ing is that such criteria have nothing to do with whether the 
product is a presentable film communication about how 
someone chooses to see something. When filmmakers and 
filmviewers become competent in looking at how film - and 
filmmakers- can see the structured integrity of events, there 
will be no difference between footage and films; a non-
theatrical film language will then emerge, bringing the acts of 
filming, observing, and participating together into a unified 
activity. 
RFO has nothing to do with "pretty pictures" (even when 
one is filming a beautiful event) or "making movies" to illus-
trate verbal concepts. It has nothing to do with making visual 
books or teaching devices, although the latter may be a 
secondary usage. It has to do with research. Research means 
questions, problems, thinking designs, discovery patterns, 
creative and intuitive probing. With film, research means ex-
ploring the seeing process, sharpening filmic observation 
through sharpened human observation. 
Researchable film observation is a reduction of the event-
to-film translation process such that the film moves closer to 
(cognitively) the actual event itself. In doing so, it is the 
integrity of the event, its wholeness, and its own structure 
(not the film's restructuring) that is communicated. It is such 
a perception of the event that makes it researchable. 
Much of the potential of RFO is based on comprehending 
film as a translation process; only then can one appreciate 
the importance of a reduction of translation steps from the 
initially perceived world of events (without the camera) to 
the recoded world organized on film. RFO is not an explica-
tion of an event or the event itself, but a translation of the 
event. This goes back to the distinction that must be made 
between phenomena and the units of pattern that are used in 
both their description and explication. An explicit assump-
tion of RFO is thus that human sensing is the only justifiable 
starting point for film translation. The premises are: there is 
no such thing as "raw data"; all retrievable data are non-
neutral translations, descriptions, or memories of what once 
happened in time and space. Meaning in the event is first 
experienced and understood as direct feeling. As a directly 
experienced event is filmed, the filmer is continually adding 
and re-combining impressions so that in the next instant, new 
aspects of further experiencing can be collected in the 
process of filming. 
Thus, RFO makes three distinct contributions to the re-
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duction of the translation process: (1) More of the initial 
intuitive meaning of the event observation is present in the 
film. (2) The human/film observation process opens itself up 
to more possible clues, intuitions, and circumstances- a flex-
ibility based on what is alive in the world of directly exper-
ienced meaning in action. (3) Biases can now be seen more 
clearly, as more of the epistemic bases of the selection and 
collection process can be directly grasped. In sum, RFO is 
expressive of the fundamentally adaptive and self-correcting 
nature of human processing. 
We emphasize that we are not talking about a film 
shooting style that exists independently of the events to be 
filmed. It is relatively easy to copy a shooting style without 
knowing the motivation for the choices made. Yet, this does 
not make the product researchable. The camera and camera-
man can be moving extensively or little at all. The takes may 
be short or long shot sequences. In some cases, the frame 
may remain constant for a long time; in others, it may shift 
frequently. The filmer must know how to see the event in 
order to show, with film, how the event can be seen. The 
exact nature of the shooting strategy is in large part a func-
tion of the context- both social and scientific- and the con-
tent flow of the event. 
There is no one way to do it and there are no rigid dis-
covery procedures. The skills include improvisation, luck, 
intuition, excellent reflexes, and an acute understanding of 
researchability, methodology, and epistemology. Research-
able film observation is a new film language, but its purpose 
is not to create new film language cliches. Rather, it aims to 
expand the research potential of film through a new under-
standing of the relation of human observational sensing to 
film observational sensing. 
We see RFO as a humanistic and creative endeavor which 
explicitly recognizes that human filtering is essential. RFO is 
a record of human contacts. Its purpose is to maximize re-
searchabil ity so that there is in no way an attempt to 
condemn the product to archives or to a limited audience of 
specialists. 
CONCLUSION 
As filmmakers and audience participants we have gener-
ated and watched competent and successful CFL, and have 
observed several vanet1es of CFL produced by colleagues. 
Both our personal work and our observations lead us to be-
lieve that neither current CFL nor trends in stylistic refine-
ment will lead to researchable film. 
In addition, we think, more firmly than ever, that LOC is 
not a researchable alternative. The epistemological grounds 
upon which we have criticized LOC are essentially those 
upon which the critique of all behavioral scientism rest; both 
derive from an ideology desirous of separating scientific 
activity from human experience. The aim is objective detach-
ment. A basic feature of the RFO paradigm, by opposition, is 
the desire to re-center analysis in experience, promoting a 
continuity of the existential and objective. The scientistic 
LOC indifference to the conditions of knowing are thus 
transcended in RFO. 
We see RFO as an alternative because it is not a program 
of "how to do it" but a way of thinking about the variables 
to be dealt with in order to do research with film. The most 
crucial input to this new language system is the kind of 
seeing that the multi-disciplined trained observer can do. He 
knows how to collect images on film to make it researchable, 
and is trained to do it. RFO is a way of looking with film 
that does not conform to conventions imposed from without 
the research context but responds to structure and exper-
ience from within it. As such, it is both an essential input to 
research thinking, and a truly exciting new kind of observa-
tion-partiCipation, embracing the communicational and 
meta-communicational potentials of human interaction. 
NOTES 
1 We wish to thank John Collier, Jr., Ardis Gaither, Jim McDonald, 
Buck Schieffelin, and Marge Zabor for detailed critiques of an earlier 
draft. 
2 By "translation " we mean the putting-into-code of messages; 
when we speak of film as a translation medium we are referring to the 
use of culturally organized sets of methods for structuring images. 
3 0ur emphasis on the importance of a research problem is not an 
insistence that filming be programmed. We recognize the value of 
digressive filming within the general framework of a specific research 
problem. 
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ART AS A STRUCTURAL SYSTEM: 
A STUDY OF HOPI POTTERY DESIGNS1 
LAURAJ.GREENBERG 
WORKING HYPOTHESES: THE RESEARCHER 
It is Arnheim's (1966) working hypothesis that art reflects 
not one but two processes of abstraction, namely: (1) the 
abstraction entailed in visual perception which requires that 
one order and classify in order to perceive, and (2) the 
abstraction entailed in devising any visual representations 
("realistic" or otherwise). Thus: 
There is no direct transfo rmation of experience into form, but 
rather a search for equivalents [Arnheim 1966:266]. 
Also, perhaps, in the realm of "working hypothesis" is the 
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, which speculates on the nature of 
the relationship between language and thought. Although the 
specific formulations of this hypothesis vary (Whorf 1940, 
1941; Sapir 1929: 209), there is a general connection posited 
between a language's lexation and grammatical structure, and 
the content of thought. In other words, one's linguistic 
categories and discriminations presumably influence what 
one will in fact think, and vice verse. 
This paper ultimately derives from my interest in the 
relationship between these two working hypotheses. Al-
though one evolved in the discipline of linguistics and the 
other in the context of the psychology of art, they seemed to 
contain possible congruences. In particular, I was interested 
in the possible implications of each for the other. It seemed 
that if Whorf were correct about language affecting the way 
people classify and order reality, and if Arnheim were right 
about perception necessarily entailing classification and 
ordering of "visual" reality, then there ought to be the 
equivalent of a visual Whorf hypothesis. That is, if perception 
entails active classification and ordering, and if classifications 
(lexicon) and rules of ordering (as evidenced in grammatical 
structure) vary from culture to culture, then one would 
expect visual perceptions to vary cross-culturally in some 
patterned way as well. Further, it would be logical to expect 
Laura Greenberg is a graduate student in anthropology at the 
University of British Columbia. She is, at the moment, en-
gaged in writing a doctoral dissertation on the structural anal-
ysis of the art of the Northern Northwest Coast of America, 
which focuses on the cognitive operations of inversion and 
intersection as they are used to generate the art, and on the 
specific and prolific use of visual punning for social and sym-
bolic ends. 
that visual discriminations and categories would influence 
(and be influenced by) art and other "expressive" visual 
systems (e.g., architectural systems) or systems of spatial 
terminology, and by language. Secondly, the methodology 
of linguistics, which so elegantly arrives at system by the 
ordered and "scientific" study of variation, seemed to have 
the potential for elucidating these visual systems. 
I devised a specific project which attemped to examine 
and/or verify the above hypothesized connections, choosing 
the Hopi as a case study, and basing my methodology on 
linguistic methodology (with some necessary modifications). 
My choice of the Hopi, specifically Hopi pottery designs, had 
been motivated by two considerations: (1) that the art 
system or corpus be relatively abstract or non-representative 
(thus minimizing semantic meaning as a consideration and 
maximizing "visual" considerations), and (2) that the people 
have a relatively well-integrated, coherent, and self-contained 
philosophy and social structure. As a logical first step in 
constructing the total design system, I proposed isolating 
what I called "visual phonemes" in Hopi pottery designs (a 
term derived from the "new archeologists"). 
Art is, no doubt, a "language"; however, I realized that 
the linguistic analogy is a difficult one to translate into visual 
terms. For one thing, language is, by necessity, a more 
conventionalized system than art. And for another, whereas 
the given in linguistics is that humans are physiologically 
capable of producing only a finite number of mono-sy11abic 
sounds which can be taken as the basic components of any 
language, such obvious and discrete units are not inherent in 
the visual realm. And yet, I thought that these and other 
obstacles could be circumvented by the careful construction 
of a series of test drawings (based on patterned variations of 
actual Hopi designs), which could then be used to determine 
"significant variation" and thus to isolate visual phonemes. 
Aside from certain pragmatic considerations, such as 
having no Hopi contacts when I arrived in Arizona, two 
factors ultimately caused me to abandon my search for visual 
phonemes and to reconsider my theoretical model. The first 
was that it became disconcertingly and progressively more 
apparent, the more I read and the more I saw of Hopi 
designs, that my model (which was based on the primacy of 
units or elements) was antithetical to the nature of Hopi art 
and to Hopi culture as well (which stresses the primacy of 
the total). This is, incidentally, an important point, and one 
which will be further developed in the body of this paper. 
The second mitigating factor evolved as I abandoned my 
quest for visual phonemes, and set about examining the pots 
in the Museum of Northern Arizona in an effort to study 
actual variation in pottery designs. As I studied the designs I 
photographed them as a way of recording them, and in 
addition, I often drew them. In drawing them, a certain logic 
or conceptual order began to emerge in what had previously 
appeared to be fairly chaotic designs. In order to reproduce a 
design, it is necessary to actively perceive it, i.e., to ei~her 
discern or create spatial relationships and order in the des1gn, 
such that it can be recreated. (Reproducing from memory 
alone would require an even more exacting perception). 
Thus it was not surprising that the designs became clearer as 
I dre~ them. What was more surprising was that the order in 
most cases was actually quite simple; it had eluded me so 
entirely before I was forced to search it out, only because it 
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followed different tendencies than those I was used to. For 
example, although I would have been aware of the symmetry 
of a bilaterally symmetric design at first glance, I was at first 
totally oblivious of designs which possessed other sorts of 
symmetries, such as rotational symmetry. What was most 
important was that as I drew I began to discern certain 
structural similarities between designs which had previously 
seemed to have not a single thing in common. The fact that 
these previously confusing designs could all be made compre-
hensible by the same ordering principles suggested that these 
principles were not totally arbitrary, but perhaps represented 
a valid structure. All of which suggested the use of a 
structural model. 
Structural analysis seemed an appropriate solution to my 
problems if for no other reason than because structural 
linguistics, which Levi -Strauss (1967:32) credits as the in-
spiration for his own structuralist approach, entailed a similar 
shift from analysis of terms to analysis of relationships 
between terms. This shift, plus the shift in emphasis from 
conscious phenomena to unconscious infrastructure, the 
discovery of general laws, and the search for system 
(Levi-Strauss 1967:31) seemed relevant to the patterns I was 
discovering in Hopi designs. 
In addition, that aspect of Levi-Strauss' thinking which 
surfaced in The Savage Mind (1966) seemed potentially 
compatible with part (and only part) 2 of Arnheim's visual 
model; there is no direct transformation of experience into 
form, but rather a search for equivalents. Taken together, 
they suggest an interesting framework. 
It would seem that the tendency to order and structure 
would be a basic cognitive process which is used by man to 
apprehend his universe, and that art could be thought of as 
an external form of this internal process. As such, it would 
seem useful to analyze an art system in terms of structure. In 
particular, "the search for equivalents" might be structural, 
i.e., there might be structural symbolism. This seemed 
especially likely given the susceptibility of structural relation-
ships to visual or "schematic" representation. 
In The Savage Mind (1966), Levi-Strauss examines the 
organization of totemic systems, and classifications of the 
biological world. These are significant, not in what each 
category includes, but rather in terms of the total system 
(and the types of discriminations which are thereby made 
visible). And similarly, in The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship (1969), he again expresses interest not so much in 
the individual kinship categories per se, but rather in the 
total systems which are thereby elucidated, and (most 
importantly) in the implied structure of those systems. 
In analyzing Hopi designs, I have attempted a structural 
analysis- the visual corollary of a structural linguistic analy-
sis. How are a specific set of Hopi designs organized, what is 
their visual structure, what organizing principles are evident, 
and what sorts of discriminations do these organizing 
principles imply? Secondly, how do these organizing 
principles correlate with those of other Hopi sub-systems, 
e.g., the Hopi cosmological system or the Hopi linguistic 
system? And lastly, how valid is this approach: i.e., what 
questions (anthropological or otherwise) does it address, 
what kind of answers does it provide, and what further 
questions are in turn generated by those answers? 
HISTORICAL AND MATERIAL CONTEXTS: 
THE HOPI 3 
Brief History of Pottery-Making in the Area4 
The Hopi are a Pueblo group living in what is now 
Arizona. Pottery-making has been practiced in the area for 
the past 15 centuries, and as early as A.D. 600 pottery was 
being produced in a variety of colors by people alleged to· be 
ancestors of the Hopi (Bartlett 1936:1 ). However, although 
occupation of the sites seems to have been nearly con-
tinuous, the history of the area (like the history of any area) 
seems to have been somewhat erratic. One result has been a 
series of distinct pottery types of varying color, shape, and 
design, which archeologists have been able to distinguish and 
to sequence. In its most basic form, the historical sequence 
of pottery types has been summarized by Bunzel (1929: 81) 
as follows: 
I. Black on white period. Entirely geometric ornament. 
II. Late prehistoric period. A gradual development of 
colored wares and animal ornament, reaching its highest 
development at Sityatki village. 
Ill. Historic period. A gradual return to white wares and 
geometric ornament. 
IV. Contemporary. A recent revival of II. 
The pottery that I have analyzed comes exclusively 
from the last of these periods. Much of the pottery was 
produced after the above classification was in print, some as 
late as 1970. However, many of the designs have been 
adapted from earlier designs. This is in part inherent in the 
nature of Hopi pottery design, which reflects a series of 
historical intrusions, interruptions, and fortuitous influences. 
For example: The advent of the Spanish in the seven-
teenth century is thought to have resulted in a degeneration 
of Hopi pottery; the founding of the First Mesa town of 
Hano by a group of migrating Tewa in the eighteenth century 
is thought to have revived the industry; and Zuni patterns are 
thought to have been i·ncorporated into Hopi pottery as a 
result of the nineteenth century drought which caused the 
Hopi to seek refuge in Zuni territory. 
Even archeol~gy has not been without its effect. In the 
late nineteenth century, the archeologist J. Walter Fewkes 
started excavating a site named Sityatki, and unearthed some 
spectacular pottery. The wife of one of the archeological 
fieldworkers, Nampeyo, became interested in the pottery 
sherds; she first began copying the patterns, and later 
adapted them to create her own designs. She has been 
followed by later generations of Nampeyos who have 
followed the tradition. (The pot shown in Figure 10 is, 
incidentally, a Nampeyo pot). 
Nor does Nampeyo's "Sityatki Revival" represent the last 
of the fortuitous influences. The tourist trade in the 
twentieth century affected the kinds of pottery produced, 
and no doubt the present resurgence of interest in Native 
American cultures is currently having a similar effect. All of 
which is described in this section in order to show that, 
although the Hopi and their ancestors have been producing 
painted pottery for the last several centuries, the design 
system has not by any means remained constant nor has it 
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developed smoothly. But for all that the influences were 
fortuitous, the important point in this context is that their 
effects do not seem to have been totally random. Rather, 
they all seem to have been incorporated in selectively Hopi 
ways. 
Pottery Technology 
Despite the complexity of the pottery patterns, the 
technology which the Hopi employ to produce pottery is 
relatively simple (which is not to say easy). Traditional 
pottery is still made by women, using neither wheel nor kiln. 
Using the coil method, the potters progressively add rounds 
of clay to a base, smoothing each piece into the preceding 
layer. The walls of the vessel are later thinned and evened 
with a gourd scraper. After drying, undecorated utility wares 
are fired directly, while decorated wares may first be slipped 
with several thin layers of one of the other clays. Finally, the 
designs are applied with brushes. (It is only this last process 
with which this paper will be concerned.) 
Pottery Shapes and Designs: 
A Broad Typology 
Hopi pottery is made in a variety of forms: low, shallow, 
corn-meal bowls; slightly higher, broad-lipped stew bowls; 
narrow-necked water jugs; and such additional items as 
ladles, tiles, and canteens. Further, the shapes of the vessels 
are relevant to a discussion of the designs which are found on 
them. As one would expect, certain types of designs are more 
frequently associated with one type of vessel than another, 
since the design fields vary with the shape of the pot. 
There have been many attempts at classification of Pueblo 
pots by shape and design. Most of these typologies are 
archeological typologies whose avowed purpose is to differ-
entiate pots, usually by approximate date and area. By 
contrast, my intention here is to show what Hopi pots, or 
rather their designs, have in common. The purpose of this 
typology is to give the reader a general idea of the design 
solutions which the Hopi have employed. 
I am following Bunzel 's general prescription that designs 
are essentially organized around the "roadline" (1929: 13), 
and am basing my categories on the placement of designs in 
relation to the "roadline" of the pot or of an equivalent line. 
The "roadline," which Bunzel translated from the Zuni word 
omane (road), is simply the line that encircles the neck of 
those pots which have necks and circumscribes the interior of 
those pots which are too shallow to have necks (e.g., bowls). 
Although Bunzel systematized possible design arrangements, 
these were too limited for my purposes as she dealt with only 
two types of pots: the water jug, and the shallow bowl. I did, 
however, try to follow her general parameters of variation in 
the formation of the typology which follows, i.e., amount 
and part of the field filled, number and type of band 
groupings, and number and type of repetitions. 
General Design Typology: 
I. Pottery with bounded panel designs. Bounded in this 
case means that the design field is specifically defined by, 
and generally contained within, encircling lines. These lines 
are the "roadline" and secondary lines. 
A. Pottery with basically one main circumferential 
band. The circumferential band is a common feature of 
Hopi pottery. It either occurs on the exterior circum-
ference of a vessel or along the interior rim (and around 
the border in the case of tiles). I refer to further 
divisions of this band either as reflecting "vertical," 
"horizontal," or "oblique" divisions panels, following 
Bunzel (1929:13-48). In some pots, there is an addition-
al and smaller horizontal band around the neck. 
1. Designs with one main horizontal band which is 
vertically sub-divided. The vertical divisions produce 
individual design panels. These vary from two to 
eight in number (and perhaps even more). They are 
of various arrangements: 
(a) One panel repeated several times. This is 
one of the simplest and most common arrange-
ments. The panels are often further sub-divided 
along a diagonal. 
(b) Alternating panels (two or more). Rather 
than merely repeating the same design pattern, 
two or more design patterns are alternated. 
Thus reading around the pot or tile one would 
have one panel with design A, then one with 
design B, then design A, then B, etc. Or one 
could have ABCABC, etc. And once again, the 
panels are often sub-divided along a diagonal. 
(c) More complex alternating panels. These 
pots are basically of the same type as the ones 
above, but the panels which repeat are more 
elaborately sub-divided into horizontal, vertical, 
and oblique sub-panels. 
(d) Alternating fixed and progressive panels. A 
fixed panel refers to one which is repeated 
exactly, and a progressive panel is one which 
varies slightly each time it appears. The varia-
tion can result from color being used different-
ly. This is fairly uncommon. 
(e) Non-repeating or irregularly-repeating 
panels. With only one or two possible excep-
tions, I have not seen pots of this type, but I 
included this as a residual category. 
2. Designs with one horizon tal band with no 
explicit divisions. 
(a) Continuous patterns. These are patterns 
which are composed of a repeating pattern 
which forms a single connected unit. A scroll or 
meander would be a good example. 
(b) Dis-continuous patterns. These are pat-
terns which are composed of discrete elements 
but which are so arranged that each pattern 
leads into the next. 
B. Pottery with circular interior areas which are pan-
elled. 
1. Designs with two or more main panels, which 
may or may not be sub-divided. The major division 
is generally made with a line which is not a 
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diameter, and so the panels defined are almost never 
equal. The panels can either be treated as bounded 
fields (i.e., sub-divided), or treated as semi-bounded 
fields. 
2. Designs with more than two main panels, 
arranged rotationally. In designs with more than 
two main panels, the arrangement is often rotational .. 
In such designs panels are created by the intersection 
of several lines, none of which is a diameter of the 
circular area. The panels produced are equal in area, 
and generally identical as well. 
3. Designs with center or near-center radically 
divided panels. I came across only one pot of this 
type, which was a canteen, executed in such a way 
as to suggest an animal face. 
II. Pottery with semi-bounded, non-panel designs. These are 
designs which are bounded only by one line, the "roadline," 
and no bottom restricting line. Or, in the case of interior 
designs, these are non-panel designs emerging from the 
"roadline." By the term "semi-bounded," I definitely mean 
to imply that it is the encircling line which is the basis of the 
design's organization. Designs of this type vary considerably, 
however: 
A. Pottery with regular, repetitive designs originating 
from the roadline. These are generally exterior circum-
ferential designs, and are often quite similar to the 
designs in I.A.2., except that they are bounded on only 
one side. 
B. Pottery with irregular, non-repetitive designs 
originating from the "roadline." These can be either 
exterior or interior designs, and are practically all fairly 
birdlike, with obvious wings and body forms which are 
themselves composed of smaller panel sections. In such 
cases too, there is often at least part of the "roadline" 
which has no protruding design. Many Sityatki derived 
pots are of this form. 
Ill. Pottery with unbounded, central designs. This category 
applies to designs which, though they may be on a pot which 
is circumscribed by a "roadline," are not attached to it and 
do not emanate from it. If there is a "roadline," it is 
somewhat extraneous to the rest of the design. 
A. Pottery with one central, free-floating design figure, 
generally a conventionalized representational figure. 
These designs are usually standard bird or· kachina 
figures, and occupy the central area of an interior design 
space. In the case of an exterior design these are usually 
repeated twice, although only one figure can be seen 
from any viewpoint. 
B. Pottery with repetitive or periodic design patterns, 
generally organized from the center. Occasionally in-
terior designs are created by organizing periodic band 
designs around the center of the vessel (as opposed to 
organizing them from the circumference). Designs of this 
type can be quite elaborate. In the few cases where 
non-bounded designs are exterior designs, they generally 
consist of small isolated design groups occurring two or 
more times around the exterior of a shallow bowl for 
which most of the design interest is in the interior 
pattern. 
Symbolism: Dominant or Incidental 
One of the premises of a structural study is that the 
relationships between elements are ultimately more revealing 
than the elements themselves. Since I had proposed to study 
Hopi pottery designs as an independent, or at least -autono-
mous, system (not dependent on other systems for meaning), 
I felt compelled to consider the extent to which Hopi designs 
employ conventional symbolism or symbolic elements (such 
that the semantic meaning of elements could be a mitigating 
factor in the relationship between elements). By the term 
conventional symbolism, I mean nothing more than what 
Bunzel calls "the [fixed] association between designs 
and ... ideas" (1929:70), or what could be called a conven-
tionalized and conscious association between a visual form 
and meaning; i.e., a symbol's iconic content, or agreed-upon 
semantic meaning. 
Whereas the literature reflected nearly universal agreement 
as to the beauty of Hopi pottery, and only minor dis-
crepancies as to the nature of its manufacture; on the matter 
of whether the designs carry meaning there seemed to be 
bitter disagreement, verging on ideological warfare. The views 
ranged from those who implied that Hopi art is totally 
governed by symbolism to the extent that aesthetics or 
"sensuous pleasure in beauty of form and color" is quite 
secondary (Hough 1919: 268), to those who intimated that 
the very idea that Hopi pottery designs are symbolic was 
foisted upon the buying public by unscrupulous traders 
(Sikorski 1968:20). In the middle were those who suggested 
that truly symbolic design elements are used only ·on 
ceremonial objects, but that the forms (and not the meaning) 
may also be carried over into a purely decorative context as 
an alternative to creating new elements (Hubert 1937: 2). 
One of the earliest contributors to this controversy was 
the aforementioned Fewkes (1898, 191 0), who traced Hopi 
bird, butterfly, and feather symbolism from ancient to recent 
times, in the art and in a ceremonial and religious context, 
and imputed a connection between the two. As it happens, 
many contemporary pots do seem to carry designs which are 
easily recognizable as conventionalized bird forms. In ad-
dition, many pots which do not have avian figures do seem to 
have avian forms. These might not be recognizable as such 
but for their clear resemblances to earlier and more explicit 
avian forms. One can find such derived forms in contem-
porary pots (see, for example, Figures 2 and 18). 
For the sake of argument, I accepted as fact that certain 
avian and feather symbolism did exist, at least at one time in 
the past, and further that these avian or feather elements 
have been carried over into modern designs, in form if not in 
content. And so the question of whether pottery designs 
were originally symbolic became non-problematic. What 
became more problematic was whether designs and design 
elements still carry symbolic meaning (primarily of a 
religious or sacred nature) and, if so, to what extent it 
dictates the placement of elements in any design. 
To answer this last set of questions, I turned to Ruth 
Bunzel's (1929) study of Pueblo pottery. In reference to the 
Zuni, and with the two exceptions of the "road" or 
"roadline" and a specific "prayer-stick" design (1929:69-70), 
she discusses the matter of symbolism as follows: 
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[the names which refer to designs] are not pattern names, since 
they are so loosely applied that there is no definite association 
between any name and a particular form. The same name is 
applied- to elements having nothing in common from a stylistic 
point of view, and conversely, the same element may be 
differently designated in different contexts. Nor are the designs 
symbols in any sense of the word. We are justified in using the 
word symbol only where the associations between the design and 
the object or idea suggested is fixed and recognized [1929:69; 
italics my own). 
The above was written in reference to the Zuni; as for the 
Hopi, she suggests that "the associations between designs and 
objects or ideas is even more tenuous than at Zuni" 
(1929: 70). On another occasion she states outright that 
"[religious] symbolism plays no role in decoration" among 
the Hopi (1929: 52). In addition, she offers the following 
comment with specific reference to Fewkes: 
There is no reason to assume that the meanings now attached to 
Sityatki designs are those originally associated with them, nor is 
any such claim made by the persons who use them .... The 
modern Hopi sees rainbows and mountains where the archeologist 
sees birds and serpents. One can take one's choice [Bunzel 
1929:71). 
Thus, not only does it seem that symbolism was not a 
factor in Hopi pottery designs at the time Bunzel did her 
fieldwork; there is even some doubt as to whether it ever was 
a factor (cf. Bunzel 1929:69-71 ). This conclusion justified 
discounting the possibility that Hopi pottery designs are 
regulated by what would be primarily "non-visual" con-
straints, i.e., constraints dictated by religious or other 
meanings. Such constraints would have either diminished the 
value of a "visual" structural analysis of the corpus (since 
non-visual constraints would have been operative), or have 
made it considerably more complicated. 
In fact, not only did the literature not diminish the case 
for a visual structural analysis of Hopi art; it seemed, if 
anything, to strengthen the case for pursuing a line of 
analysis which would concentrate on relationships between 
elements rather than on elements themselves. For while 
certain forms had been taken over or adapted from other 
pueblo groups (e.g., the Zuni) and from at least one defunct 
site (Sityatki), and possibly even from a ceremonial context 
as suggested by Hubert (1937: 2), the linguistic terms which 
refer to these elements or configurations remained 
ambiguous and non-specific. It was reported, for example, 
that a form could be given one name in one context, and a 
different name in a different context, and still a third name 
in the first context after a lapse of time (cf. Bunzel 
1929:53-54). This inexactitude in naming elements, as well 
as the fact that they seem to be taken over rather than 
invented, could be thought to indicate that the elements are 
not themselves important as entities. Rather, spatial relation-
ships between elements and generating placement of ele-
ments may be more important. 
This seems quite possible given the precise terminology 
for describing spatial concepts: 
There is a notable paucity of terms of a purely descriptive 
character, such as square, circle, triangle, and the like, although 
the language is not lacking in precise terminology for spatial 
concepts [Bunzel1929:54). 
It seems still more possible in light of the fact that the 
Hopi language has a preference for verbs as opposed to our 
favoring nouns, and thus seems to turn our propositions 
about things into propos1t10ns about events (Whorf 
1950: 70). Interestingly enough (and perhaps as a fitting 
allegory for anthropology), Bunzel drew entirely different 
conclusions from the inconsistent design terminology but 
precise spatial terminology. She suggested that the lack of a 
consistent linguistic terminology for design elements in-
dicates that art is not the object of rational thought among 
the Pueblo Indians (Bunzel 1929: 54); whereas, on the basis 
of the same information, I suggest the possibility that it is 
rational, but that the rationale used is based more on process 
and relationships than on elements or things. It was with that 
possibility in mind that I started my structural analysis. 
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
OF HOPI POTTERY DESIGNS 
Operationalizing Levi-Strauss 
It may be the general consensus that Levi-Strauss' 
ultimate insights are more inspiring than his specific method-
ology (cf. Hayes and Hayes 1970). Whereas the former are 
almost indiscriminately applicable, the latter is often ex-
ceedingly difficult to apply to any given situation, in part 
because it is so disturbingly elusive (particularly in his earlier 
work), and in part because it is so specific. Thus in an effort 
to operationalize structuralism, I turned to the most concrete 
and the most relevant strictures I could find-the four basic 
operations of structural linguistics, as reported by Levi-
Strauss in Structural Anthropology (1967): 
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious 
linguistic phenomena to study of their unconscious infrastructure; 
second it does not treat terms as independent entities, taking 
instead' as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, it 
introduces the concept of system ... ; finally, structural linguistics 
aims at discovering genera/laws, either by induction [or by logical 
deduction) [Levi-Strauss 1967:31). 
Although the translation of structural linguistic principles 
into a visual equivalent was not as automatic as one might 
have hoped, it did at least represent a general strategy. 
However there were certain basic problems. Clearly a 
prerequi;ite for a decent "structural analysis" of a given 
design corpus is a general (etic) descriptive system. Just as 
clearly, such a descriptive system can ultimately be con-
structed only on the basis of several individual design systems 
(such as Hopi pottery designs). Further, the existing 
terminology which I had at my disposal consisted mainly of 
design terms, e.g., symmetry, balance, rhythm, etc., as well as 
a few Gestalt relationships like figure-and-ground which had 
been incorporated into the standard design framework. With 
the terms one inherits (unsolicited) an implicit design 
framework- an entire visual context which is often in-
applicable to Hopi designs and sometimes deceptive as well. 
At times design qualities or characteristics are individually 
relevant to the Hopi material, but do not relate to each other 
in the ways that the traditional context imp I ies. Other design 
concepts are relevant to the Hopi material only because of 
their conspicuous inapplicability. 
And so I was left with essentially two options. I could 
(theoretically) invent an entirely new system of design ter.ms 
with which to analyze Hopi art, or I could use the old des1gn 
terms with the advance warning that I would be abandoning 
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their traditional contexts. I chose the latter alternative, thus 
taking the bricoleur's way out rather than the scientist's (as 
that analogy is used in the first chapter of The Savage Mind 
[1966] to distinguish alternative ways of creating order). 
What I have done then is to delineate a series of principles 
which seem to have generated the designs, or according to 
which elaboration occurs. When taken together, they create 
some idea of a design system. The principles are neither 
linear nor typologically equivalent; rather, they all inter-
relate. In that sense, they are arbitrarily ordered; and for that 
reason, I have not numbered them. In that sense also, what 
follows is a and not the structural an alysis of Hopi pottery 
designs. 
Structural Principles 
PRINCIPLE: Designs are formed in such a way that there is 
equality of figure and ground (to the point of there being no 
figure and ground). 
In our standard design framework, the term figure 
normally connotes a dominant image or shape applied to a 
background. And background (or simply ground) normally 
connotes that area or space remaining after the main figure 
or fit;ures have been applied. Occasionally in this framework 
one hears of "negative elements," in which case one normally 
assumes that the unpainted areas are the figures in that they 
are the simpler, more dominant shapes, or the shapes which 
convey meaning. But this implies the same relationship; it is 
merely the roles which are reversed. Thus the framework 
seems inevitably to imply a design situation in which there is 
dominant shape and residual (or subservient) area. 
In Hopi designs, however, the painted areas often seem 
no more simple or dominant in shape than the unpainted 
areas. In that sense, the figure and ground often seem of 
equivalent importance, almost to the point of there being no 
distinct figure and ground. The interior design in Figure 1 
illustrates this quite nicely, and represents a fairly typical 
treatment of interior space. In terms of both the total 
composition and the individual panels, the painted and 
unpainted areas are of equal visual importance. 
Another treatment of design space, as suggested earlier, is 
the exterior semi-bounded design (i.e., bounded only by the 
"roadline," from which the design emanates). The semi-
bounded design shown in Figure 2 could certainly be thought 
of as three discrete "avian" figures, one of which is shown in 
the diagram below (Figure 3). However, in terms of the total 
composition, the unpainted areas assume a shape which is 
very similar to some of the painted shapes (for example, the 
scroll, as well as the enclosed areas at the rim), and the 
figural areas merge into a repeating pattern which assumes 
prominence. 
All of which is not to imply that there are no central 
"figures" on Hopi pottery. Although not the most common 
design form, there are designs which are composed of 
centralized figures (in the sense of figural representations 
applied to the center of a design field). These are generally 
avian figures or kachina figures (the latter probably being a 
recent innovation for the tourist market). However, the exis-
tence of centralized figures or figurai representations does not 
negate the figure/ground relations described above. The 
modern Hopi pot shown in Figure 4 represents an interesting 
design solution in this respect; for although it is composed of 
two central bird figures, the unpainted area is far from being 
background in the conventional sense. The two inner shapes, 
the heart shape and the concave triangular shape, emerge as 
figures in their own right. 
And for those central, figural designs which do not 
employ the unusual design solution described above, the 
figure/ground equality is generally maintained on a lower 
level. That is, the central "figures" are usually composed of 
smaller panels which embody ambiguous figure and ground 
relations. This is also often the case for those designs which 
are not composed of a central figure (e.g., the two pots 
referred to earlier, Figures 1 and 2). 
SUB-PRINCIPLE: The smallest panels are often divided in 
such a way as to yield elements susceptible to a yin-yang 
spatial organization. What I will reluctantly call a generalized 
yin-yang model, for lack of a better term, is a more specific 
and literal form of equal figure and ground than that detailed 
in the previous principle. In the original Chinese T'ai-chi-tu 
symbol (popularly known as the yin-yang symbol or still 
more colloquially as the "yin-yang"), the field is divided into 
two identical shapes, one dark and the other ~ight, such that 
visually both are simultaneously figure and ground. (See 
Arnheim 1966:222-244 for a complete design analysis of the 
T'ai-chi-tu symbol.) 
Generally there seem to be certain forms and certain 
ways of dividing space which are susceptible to this type of 
duality, since the reversal quality is inherent in the form 
itself. Many Hopi pottery designs use such forms and spatial 
divisions to produce near yin-yang or generalized yin-yang 
effects. Among these forms are the feather or wing motif, a 
stepped design, a scroll or spiral design, continuous triangle 
designs, and the oblique division of the field (see Figure 5 for 
examples). 
PRINCIPLE: Designs are often generated by rotation. 
The yin-yang relationship described above can be thought 
of as having a particular figure/ground relationship. But it has 
other defining characteristics as well. In particular, the 
original T'ai-chi-tu symbol is rotationally symmetric or is at 
least a variant of a rotationally symmetric design. 
As the name would imply, rotational symmetry is a form 
of symmetry in which parts of the design recur as a result of 
being rotated around a central axis. (For an excellent 
explanation of rotational and other symmetries, all of which 
are described and analyzed in terms of the type of operations 
according to which repetitions occur, see Shepard 
1956:267-276.) 5 
The pattern on the canteen shown in Figure 6 is an 
example of a pattern which appears deceptively complex 
until one looks at it as a relatively simple rotational design 
with two equivalent parts in rotational opposition to each 
other along a central axis. Such bifold rotational designs are 
fairly common in Hopi pottery. Any line cutting through the 
center of the field would result in two identical design halves, 
although clearly the explicit line provides the most obvious 
division. 
Conceptually similar, although more complex than the 
canteen design, is the design shown on the pot in Figure 7. 
The same rotational operation is used or implied, only in this 
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case there is a fourfold field, with explicit divisions. In 
addition, the four quadrants have each been further sub-
divided, such that diagonal quadrants are identical {see 
schematic drawing, Figure 8). Again, once one perceives the 
order, the design appears simpler. The rotational symmetry is 
evidenced in the fact that any line cutting through the center 
of the field would result in two identical halves. 
A common design organization in Hopi pottery is a 
bounded panel design (with one "horizontal" band which 
often is sub-divided into repeating "vertical" panels). This 
format is used both along exterior sides and interior rims. 
Although the exact number of panels seems to vary 
considerably, the repetitions seem invariably to occur by 
rotation or to result in a rotational design. This is evidenced 
in the relative orientation of the panels, and in their order; 
i.e., the panels repeat sequentially in a 360° path. The bowl 
shown in Figure 9 has a six panel design of this type 
(consisting of three panels, each of which repeats). 
Another common design treatment is exemplified by the 
pot shown in Figure 10. This is a fairly characteristic 
Nampeyo pot (cf. pp. 00-00). In this case, there is no explicit 
division into parts which are rotationally symmetric, but the 
total is, nevertheless implicitly generated by rotation. In 
fact, it seems to be generated by two separate series of 
rotations; i.e., one could think of this design as consisting of 
one rotational opposition Pd which is itself rotated around 
the center of the pot, thus producing a PdP d P d pattern (see 
Figure 11 ). 
The reason I earlier detached the rotational principle from 
the term rotational symmetry is that the phenomenon of 
rotation can occur without necessarily producing a design 
which is rotationally symmetric. That is, parts of a design 
may be in rotational relationship to each other, but those 
parts may not be identical to each other. Thus, while a given 
design may not be rotationally symmetric, it may appear less 
chaotic and more comprehensible when looked at with 
rotation in mind. The design on the pot shown in Figure 12 
represents a case in point. The design consists of two distinct 
"horizontal" or circumferential bands. The upper band 
consists of two similar panels (although only part of one 
panel is shown in the photograph) , while the lower band is 
filled by a series of panels which, taken together, form a 
continuous design similar to the PdP d design in the previous 
pot. While not rotationally symmetric (because the two 
oblique halves are not identical), the panel (drawn in Figure 
13) makes more sense if seen as largely influenced by 
rotation, as the spiral patterns are in a 180° rotational 
relationship along the axis indicated. Similarly each of the 
sub-panels filling the lower band exhibits bifold rotational 
symmetry along the axis indicated (or, for that matter, along 
any axis going through the center of the sub-panel). 
I could give several other examples of this kind; I will 
limit myself to just two. The design panel drawn below 
(Figure 14) is one of many versions of a Zuni-derived panel 
which is used on both interior and exterior band designs. 
This design, incidentally, is the "prayer-stick" design men-
tioned earlier. Although it may appear less obvious (because 
we are probably not accustomed to considering painted and 
unpainted areas as equivalent), rotation can be seen to be 
operative in this case as well. That is, the light {unpainted) 
"step" figure and the dark (painted) "step" figure are in 
rotational oppos1t1on along an oblique dividing axis. The 
analysis of this design in this way is made more plausible by 
the fact that the explicit oblique division of panels into two 
identical parts is common. 
Another version of this same phenomenon can be seen in 
the drawing below {Figure 15) which represents a central 
avian figure copied from the interior of a shallow bowl. If 
looked at solely in terms of the painted areas, the design does 
not seem to be even marginally rotational. However, the 
unpainted swirls which are "negatively" defined by the 
darkened areas can be seen to be in rotational opposition. 
(While I would not maintain that this was consciously 
rendered in this way, I would suggest that this is at least an 
unconscious factor in the aesthetic appeal of this design.) 
This design, incidentally, is probably derived from a Zuni 
design as there are similar designs to which it bears some 
resemblance (cf. Sides 1966, Pl. 17). 
Rotation is also sometimes operative in the smallest 
details and sub-panels. Thus, for example, although the 
design on the modern pot shown in Figure 1 is not (on the 
total level) a rotational design, at least one of the panels ca·n 
be seen to be rotationally generated. I am referring to the 
crescent panel at the top, which seems to have been treated 
rotationally even though the shape of the field mitigated 
against a strict rotational design. 
PRINCIPLE: Designs are generated by repetition of ele-
ments or by formation of identical elements, and are 
periodic. 
In all of the previously mentioned rotational designs, 
rotation is the cognitive operation by which repetition 
occurs. By contrast, bilateral symmetry entails reflection as a 
way of achieving repetition, and is also used (e.g., Figure 4), 
but not to the same extent. 
The periodicity of the design results from the order and 
type of repetition. For example, circumferential bands 
(either exterior or interior to the pot) are composed of 
panels which repeat in a variety of ways. The panels of these 
bands can be arranged in a simple repeating pattern 
(AAA ... ) or in an alternating pattern of some sort 
ABABAB ... , or ABCABC ... ), or in some cases in an 
alternating fixed and variable pattern (AB' AB" AB"'). Non-
bounded designs such as the one shown in Figure 10 also 
exhibit varying types of periodicity, depending on the 
number and type of rotations. 
PRINCIPLE: Designs are generated relative to the con-
ceptual center of the field, although this center is not 
generally made explicit. 
In part this is a necessary result of rotation, and in part 
rotation is itself subsumed by this quality of conceptual 
center. Any rotational design is produced by rotating certain 
forms or elements around a center, or by dividing the field in 
such a way as to produce rotationally related areas. In either 
case, rotational designs are generated relative to the center of 
the field. 
In previous sections I have made reference to "horizontal" 
bands, often with "vertical" divisions, although these terms 
have not always been gravitationally correct; in this respect I 
have been following Bunzel's interpretive terminology 
(1929: 16, 18). If such bands were simply horizontal (concep-
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tually), they would be generated by sheer repetition of 
elements or panels along a straight line; that particular design 
operation has been termed translation by Shepard 
{1956: 269). On a cylindrical surface, such as the outside of a 
water jug or bowl, such an operation would result in a 
circular or circumferential pattern {in the same way that 
maintaining a straight linear path on earth would eventually 
define a circular path). However, if the band designs were not 
so much "horizontal" as conceptually circular or circum-
ferential, then they would be conceptually governed by 
rotation around a central point. Thus the same concrete 
designs could have been conceptually produced in two 
distinctly different ways. I suggest that the central point or 
circumferential interpretation is the more probable one, 
although I do not think that the two are necessarily mutually 
exclusive. That is, thinking of the designs as being concep-
tually generated relative to the center of the field does not 
necessarily eliminate the possibility of the bands being 
conceptually "horizontal" as well. My reasons for suggesting 
a central orientation follow. 
First, in many cases there is a similarity between interior 
designs which are clearly circular in conception, and exterior, 
"horizontal" or circumferential patterns. For example, the 
Nampeyo pot shown in Figure 10 has an exterior design 
which is very similar to an interior design on another 
Nampeyo pot. I do not have a photograph of this second pot, 
but the design, which exhibits a definite circular orientation, 
is shown in schematic form in the diagram below {Figure 16). 
Thus both would seem to be circular in conception. {Note, 
incidentally, that the painted spiralling feather patterns are 
almost identical to the unpainted spiral forms surrounding 
them, although having an opposite directional orientation.) 
Similarly, exterior designs of the type shown on the pot in 
the foreground in Figure 17 are conceptually similar to 
interior designs of the type shown in Figure 18. Both are 
semi-bounded avian designs, emanating from the "roadline." 
Only in one case the design is an exterior design and in the 
other an interior design. The conceptual equivalences in 
other respects suggest that both are conceptually contained 
in a circular field defined by the "roadline." 
Placement of the "roadline" is the most constant and the 
first operation in Pueblo pottery design {Bunzel 1929:13, 
28), and as such seems to represent an initial circumferential 
definition of the field. Most "roadlines" have a small gap or 
token non-enclosure, a Zuni practice which the Hopi have 
adopted. Although the meaning of this conventionalized gap 
has occasioned considerable dispute {cf. Chapman 1951), the 
explanation given by Bunzel is that the "roadline" is 
identified with the life of the potter, and should therefore 
not be finished. Finishing the "roadline" is symbolically 
equated with ending the potter's life {Bunzel 1929:69), and 
thus entails completing a circle or a full cycle. 
Many designs can be seen to emanate from the "roadline," 
often spiralling in toward the center of the design {see, for 
example, the design just mentioned, viz., Figure 18). This 
central orientation is somewhat apparent in the design 
product. In addition, the indication of movement inward 
toward the center has at least been mentioned, if not fully 
and elaborately documented, in the literature. Thompson 
{1945:550) reports that designs move in a circle and toward 
the center in a circular and centripetal movement. Ortiz 
{1972: 143) reports that in sand painting, one of the most 
sacred acts performed in the society, the outer boundaries 
are first set, and then the painter works inward toward the 
center of the field. 
Lastly, evidence for the central orientation of designs is 
suggested by the common use of bifold, fourfold, and other 
rotational symmetries, as well as rotationally-derived panel 
designs. All of these are either a result of, or imply, rotation 
around a center or central point. 
Thus the center of the field is vital as an organizational or 
implied force or locus, rather than as an objective or explicit 
form or point. In Western art, by contrast, the center of the 
composition is generally filled, although it may not exert any 
particular force on the rest of the composition. 
PRINCIPLE: The elements in Hopi pottery designs often 
seem to be generated by division of the field,· i.e., elaboration 
of design occurs through division into elements, rather than 
by the cumulative addition of elements. 
Although my first inclination in studying Hopi pottery 
had been to (1) isolate elements, and {2) then determine how 
they were combined, this procedure was discarded because 
following it seemed to make the designs more rather than less 
confusing. It seemed that the elements were often derived 
from the designs rather than vice versa; that is, the elements 
seemed, in many cases, "emergent" rather than basic. 
For example, the design on the modern pot shown in 
Figure 19 (which is a four-panel design) appears to be 
a rather chaotic design, which maintains its chaotic ap-
pearance so long as one tries to conceptualize it by pulling 
out elements one by one {particularly since one runs into 
immediate figure/ground problems in even trying to decide 
what the elements are). However, if one conceives of the 
design as generated by progressive divisions . or setting of 
boundaries with the filling in of details {thus creating 
elements as the last step), it becomes more visually compre-
hensible. The schematic diagram below {Figure 20) repre-
sents one possible reconstruction of one of the panels. 
Unfortunately I did not witness the actual painting of the 
design diagrammed in Figure 20, nor was I able to interview 
the potter, so my reconstruction is admittedly speculative. 
More important than the specific sequence of the divisions, 
however, is the idea of progressive divisions and emergent 
elements. And for this general idea there is additional 
evidence, both material and textual. 
First the visible intersections and overlappings of lines on 
the po~ themselves can provide some information as to 
sequence by which the designs were created; and secondly, 
what descriptions there were of the decorating process 
seemed supportive. For example: 
The area to be decorated is usually bordered or circumscribed 
by several parallel lines or bands. Then the area is divided into :wo 
or more units and next the larger design elements are applied. 
Areas which are to become solid masses of color are first outlined 
and then filled in. Thus the design progresses from the larger, 
simpler masses and lines to the more intricate details. One unit of 
the design is not completed until the next unit is started. The units 
are considered in their relation to each other and are developed 
alternately [Hubert 1937:9]. 
I do not mean to imply, by any of the above, that 
elements do not exist in Hopi pottery designs. Nor do I mean 
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to denigrate attempts to isolate and name motifs, although 
Bunzel did meet with somewhat limited success in that 
particular endeavor (1929: 53-54, 70, 118-119). Rather, I am 
suggesting that the procedure of isolating and classifying 
design "elements" per se without considering how these were 
themselves derived, is of dubious utility in the context of 
Hopi pottery. 
As it happens, that very procedure has been followed in at 
least one case of which I am aware. In a study of Hopi 
pottery exhibited at a 1959 Museum of Northern Arizona 
craft show, Sikorski (1968) has isolated, and classified Hopi 
elements. The study includes a page of over one hundred 
diagrammed "design elements" arranged in six categories, 
e.g., "triangle," "curved elements," and "irregular elements" 
(1968: 18). Not only do several of the elements seem to have 
been arbitrarily assigned to one category as opposed to 
another; the rationale for isolating and defining certain 
configurations (many of which are irregular) as entities or 
elements is neither self-evident nor explained. In total, this 
classification and isolation of "elements" does not seem to 
clarify anything. However, this very lack of clarification may 
be, itself, revealing. 
PRINCIPLE: Lines are more nearly devices for defining 
boundaries, areas or movement, than themselves elements or 
entities. 
The phenomenon of generation of elements by division 
and later filling in of areas is apparent on other than totally 
bounded panel designs of the type shown earlier (Figure 19). 
In part, this is the case because so many of the unbounded 
designs are composed of panels at the lowest levels (e.g., the 
pots shown in Figures 2 and 4). However, it is also often 
evident on those pots whose designs are not composed of 
panels or sub-panels at the lowest level. The Nampeyo pot 
(Figure 1 0) is such a pot; rather than being produced by the 
cumulative addition of given elements, the design seems more 
nearly to have been generated by lines which reflect paths of 
motion (thus creating areas which are filled in or elaborated 
with hatchure). All of which could be stated in the form of 
the above principle. 
PRINCIPLE: The design field is not uniformly elaborated, 
nor is balance literal. 
This is a negatively significant principle. It is probably 
related to equality of figure and ground, and is in that sense 
stating the antithesis of the principle or phenomenon which 
has been termed horror vacui or aversion to unfilled space in 
reference to art styles such as that of the Northwest Coast or 
Maori art. Since non-painted space seems to have value (cf. 
pages 00-00), there would seem to be no need to achieve 
balance through uniform filling of the field. 
PRINCIPLE: Color does not seem to be employed to 
distinguish between dominant and subsidiary elements or 
areas, although it is used differentially for lines versus areas. 
Again, this is a negative principle, and again it is stated to 
contrast Hopi designs with other two- or three-color design 
systems (such as the Northwest Coast system which uses 
what have been designated primary, secondary, and tertiary 
color systems [Holm 1965:29-32] ). Unfortunately, none of 
my photographs or drawings are in color, so it is difficult if 
not impossible for the reader to determine the colors in the 
pots illustrated here. All of the pots shown here are painted 
in dark brown or black, and most use in addition, a dark red 
or reddish brown pigment. (Also common, though not shown 
here, are pots with a red slip with dark applied designs, or 
with a more yellowed slip.) With one or two exceptions, 
none of which are shown here, the lines seem always to be 
applied in the dark black-brown pigment, with the reddish 
pigment applied only to fill in areas. The largest painted 
areas, in particular, seemed to have been filled in with red, so 
as to avoid too black a design. 
Structural System 
Having delineated several inter-related structural principles 
in what I have called "bricoleur's terms," I would like to pull 
these together into a more integrated and explicitly defined 
system especially since many of the principles, when taken 
together, suggest additional or emergent aspects of the Hopi 
pottery design system. 
Rotation versus bilaterality, as used here, are not merely 
terms for describing relationships between elements once a 
design is produced; rather they describe the forces or 
operations by which the designs are produced. Moreover, the 
use of each seems to imply certain concomitant relationships. 
In particular, the general tendency to favor rotational over 
bilateral symmetry has the following implications: (1) it 
tends to produce a dynamic rather than a static design; (2) it 
implies a design situation in which only one element is 
repeated, whereas bilateral symmetry often requires two 
different forms of the same element (equivalent to a 
right-hand and a left-hand form) ; and (3) it suggests the 
importance of a conceptual center (often non-ex pi icit) which 
is the one constant point in the 360° rotation of a central 
axis, or is alternatively the intersection point of all central 
axes. Further, all of the above implications are reinforced by 
other individual design principles or characteristics, as these 
have been delineated earlier. 
Thus, for example, the dynamic rather than static quality 
of the design system is reinforced by figure/ground reversals 
and equivalences (particularly those which follow a general-
ized yin-yang model), by the oblique division of panels 
(which suggests rotation), by the use of obliquely placed 
lines to define areas which are in rotational opposition to 
each other, by the use of tapering shapes and areas (which 
suggest transition), and by the use of spirals and other 
directional elements rather than more static and stable 
rectangular elements. All of the above tend to imply 
transition or movement and are in that sense dynamic visual 
devices or arrangements. In addition, the general dynamic 
aspect of the design system is specifically cyclical and 
periodic. This cyclicity and periodicity are emergent both 
from rotations (as are imp I ied in the Nampeyo design shown 
in Figure 10 and diagrammed in Figure 11 ), and from 
sequential repetitions of the type which occur in the 
ABABAB or ABCABC type of bounded panel designs (cf. 
Figure 9). 
The single rotated form versus the mirror-image forms 
(i.e., left-hand and right-hand forms) similarly relate back to 
the total system, particularly to figure/ground reversals. Both 
bilateral and rotational symmetry could be considered as 
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visual representations of duality; yet the types of duality 
represented would differ. In the rotational case, since the 
forms are identical (at least in terms of shape), the 
opposition is totally based on position or relative location. In 
the bilateral case, by contrast, which uses mirror-image 
forms, the opposition is based on opposite forms or entities. 
One might think of rotational symmetry as x and com-
plement of x (at least in a yin-yang model), and of bilateral 
symmetry as x and anti-x. The yin-yang form, as described 
earlier, is that specific form of bifold rotational symmetry 
which uses forms of identical shape but different color. As 
employed in Hopi pottery designs, th e yin-yang model 
produces a situation in which one form is explicit (i.e., 
painted), whereas the other is implicit (i.e., itself unpainted 
but defined by the surrounding painted areas) (cf. Figure 5). 
The resulting duality exhibits complementary opposition. 
The interior Nampeyo design drawn in Figure 16 is in-
teresting in this respect in that, at the total level, the pattern 
exhibits a duality of the complementary, imp I icit versus 
explicit variety. The painted and unpainted areas are each 
other's complements in terms of shape, although the orienta-
tion and implied directional movement are diametrically 
opposed. Complementary duality of this sort is related both 
to figure/ground equivalences and to the use of rotational 
symmetry. 
Another characteristic of the total design system which is 
emergent from the several individual design principles, when 
these are considered together, is the importance of the total 
design as a total design. That is, the designs seem to be 
generated from the highest level downward, rather than being 
built up from a series of discrete elements. The distinction 
which I am trying to make here is analogous to the difference 
between a logical system which is based on deduction and 
one which is based on induction. In part, the importance of 
the total is evidenced in (or resultant from) the generation of 
designs relative to the conceptual center of the field. But 
more importantly, it is evidenced in the progressive divisions 
of the field such that elements are seemingly the conceptual-
ly last phase in the generation of the pattern rather than the 
reverse, i.e., the generation of pattern by the cumulative 
addition of elements. 
The above point is important, if for no other reason than 
that it runs counter to the "natural" assumption that 
elements are of prime importance, with operations being 
defined in terms of elements, and being significant only as 
they specify the ways in which elements are to be combined. 
Such an assumption could follow quite automatically from 
an attempt to translate or adapt linguistic methodology 
directly to the visual realm. In the Hopi case, it would seem 
that operations have primacy. Moreover, operations seem to 
be performed relative to the total. Thus, for example, in the 
course of this structural analysis, it often seemed more 
accurate to suggest that a field was divided in order to 
produce x number of panels rather than to say that a 
particular panel was repeated x number of times (e .g., Figure 
9), or to suggest that a field was divided in such a way as to 
produce four quadrants in rotational opposition to each 
other, rather than to say that a section was repeated four 
times (e.g., Figures 7 and 8). 
Finally, the Hopi design system seems to be composed of 
different levels of design, all working in similar ways, rather 
than being based on dominant and subservient (or filler) ele-
ments. This is due to the importance of the total design and 
its central orientation, the emergent aspect of elements, and 
the primacy of operations over elements. Thus, for example, 
the total design may be composed of several panels, which 
are in turn composed of sub-panels, which are further divided 
and filled, etc. 
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITIES IN OTHER SYSTEMS: 
WORLD VIEW 
The premises of this study, it should be recalled, are 
twofold: (1) that designs can be analyzed as a structural 
system, i.e., that certain generating or structuring principles 
can be inferred by induction, and (2) that the structure of 
designs should logically be related to the structure or 
structuring of other Hopi cultural systems. Thus, having 
attempted a "structural analysis" of Hopi pottery designs 
and having arrived at a particular visual structural system, an 
obvious second step would be to see if, or rather how, these 
visual structures correlate with the structure of other 
systems. For example, does the way in which the designs are 
organized have anything in common with the way the Hopi 
cosmos is conceptually organized (or structured)? Or, more 
realistically, what do the two systems have in common? 
Although any number of Hopi systems and sub-systems 
could have been analyzed for purposes of comparison, the 
"world view" or structuring of world seemed the most basic, 
and therefore the most obvious system to present in the brief 
space allotted here. 
"Linguistic" Structuring of Reality 
The choice of world view was a particularly obvious one 
since it was largely on the basis of Whorf's studies of Hopi 
linguistics (1936, 1938, 1940, 1941) that he formulated his 
noted hypothesis, and since I am considering "world view" 
or cosmological organization broadly enough to incorporate 
Whorf's lexical and grammatical structuring of reality, i.e.: 
A world view provides a people with a structure of reality; it 
defines, classifies, and orders the "really real" in the universe, in 
their world, and in their society. In Clifford Geertz's phrase 
(1957), a world view "embodies man's most general conceptions 
of order" [Ortiz 1 972:1 36]. 
According to Whorf (1950:68), the metaphysics underly-
ing our own language entails the imposition on the universe 
of two grand cosmic forms: time and space. The former is 
kinetic, one-dimensional, and subject to a threefold division, 
i.e., past, present, and future; the latter is static, three-
dimensional, and consists of infinite space. 
By contrast, time and space, as such, are simply not Hopi 
concepts. That is, time as an objectified concept is not 
translatable into Hopi, either in terms of specific words, 
expressions, grammatical forms or constructions; nor do the 
tenses past, present, and future have Hopi equivalents (Whorf 
1950:67). And yet, as Whorf points out, without these 
distinctions "the Hopi postulates equally account for all 
phenomena and their interrelations" (1950:67). The 
question is, how? The answer is that the Hopi also impose 
upon the universe two grand cosmic forms: these are not 
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time and space, but rather manifested and unmanifested (or 
manifesting). These could also be thought of as objective and 
subjective: 
The objective or manifested comprises all that is or has been 
accessible to the senses, the historical physical universe, in fact, 
with no attempt to distinguish between present and past, but 
excluding everything that we call future, BUT NOT MERELY 
THIS; it includes indistinguishably all that we call mental -
everything that appears or exists in the mind ... and by an implica-
tion and extension ... in the very heart of the Cosmos itself 
[Whorf 1950:68-69]. 
Whorf makes the observation that we 6 carry spatial 
concepts (almost obsessively) into our speech and thought 
through the use of spatial metaphors of all sorts, and by 
"objectifying-imaginatively spatializing qualities and poten-
tials that are quite non-spatial (so far as any spatially-
perceptive senses can tell us)" (1941:83). By contrast, the 
Hopi language evidences a total avoidance of such metaphors 
and extensions of spatial concepts to non-spatial matters 
(1941 :83). Whorf's explanation for this phenomenon is that 
major Hopi grammatical patterns do not provide analogies 
for imaginary space, and that the Hopi have other linguistic 
devices, in particular verb forms, which serve the same 
expressive purpose (Whorf 1941: 83). 
Rather than suggest that the Hopi do not carry spatial 
concepts into their language and thought, as Whorf does 
(1941 :83), I suggest that or.e could as validly say that the 
Hopi carry "non-spatial" concepts into their spatial thought. 
That is, that the same structuring principles come through in 
verbal and visual thought and expression. 
For example, it seems that sequence, repetition, duration, 
and intensity in the Hopi language are all relevant considera-
tions in Hopi designs and express characteristics which were 
seen to generate the designs. 
The more one learns about Hopi linguistic forms, the 
more apparent the parallels between linguistic forms (particu-
larly verb forms) and the structure of the design system 
become. For example, in a quite detailed paper, Whorf 
(1936) deals specifically with two of the nine aspects of 
Hopi verbs; the segmentative and the punctual. In that paper 
he presents the following series of concrete examples to 
demonstrate the change from a punctual aspect (manifested 
about a point) to a segmentative aspect (a series of repeated 
interconnected segments of one large phenomenon), by the 
consistent reduplication of the root and addition of a suffix 
(Whorf 1936:52): 
ha'd it is bent in a round-
ed angle 
ho"ci it forms a sharp 
acute angle 
pa"ci it is notched 
pi'va it is gullied out 
ca'mi it is slashed inward 
from the edge 
hari'rita it lies in a mean-
dering line, making suc-
cessive rounded angles 
(applied for instance to 
meander patterns in 
decoration) 
hoci'cita it is zigzag 
paci'cita, it is serrated 
piva'vata it extends in suc-
cessive gu II ies and 
gulches (said of ground) 
cami'mita it is fringed, it 
is slashed into a fringe 
along the edge 
What is significant in terms of this paper is neither the 
specific linguistic mechanism used (although it relies on a 
reduplication which is interesting), nor the specific Hopi 
words, but rather both that the specific connotations of the 
above words (punctual and segmentative) seem eminently 
suited to describing many Hopi designs, and that the implied 
cognitive distinctions which are apparently necessary in 
choosing the proper aspect of a verb also seem relevant to 
Hopi designs. Moreover, the particular set of words cited 
above is not unusual in terms of the particular discrimina-
tions which it requires. 
The Hopi language is equipped to deal with (and 
requires discriminations dealing with) vibratory phenomena, 
forces, repetitions, type of sequences, duration, etc. Similar-
ly, the design system seems to be based on repetition, to be 
generated by central forces and by rotational forces and 
movements, and to vary according to number and type of 
sequences. In addition, the Hopi language exhibits marked 
tendencies to use verbs rather than nouns (Whorf 1950), to 
transform our propositions about things into propositions 
about events, and not to "objectify" or think in terms of 
entities (Whorf 1941: 79). I cannot over-emphasize that 
processual descriptions based on operational distinctions of 
the above type seem more readily applicable to a description 
of Hopi pottery designs than a terminological system based 
on classifications of elements or "entities." It is relatively 
easy to determine sequence, repetition, and intensity of 
designs (which areas are highly developed and which are not); 
it is not always possible to determine which parts of a design 
are object (figure) and which are ground. It is also interesting 
to note that, as a specific alternative to "objectifying" things 
(thus creating "entities" of such "things" as days and hours) 
and creating imaginary plurals on these "entities," the Hopi 
language relies instead on cyclicity and patterns of repetition 
(Whorf 1941: 78). Their designs also seem to be based on 
cyclicity, and patterns of repetition, to the point of 
reflecting patterns of change without having discrete "ele-
ments" (e.g., Figure 1 0). As for the two grand cosmic forms 
which Whorf (1950:68) has delineated- manifested and 
unmanifested- it seems more than coincidental that there is 
not a figure (object) on a (residual) ground in Hopi pottery 
designs, so much as an explicit or painted form and an 
implicit or unpainted form, each of which seems significant 
(cf., in particular, Figure 16). Could this not be seen as a 
visual representation or rather a structural reduplication of 
"the Hopi philosophy of the universe in respect to its grand 
dualism of objective and subjective" (Whorf 1950: 70)? I 
suggest that, if not created with this similarity in mind, the 
designs which employ this device are unconsciously appeal-
ing, or correct, or "aesthetic" because of this structural 
similarity. 
Cosmological Structuring and Reality 
While the preceding Whorfian analysis presented a way of 
"structuring reality," and could in that sense be considered a 
"world view," it was so abstracted as to be more of a 
meta-world view. I would therefore like to use this section to 
briefly present a more specific, or at least more concrete 
version of the Hopi world view, particularly the Hopi 
cosmology, which could perhaps be thought of as a created 
rather than a mediated reality. Toward this end, I will rely 
heavily on overview articles by Ortiz (1972) and by 
Thompson (1945). 
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Ortiz (1972} concedes that it is both possible and 
productive to talk of a general Pueblo world view, i.e., those 
aspects of world view which are universal to all the Pueblo 
people (1972: 142}. The first generalization which he pro-
poses for all the pueblos is that: 
they all set careful limits to the boundaries of their world and 
order everything within it. These boundaries are not the same, but, 
more important, the principles of setting boundaries are ... [Ortiz 
1972:142]. 
The idea of setting boundaries at all, and further, the idea of 
setting them as an initial operation in the process of ordering, 
is once again paralleled in the Hopi design system. Their 
pottery designs seem, in many cases, both processually (cf. 
Bunzel 1929 and Hubert 1937:9} and conceptually (cf. the 
Structural Analysis section of this paper} to be generated by 
the successive setting of boundaries. I might add, as an aside, 
that Hopi architectural terminology also deals with 
boundaries of spaces rather than with spaces as entities (e.g., 
rooms, hallways, etc.}; thus hollow spaces are not named as 
objects but are rather located or described by relative loca-
t.ion (cf. Whorf 1953}. 
The boundaries of the cosmos are specifically set by the 
Hopis according to four cardinal directions and three cosmic 
levels. In addition: 
All the Pueblos also have a well-elaborated conception and 
symbolization of the middle or center of the cosmos, represented 
by a sipapu, an earth navel, or the entire village. Usually there are 
many different centers because sacred space can be recreated again 
and again without ever exhausting its reality .... Among the 
Pueblos, the center is the point of intersection of the six 
directions, with a seventh being the center itself. If only four 
directions are given symbolic elaboration, the center will be the 
fifth direction [Ortiz 1972:142]. 
The importance of a conceptual center as a generating 
force, and indeed as the intersection point of several 
directions, again seems structurally congruent with the 
conceptual importance of the center as a generating force in 
the design system. In that system, the center is the 
intersection of all central axes, or the constant point in the 
rotation of any one axis. Similarly, the relative definition of 
sacred space seems to be structurally duplicated in the 
individual design panels and sub-panels which are organized 
(rotationally or otherwise} relative to their own respective 
centers. 
Much of what I have discussed previously is corroborated 
by Thompson (1944, 1945}, such as: the tendency to 
conceptualize phenomena in terms of growth cycles, repeti-
tive and vibratory movement patterns and serial metamor-
phoses, the tendency to conceptualize Hopi history as an 
unfolding of sequences or phases, and the dynamic view of 
the cosmos (1945:542}. The nature of Hopi duality, particu-
larly as that duality differs from our own, is also discussed: 
the Hopi concept of the balanced, correlative interdependence of 
the manifold aspects of reality excludes an arbitrary over-all dual 
division, such as that which structures our own thinking and forms 
the basis for our traditional ethical concept of the competing 
forces of good and evil. Duality in the Hopi world view exists only 
insofar as it represents two correlates in a reciprocally balanced 
universal scheme, and each correlate is conceived as an indispens-
able part of the whole, neither one being essentially subordinate to 
the other [Thompson and joseph 1944:44]. 
At the risk of belaboring a point, I suggest that the type of 
duality described above is structurally duplicated in the 
yin-yang type of (complementary} duality which is based on 
equal figure and ground and on rotational symmetry, rather 
than in the (antithetical} duality of bilateral symmetry. 
Once again, the importance of the total, and of period-
icities and cycles, suggests apparent structural parallels with 
the design system. In particular I suggest that such designs as 
the pottery design shown in Figure 10 (and schematically 
diagrammed in Figure 11) represent a visual structural 
replication of the way reality is conceived, again probably 
unconsciously. I further suggest that structural parallels are 
to be found and are significant in other systems, e.g., Hopi 
ethics or Hopi religion, but shall not deal with these at this 
time. The world view has already been discussed in sufficient 
detail to at least indicate the plausibility of the structural 
analysis of pottery designs given earlier in the Structural 
Analysis section and to suggest that that structural system 
relates to other "non-visual" structures and structurings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In an effort to elucidate the elusive nature of structure, 
Levi-Strauss (1960: 52} made reference to a hypothetical 
jig-saw puzzle generated by a hypothetical mechanical saw, 
the movements of which were regularly modified by a 
hypothetical cam shaft. The structure of the puzzle does not 
exist, he suggests, "at the empirical level" (which would, I 
presume, be essentially a description of the proxemic 
relationships between parts of the assembled puzzle}; rather, 
it lies in the mathematical formula which expresses the shape 
of the cams and their speed of rotation. 
With the frank acknowledgment that I will in the process 
probably be subverting the intended meaning of Levi-Strauss' 
analogy, I would like to extend it. I suggest that the above 
formulation "of the empirical level" could be thought of as 
structure (noun form}, whereas the mathematical formula 
would, by contrast, represent structure (verb form). The 
former refers to product; the latter refers to process. 
Similarly, I suggest that designs could be thought of in terms 
of design (noun form) or in terms of design (verb form}. 
This paper represents an attempt to deal with design (verb 
form}, with design as process, with design as a created system 
which follows certain principles of elaboration which may 
well conform to the principles followed in other cultural 
systems. In that context, my main conclusion is that I have 
begun, and that that beginning is worth continuing. In that 
sense,- the questions I have answered, however tentatively or 
speculatively, are less interesting than the further questions 
which those tentative answers suggest. Accordingly, my 
conclusions will deal both with what has actually been done 
in this study, and with what further studies or approaches 
could or should, as a result, be attempted. 
What Has Been Done in This Study 
Very simply, I have attempted both to delineate the 
structure of a particular design system, and to compare that 
structure with the structuring principles followed in other 
systems in that culture. In particular, I have dealt with 
A STUDY OF HOPI POTTERY DESIGNS 47 
linguistic structuring of reality, since much of Wharf's work 
was with the Hopi language, and since I was initially 
interested in a visual equivalent of the Whorf Hypothesis. 
The tentative conclusion on this particular relationship is 
that the same structuring principles do seem to be operative 
in both systems, and in other systems as well (cf. Thompson 
1945; Ortiz 1972). A further conclusion, which will be 
elaborated below, is that such structural similarities are 
revealing. 
In terms of the specific structural analysis of Hopi pottery 
designs, certain tentative conclusions are more intrinsically 
interesting than others. In particular, I am thinking of my 
tentative conclusions as to: (1) the importance of operations 
rather than entities as a conceptual clue to the organization 
of the designs, and (2) the likelihood of designs being 
generated "downward" by successive divisions rather than 
"upward" by the cumulative addition of elements. Both of 
these are interesting if for no other reason than that it often 
seems to be assumed that the reverse is the case, i.e., that 
elements are of prime importance, and that designs are 
formed by the progressive addition of elements. The point 
here is that the reverse may be the case in some art systems, 
but that it needn't necessarily be the case. The seeming lack 
of figure and ground in the traditional sense is also an 
interesting principle in this respect; i.e., it is possible not to 
have traditional (dominant) figures and (residual) ground, as 
such. 
In that sense, my specific analysis of Hopi pottery designs 
as a structural system serves to expand and explore the realm 
of logical possibilities of design, so that actual ways of 
organizing designs can be placed in the context of possible 
ways of organizing designs. Such an examination of logical 
possibilities (particularly as these are phrased· in terms of 
structural possibilities) is essential if one is ever to be able to 
discuss the logical probabilities of designs or design motifs 
occurring in disparate cultural groups, or if one is to draw 
cross-cultural comparisons. I suggest that if a cross-cultural 
grid or etic scale is at all possible, it will ultimately be a 
structural grid. To the extent that this paper deals with a 
process approach to art, and attempts to examine structural 
possibilities and cognitive implications of possibilities, it 
contributes towards the eventual establishment of such a 
grid. To the extent that it also seems to make Hopi pottery 
designs more visually and conceptually comprehensible, it 
also makes a contribution. 
In addition to feeding back into the art context from 
which it derived, I think this study has a minor, though real, 
potential for being recycled into the structural framework 
from which it derived. That is, I think that any information 
on "visual" cognition and structuring is of obvious relevance 
to structural theory in general. For example, the distinction 
between the dualities entailed in rotational versus bilateral 
symmetry seems to suggest that "binary oppositions" may be 
of more than one type (e.g., antithetical oppositions and 
complementary oppositions) and would probably be worth 
investigating further. 
The above are what I consider to be the strengths of this 
study. However, the study itself suffers from a certain 
symmetry and balance: every strength is matched by a 
weakness. Generally the weaknesses seem to follow from the 
tentativeness of the study. In particular, I see three weak-
nesses, none of which are irremediable. (The remedies will be 
discussed in the next section.) 
First, this study would have been infinitely stronger if I 
had been able to interview potters, and to observe the designs 
being painted. Instead, I had to rely on written material, and 
answers to other people's queries (e.g., Bunzel 1929), whicfi 
did not always correspond to what I would have liked to ask. 
Second, the structural analysis of the design system was 
phrased in such a way as to be more subjective than 
objective. The analysis was certainly made more plausible by 
the existence of numerous structural similarities in other 
systems. However, these similarities present a compelling 
rather than a conclusive case for the analysis. Thus, although 
one could argue that the analysis was to some degree 
confirmed by the structural similarities in other systems, 
such an argument would be undeniably circular, i.e., prelimi-
nary research on the Hopi no doubt influenced the analysis of 
their pottery. (However, if the argument is circular, it is no 
more circular than the relationship which is being in-
vestigated.) All of which is not to say that an analysis such as 
was given in the Structural Analysis section must necessarily 
remain either tentative or unverifiable. Rather, it can be used 
to generate predictions which would themselves be testable. 
At least one such set of predictions will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Third, this study suffered from the lack of an adequate 
terminology with which to describe a design system concrete-
ly and precisely, and with which to state empiricaHy 
verifiable propositions. Having chosen the "bricoleur's out" to 
describe the structural system, I made no progress in the 
specific invention of a genuinely "scientific" terminological 
system. However, the general parameters which such . a 
terminology should follow did become clearer. 
What's Being Done as a Result of This Study 
i am currently following two quite distinct lines of 
investigation, each of which follows from the framework and 
conclusions of this paper. The first entails making specific 
experimental predictions on the basis of the Hopi study, and 
devising a feasible way of testing them. The second entails 
studying an entirely different art system occurring in a 
structurally dissimilar though equally cohesive society, in an 
effort to broaden my framework and test its general 
applicability and explanatory value. Both will be briefly 
described below. 
Although the specific structural analysis presented in this 
study is of unverified psychological validity, it can be used to 
generate predictions which are directly verifiable. Toward 
this end, I returned to and modified my original idea of test 
drawings. As conceived of originally, the test drawings would 
have entailed taking a standard design motif, varying it 
randomly, and using those variations to determine which 
types of variation are significant and which are not. Whereas 
this seems to work well for linguists, and is methodologically 
flawless, it is quite unwieldy when operationalized for 
designs because the variation is hard to control. The test 
drawing technique was eventually modified such that it was 
not to be used to elicit information randomly, but rather to 
test specific predictions. 
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The experimental procedure is as follows: The subject is 
given a drawing of a simple design and asked to examine it so 
that he can subsequently reproduce it from memory. He 
would then attempt to draw it himself, and would be given 
the opportunity to make verbal corrections and to indicate 
possible deficiencies and vagueness in his drawing (thus 
allowing him to compensate for lack of drawing ability and 
providing a measure of his certainty as to what was correct 
and what was hazy in his visual memory). Lastly, he would be 
asked to describe the original design verbally. The drawing 
process would be filmed, thus providing a permanent record 
of the sequence in which the design was reproduced. 7 
The theory behind such a procedure is as follows: First, it 
is assumed that in order to reproduce the design, the subject 
would be forced to actively organize it and classify it in a 
systematic way. The correctly rendered aspects of the design 
would provide some indication as to which aspects of the 
design were actively classified and in what ways, just as the 
mistakes would presumably indicate which aspects of the 
design were not particularly relevant to the viewer's ordering 
system. Similarly, it is thought that the sequence in which 
the design is reproduced is indicative of the relative impor-
tance of the various ordering principles. The use of verbal 
description would provide a way of testing the relationship 
between linguistic categories and visual discriminations: 
presumably those aspects of the design which are noted 
verbally would be correctly rendered in the subject's draw-
ing. 
In order to obtain significant results in the above 
experiment, the test drawings would have to be created with 
specific ordering principles and variables in mind. For 
example, see the test drawing below (Figure 21 ). It is a 
relatively simple and highly regular design if perceived as a 
rotational design composed of an inner and outer line 
arranged in directional opposition to each other. If one were 
more accustomed to bilateral symmetry, and tended to 
classify in terms of entities rather than lines, it would 
probably be considerably more difficult to perceive correct-
ly. 
Using such a test drawing, and on the basis of both the 
structural analysis of Hopi pottery designs and Whorf's work 
on linguistics, I would make several predictions. Specifically, · 
I would predict that if the above test drawing were given to a 
large group of Hopis and a large group of Anglo-Americans, 
the following patterns would emerge statistically: that the 
Hopis would be more consistently accurate in rendering the 
rotational repetitions and the specific directions would be 
more often correctly reproduced, that the Hopis would be 
more likely to notice that all of the swirls (including the 
inner ones) are virtually identical in size, and that they would 
be more likely to reproduce the design by first drawing a 
continuous outer and then a continuous inner line (rather 
than by several choppy lines used to block out a shape). I 
would also predict that the Hopis would be more likely to 
verbally describe the design in terms of lines and motion, and 
that the Anglos would be more likely to describe it in terms 
of entities. 
The second line of investigation which follows indirectly 
from the structural analysis of Hopi pottery designs is an 
analogous though greatly modified structural study of 
Northwest Coast Indian art. In part, that particular system 
interested me because it is structurally opposed to the Hopi 
system in so many ways: Northwest Coast designs are pre-
dominantly bilateral (to the point of split representa-
tion), balance is quite literal (e.g., literally an eye for an eye 
and a tooth for a tooth), the field is almost entirely filled in 
many cases, and "elements" seem to be extremely important. 
The organization of Northwest Coast societies seems cor-
respondingly opposed to the Hopi organization as well, but it 
does not seem worthwhile to develop those comparisons at 
this time. 
In the particular study of Northwest Coast art which I am 
working on at present, 8 I have changed my approach in the 
following ways. First, I am considering operations which are 
more directly Levi-Straussian, i.e., (1) the operation of visual 
intersections, and (2) the operation of inversion. The former 
operation is visually equivalent to mediation as that is used in 
myth, and seems to be a reverse and complementary 
operation to visual opposition. It is used as a way of 
combining both elements (to produce a formline system) and 
total figures, and is the specific mechanism by which 
numerous visual puns are formed. The operation of inversion 
is used on the meaning level such that humans and crest 
animals are shown in symbolically inverted circumstances 
(e.g., a crest animal which occurs on a headdress worn by a 
chief might itself be wearing a similar headdress consisting of 
a human figure). Again, the operation is similar to one which 
occurs in myth. Secondly, I am working on the meaning level 
more directly, since much of Northwest Coast art is crest art, 
or is at least directly representational. (The premise in this 
case is that such an art system is used as much to indicate 
relationships between crest groups as to merely differentiate 
them.) What follows directly from the Hopi study, in this 
case, is the use of a process model which is directed at 
operations rather than at configurations. 
Thus the final conclusion to this paper is a premise: that 
design can be studied in terms of process, and in terms of 
system, and that such studies both answer and generate 
structural, "visual," and cognitive questions. 
NOTES 
1This study is a revised version of a senior honors thesis submitted 
to Harvard University in 1971. The original study was financed by a 
National Science Foundation research grant obtained through the 
Harvard Anthropology Department, and was largely carried out using 
the resources of the Museum of Northern Arizona's Research Center. 
This manuscript was prepared while I was on a fellowship program at 
the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. I would therefore 
like to acknowledge the support of all of the above institutions. In 
addition, I would like to thank those people who assisted me at the 
Museum of Northern Arizona for their help, Dr. jeremy Sabloff who 
was my thesis advisor at Harvard for his encouragement, and Professor 
Sol Worth of the Annenberg School of Communications for his 
generous assistance and constructive comments both on this manu-
script and on a related verification project conducted at the Summer 
Institute of Visual Communications in Sante Fe, New Mexico, during 
the summer of 1972. 
2 1 am admittedly interpreting both Arnheim's and Levi-Strauss' 
work selectively, and in that sense make no pretense of accurately 
representing either of their frameworks . In addition, having discussed 
the work of Whorf with Arnheim on one occasion, I know for a fact 
that despite all the possible congruences which I see, he is aware of 
irreconcilable differences (personal communication 1971 ). For a 
discussion of some of these differences (cf. Worth 1974:276-279). 
3 1 am using Hopi (in reference both to pottery and its makers) to 
indicate both the Hopi and the Hopi-Tewa, and descendents of the 
group of Tewas who migrated to the First Mesa town of Hano some 
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300 years ago. Although they still maintain a certain cultural 
autonomy, the pottery tradition is, for the purpose of this analysis, 
essentially the same as the Hopi. Some of the pots illustrated in this 
article, are Hopi-Tewa. 
4 I have generally not cited specific sources for this and the 
preceding two technical sections, because the information is such a 
conglomeration of so many sources, most of which are listed in the 
bibliography. 
5 In particular, Shepard (1956:269) defines band patterns in terms 
of operations by which the repetition occurs, e.g.: translation 
(foreward movement without change in orientation), reflection 
(folding along an axis so as to produce a mirror-image), bifold 
rotation (a 180° rotation of a single axis), as well as various 
combinations of the above. These seem to be predominantly 
conceptual or cognitive operations, rather than actual physical 
operations. Symmetries of total patterns could thus conceivably be 
classified in more than one way, depending upon what one defined as 
the 'element' which is subjected to the operation. In this study, I have 
concentrated both on the operation of rotation (180° or otherwise) 
and on the division or creation of fields which imply rotation, 
although the resulting symmetry (if there is one) could often be 
classified as 'radial' just as eas ily as 'rotational.' 
6 The terms we and our, as used to refer to citations of Whorf 
(1941 ), specifically refer to the group which Whorf has labeled 
"Standard Average European." This category includes English, 
French, German, and other European languages, the assumption being 
that all such languages use the same basic distinctions (Whorf 
1941 :78) in the grammatical constructions and categories discussed, 
and differentiated from the Hopi language. In other citations from 
Whorf, the same referent is probably applicable, but it is not specified 
explicitly. 
7Th is experimental procedure, including the use of film to record 
the drawing process, was devised and tested in preliminary fashion 
during the summer of 1972, at the Summer Institute in Visual 
Anthropology, held in Sante Fe, New Mexico. 
8 This study forms the basis of a doctoral dissertation for the Uni-
versity of British Columbia. 
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FIGURE CREDITS 
Most of the pottery shown in the illustrations is from the 
collection of the Museum of Northern Arizona in Flagstaff. These 
pots are labeled by the abbreviation MNA in the following list and are 
followed by their catalogue numbers. All other pottery , listed as 
"modern (1970)" in the following list, appeared at the Craft Exhibit 
at the Museum of Northern Arizona during the summer of 1970. All 
photographs and drawings are by the author. Figures 5 and 21 are 
schemadc drawings. 
Figure 7 - modern bowl, MNA Craft Exhibit (1970). 
Figures 2, 3 - MNA cat. #2208/E1503. 
Figure 4- modern bowl, MNA Craft Exhibit (1970). 
Figure 5 - schematic drawing by the author. 
Figure 6 - MNA cat. #225/1 015. 
Figures 7, 8 - MNA cat. # 1 015/E556. 
Figure 9 - MNA cat. #1 014/E515. 
Figures 70, 7 7 - MNA cat. # 774/E2630. 
Figures 72, 73 - MNA cat. # 918/E458. 
Figure 74- exterior panel from MNA cat. # 255/1 013. 
Figure 75 - interior design from MNA cat. # 1015/E521. 
Figure 76 - interior design from MNA cat. #1026/E615. 
Figure 7 7 - modern bowl , MNA Craft Exhibit (1970). 
Figure 78 - MNA cat. #782/E157. 
Figure 79, 20 - modern bowls, MNA Craft Exhibit (1970). 
Figure 27 - schematic drawing by the author. 
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THE SITUATION AND TENDENCIES 
OF THE CINEMA IN AFRICA 
PART I* 
JEAN ROUCH 
translated by STEVE FELD 
The cinema began to take hold in Africa from the first 
years that followed its invention. In South Africa, for 
example, as early as 1896, cinema was introduced by a 
vaudeville magician who had stolen a "theatregraph" from 
the Alhambra Palace in London. And today, the word 
"bioscope," used from the turn of the century by "Warwick 
bioscope" projectors, is still the usual word for cinema in 
South Africa. 
In West Africa, the first attempts at cinema projections 
date from 1905, the year that travelling cinemas projected 
the first animation strips in Dakar and surrounding areas. At 
the same time pioneers and explorers began to use the 
camera, and the French cinematheque has several catalogs of 
George Melies referring to the first films made in Africa. 
Since this pioneering period, the cinema has developed 
considerably, but one must nevertheless note, along with 
Georges Sadoul, that Sub-Saharan Africa not only remains 
one of the most under-developed areas of the world in terms 
of films shown, 1 but moreover the most backward continent 
in the area of film production. While Asia, South America, 
and Indonesia have long been making films, Sub-Saharan 
Africa has not yet produced a single feature length film. 
In the words of Georges Sadoul, "Sixty-five years after 
the invention of the cinema, in 1960, there is not to my 
knowledge a single true feature length African film produc-
tion - acted, photographed, written, conceived, edited, etc., 
by Africans and in an African language. Thus two hundred 
million people are shut out from the most evolved form of 
the most modern of the arts. I am convinced that before the 
close of the 1960s this scandal will be but a bad souvenir of 
the past. " 2 
It thus appears particularly opportune today, at a time 
when African cinema is being born, to take account of 
current productions in Africa, the possibilities of new 
productions and distribution, and to analyze the current 
tendencies in the new African cinema. 
The plan of our study will be the following: (1) an 
account of commercial, educational, and documentary films 
made in Africa up to today; (2) an analysis of the importance 
of these types of film from filmic, cultural, and social 
This is the second in a series of translations of the major 
writings of jean Rouch, translated by Steve Feld, which will 
appear in the first five issues of Studies. An introduction by 
Feld to the entire series of articles appears in Vol. 7 No. 7. 
viewpoints; (3) an analysis of new tendencies and the 
conditions for the development of a true African cinema. 
As to reference documents: It is important to note here 
the considerable difficulties of documentation in the field of 
African cinema. I apologize for many errors and omissions 
that are inevitable in this type of study; but I think that 
above all this report is a foundation, which after the 
necessary corrections and rectifications will give researchers 
access to information for their studies. 
I have gathered these data by using: the classic litera-
ture- unfortunately very slight- on African cinema (Georges 
Sadoul, Leprophon, Thevenot); a review of the first and only 
international conference on "Cinema in Sub-Saharan Africa," 
organized in Brussels during the World Fair in July 1958; 
different UNESCO reports (in particular the report of 
January 1961, concerning the development of information 
media in under-developed countries), different articles on 
African cinema published in the journal Presence Africaine, 
and the special issue of La Vie Africaine on African cinema 
(June 1961 ). I have also made as much use as possible of 
reports of information services prepared by African republics 
in response to a questionnaire circulated by the Comite du 
Film Ethhographique of the Musee de I'Homme in Paris. 
Finally, I will make much reference to my own experience as 
a filmmaker and observer during the course of several trips to 
West Africa since 1941. 
ACCOUNT OF AFRICAN FILMS TO PRESENT 
In this rapid survey we will only distinguish two categories 
of film: (a) commercial and documentary films, and (b) 
educational films. In fact, it is not possible to establish very 
neat boundaries between commercial, documentary, scripted, 
and ethnographic films; these genres have frequently been 
mixed since the beginning of African film. On the other 
hand, educational films can be neatly placed to the side, as 
their appearance has been recent, and their aim and manner 
of technical production has been completely different. 
Commercial and Documentary Films 
The first films shot in Africa by foreign directors (and 
with rare exceptions, all of the films analyzed in this account 
are, unfortunately, of this type) were boldly exotic. One sees 
here a logical continuation from colonialist literature, which 
also, until the last few years, was aimed toward this sense of 
removal and bewilderment. 
We know very little about the first Melies documentaries 
or the films made by Pathe before 1925, but what their 
catalog titles indicate is the capricious foreignness of savagery 
and cannibalism; showing the African as a peculiar animal 
whose behavior is rather laughable, when not classed at the 
very limits of pathology. 
The first World War allowed Europeans to discover 
another aspect of the African: the courage and good humor 
of the Senegalese sharpshooter favored the creation of the 
stereotype of the complacent childish Black, the "Uncle 
Tom."** 
It is peculiar to note parallel images of the Black 
stereotype: In the United States, until the second World War 
the Black American was reserved for film roles of the smiling 
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domestic, just as at the same time in African cinema the 
Black African was either the incomprehensible savage or the 
devoted servant, never lacking in a sense of humor. 
The first noteworthy film about Black Africa is un-
doubtedly Leon Poirier's La Croissiere Noire, made during 
the first automobile crossing of Africa, from north to south, 
by Citroen tractors (October 1924-June 1925). The basic 
subject of this film is auto adventure, but parallel to this real 
epic some representative aspects of populations encountered 
during the trip are shown. The travellers were undoubtedly in 
a hurry, but it is obvious that they took some time to choose 
and look at their subjects. The documents have aged, but 
remain as inestimable archival data, both in terms of the 
discovery of Africa and the evolution of African cultures. 
Without doubting the sincerity and good will of the 
filmmakers, two orientations are clearly apparent; the incom-
prehension of a world just glimpsed, and having stopped to 
look closer, the barbary of what is discovered there (platter-
lipped women, circumcision rites, aspects of the daily life of 
pygmies, etc.). Although they are rendered as objectively as 
possible, these images remain frozen, if not ironic docu-
ments, quite far from the human warmth of the films made 
previously or at the same time by Robert Flaherty (Nanook 
of the North, Moana). 
The same feeling· was present in all of the written or 
filmed reports of expeditions of the period; the West 
discovered the rest of the world with a lens little different in 
viewpoint from the pen of Marco Polo. 
Unfortunately, the situation degenerated, and in succeed-
ing films Africa was but a continent of barbarism and 
inhumanity. Clearly, Africa was not the only continent 
subjected to this treatment: Asia, South America, Greenland, 
and generally all colonized countries were recalled on the 
screen from meager images of wild dances, guitar players, or 
primitive hunts. Titles like Among the Cannibals, Among the 
People Eaters, and Bali, Island of Naked Breasts sufficiently 
evoke the spirit, or rather the lack of spirit, of the period. 
Raymond Barkan, in a particularly well documented 
study- "Vers un cinema universe!" (Cinema 67 )- describes 
several typical scenarios: 
An ivory hunter (frequently accompanied by the widow of an 
explorer) abandoned by his porters, captured by a ferocious and 
vociferous tribe, is saved at the last minute by the bullets of an 
emergency squad. Or: In the debilitating climate of the tropics, a 
white man (generally a plantation owner) and a white woman, in 
the midst of dreadful lovelife complications, are aggravated by an 
indigenous rebellion, or occasionally by an earthquake or floods. 
Or: In India, the polo addicted officers of His Majesty's Britain, 
gain fame at the head of their Sepoys against revolting bands. Or: 
In the Sahara, foreign legionnaires or Arab troopers (their captain 
joined the Army in a fit of the blues) victoriously battle against a 
group of pillagers. These explorers universally dream of civilization 
penetrating the Dark Continent, vehemently attacking the powers 
of sorcerers, and blazing the trail for missionaries who would 
convert the natives to Christianity and doctors who would 
immunize them against sleeping sickness. 
"We are writing with a minimum of humor and dramatiza-
tion" observes Barkan justly. 
As a completely new means of expression, the cinema neither had 
the spare time nor the desire to read the works of Levy-Bruhl and 
Frazier. Working at the level of newstand adventure novels, the 
racism of these films was more stupid than deliberate. If cinema 
sacrificed itself to all of the commonplace colonialist ideas, it was 
equally for purposes of commercial conformism as for political 
conformism .... In truth, the Hindus, Africans, Indians, and 
Arabs were of little more consequence than the lions, tigers, 
orangutans, cobras, and scorpions among whom they accom-
plished their missions in the jungle, the tropical forest, or the 
desert. 
And Barkan concludes: "Whatever antipathy comes from this 
cavalier treatment inflicted on our colored brothers, there is 
no proof that it added to the racialism upheaving mankind." 
From this period, dominated in France by the colonial 
exposition of 1931, we are reminded of Trader Horn, where 
one of the chief attractions was an African being devoured 
alive by a crocodile (and from the statement of the 
filmmakers it was never really clear whether the sequence 
was faked or accidental) and above all of Bozambo (also 
known as Sanders of the River), a sound film with music, 
starring the Black American singer, Paul Robeson. I will 
dwell upon this latter film at length for two reasons: 
Bozambo was one of the first quality sound films made in 
Africa, and, chiefly, Bozambo was quite an appreciable 
success in France and is still a considerable success in Africa. 
On the musical level it is interesting to note that thanks to 
Paul Robeson's extraordinary voice, a low quality pseudo-
African music was successfully imposed on both European 
and African listeners. For example, I've heard young Africans 
sing the canoer's tune, ayoko; this is a very rare example of 
musical falsification simultaneously abused by foreigners and 
natives alike. 
The African success of this film is even more peculiar, 
because there has never been a film which so elevates the 
glories of colonialism. Based on a novel by Edgar Wallace, the 
film is the story of a British colonial administrator, Sanders 
(nicknamed "Sandy the strong") who with his African 
servant, Bozambo, arrives at a river area in his administrative 
district to put down traditional authority and maintain 
colonial order. For the most part, the film takes place in 
Nigeria; for the needs of certain action some exteriors were 
also shot in the Congo among Wagenia fishermen, and in 
animal reserves in Kenya. These authentic settings served as 
the basis for the studio sets in Hollywood, where the rest of 
the film was shot. 
One can see, equally on the visual, auditory, and 
ideological levels, that this is one of the most faked films that 
has ever been made, and yet, the film continues to enjoy 
quite a success in Africa. Some African friends with whom 
I've discussed this problem have perhaps given me the key to 
understanding this success: for the .first time in film, a Black 
plays a leading role, and even if it is as a puppet of a British 
colonial administrator, it is nevertheless sufficient to create 
considerable sympathy among African audiences. 
Bozambo opened the way for an African fantasy cinema, 
and the hero that followed was not Black but the white 
Tarzan of the familiar unending film series. The raceless 
ape-man and his fantastic adventures against men and beasts 
became a pastime whose prodigious success touched upon 
the entire world. 
In order to finish with films of this tradition made 
between the two wars, we will just note two very interesting 
films by Leon Poirier: Cain, made in Madagascar, and 
L 'Homme du Niger, made with Henry Baur in the interior 
Segou region of the Niger delta. Despite the defects of these 
two films, the directors deserve credit for not faking 
52 STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
anything. For the first time, cameras were set in place and 
shot natural surroundings and real people. In reviewing these 
films today it is strange to discover, because of the time since 
an earlier viewing, a sort of inversion in the pictures: the 
environment being the principal object of interest, to the 
detriment of the actors, who are transformed into secondary 
accessories. 
On the other hand, the first true documentary films began 
to appear at this time. Previously, Marc Allegret, accompany-
ing Andre Gide in the Congo, brought back the naive but 
pretty pictures of Voyage au Congo (1928), where most 
frequently aesthetics took precedence over ethnographic and 
social documentation. If the film had bee n the cinematic 
mirror of Gide's classic book bearing the same title- a violent 
testim ony against the excesses of colonialism- it would 
certainly have oriented those to follow in the 1930s, thus 
pl aying for Africa a comparable role to that played for Asia 
by Pudovkin's Storm over Asia (1928) or, above all, for 
America by Eisenstein's Thunder over Mexico. 
But it would be necessary to await the images of the Ivory 
Coast rescued by Vautier (Afrique 50) in order for the 
number one problem of Africa in the twentieth century- its 
relation with the White world- to be evoked with sincerity, if 
not impartiality. 
In the area of documentary film, the experience of the 
period between the two wars was already very conclusive. 
Marcel Mauss, uncontested master of the French school of 
ethnology, had already professed in his lectures an interest in 
adding still photography, cinema, and sound recording to 
traditional ethnographic research. And it is interesting to 
note that it was infinitely easier then to depart on an 
exploration with a 35mm camera and Edison cylinder 
recorder than it is today to pull together a simple expedition 
to the Sahara. But in fact, if for most present day leaders in 
French ethnology- Leroi-Gourhan, Levi-Strauss, Bastide- this 
teaching of Marcel Mauss remains theoretical, a few pioneers 
made the first African ethnographic films during the Dakar-
Djibouti expedition, which went from the Atlantic to the 
Indian Ocean, under the leadership of Griaule, Schaeffner, 
and Leiris. The first attempts were made particularly among 
the Dogon of the Bandiagara cliffs, and in 1938, Marcel 
Griaule, during a second mission, made two model 35mm 
sound ethnographic films. 
Au Pays Dagon is a short fifteen-minute film illustrating 
aspects of the daily life, material culture, and religion of the 
Dogon. And Sous les Masques Noirs shows funeral cere-
monies of a village in the cliffs, and documents the 
construction, role, and use of large masks, which through 
ritual dances permit the soul of the deceased to be returned 
to the dwelling of its ancestors in the next world. 
At about the same time, in 1936, Jean d'Esme shot La 
Grande Caravane (35mm, sound) in Eastern Niger; it retraces 
the voyage of a salt caravan from Agades to Bilma, where the 
salt mines are found. Unfortunately, despite the passionate 
images, the author could not escape the manner of the early 
sound documentaries, namely, the use of a gossipy and 
exasperating narration, and tedious music in the style of the 
Persian March. 
It is the same defect which marred a short and completely 
forgotten film, Coulibaly a I'Aventure, made in 1936, in 
Guinea, by G. H. Blanchon. This was the first African 
sociological film, and its subject is one of the most important 
phenomena found in West Africa- the migration of young 
people from the savannah to the cities of the coast. The 
adventures of Coulibaly, leaving upper Guinea in order to 
earn the dowry for his fiancee working as a docker in 
Conakry, and then as a miner in Sigiri, could have been an 
extremely valuable document, if it wasn't spoiled by the 
propagandist narration (in the "benefits of our civilization" 
style). 
Outside of the scene in French Colonial Africa, and some 
spectacular type pseudo-documentaries which I have already 
said too much about, I would only mention a single valuable 
ethnographic film, Pecheurs Wagenia, shot by Surbeck, at 
Stanley Pool, upstream from Stanleyville in Belgian Congo. 
One had to wait until after the war to finally see the 
development of the African cinema, both in the realm of 
fiction film as well as that of documentary film. 3 
Finally, one other aspect of filming between the wars 
should be noted. It is probable that Africa was the subject 
for several German filmmakers who were travelling all over 
the world in the 1930s, making the large series of U FA and 
Tobias films that included Walter Ruttman's Melody of the 
World (1929). Unfortunately, all of our research in this area 
has been in vain, and only documents dealing with South 
America and the Far East are in the cinematheque of the 
Musee de !'Homme. 
The second World War indirectly favored the development 
of "cinema on the move" ("cinema au long cours," following 
the excellent phrase of Jean Thevenot) , because during this 
period Army film units used portable materials rather than 
the more perfected 35mm cameras, which were heavy, 
cumbersome, and could not leave the studio. It was at this 
time that 16mm, previously only an amateur format, gained 
its first stronghold. 
Most professional filmm akers, at that time, were reticent 
about 16mm (and many still are today) . Yet the first color 
35mm enlargements made from 16mm films about aircraft 
carriers and flying fortresses in operation had drawn the 
attention of some filmmakers, as well as some young 
researchers (like myself) impassioned with the cinema and 
the wonderful possibilities of the 16mm medium. 
These divergent options created in France two opposing 
currents, which have a tendency to unite today- 35mm 
professional film, and 16mm exploration and research film. 4 
It was in France chiefly, just after the war, that the new 
movement had its birth. French youth, leaving the occupa-
tion, the liberation movement, the armed forces, or the 
underground, were desirous of a means of escapism, a feeling 
that has been accurately portrayed, though through a 
romantic veil, in Jacques Becker's Rendez-vous de juillet. 
The Musee de I'Homme effectively became a magnet of 
attraction for all youth seeking adventure and discovery. 
Around ethnologists like Marcel Griaule, Andre Leroi-
Gourhan, Reverend Leenhardt, and Theodore Monod, and 
great travellers like Paul-Emile Victor or Bertrand Flornoy, 
there developed a spontaneous grouping of young, well 
disposed people ready to go off to Greenland, the Antarctic, 
Borneo, Tierra del Fuego, New Guinea, or Africa. Noel Ball if, 
a young organizer out of the underground , put together a 
short Musee de I 'Homme mission, the 1946 Ogooue-Congo 
expedition, which was the first collaboration of ethnologists 
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and filmmakers and which remains a model of this genre. 
During this mission the first quality sound recordings in 
Africa were made; in addition, they allowed for making film 
sound tracks that would not have to fake exotic music. The 
three 35mm black-and-white films made during this trip-
Danses Congolaises, Au Pays des Pygmees, and Pirogues sur 
I'Ogooue- remain the first high quality images and sounds of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and they constitute first rate documents 
on traditional Congo dances, the daily life of the Ba-Binga 
pygmies, and canoe transportation from the Lastourville falls 
to Lambarene, on the Ogooue river. 5 
Concurrently, a young French filmmaker, Franc;;ois 
Villiers, shot two very different films in Equatorial Africa: 
Autour de Brazzaville and Amitie Noire. The first told the 
story of how the Middle Congo rallied behind Free France 
during the war, and the second, narrated by Jean Cocteau, 
was a poetic essay on the cultures of Chad. It is necessary to 
say that these films are not of great interest, but nevertheless 
constitute one element of the renewal of African cinema. 
The films of Villiers and the Ogooue-Congo mission were 
shot in 35mm, in the same way that conventional com-
mercial productions were made; they required the use of 
heavy equipment and reliance on a camera crew. This was 
due to the influence of the Institute des Hautes Etudes 
Cinematographiques (IDHEC), which advocated the use of 
35mm materials and technical crews for the production of all 
films, even those shot in the most remote areas. Yet at the 
same time this institute was also interested in the experi-
ments by young groups of travellers and researchers who 
were voluntarily oriented toward 16mm. 
For example, at the same time as the Ogooue-Congo 
mission, the author of this report, with two comrades, Ponty 
and Sauvy, descended the Niger river by canoe, and made 
16mm black-and-white films during the trip. I must note that 
we had chosen 16mm as a last resort, because commercial 
cinema producers were not interested in our project. If the 
results were disappointing (in particular, we used a very fast 
negative film, and we didn't have the money to deal with 
problems of heat and humidity) , a document on hip-
popotamus hunting by harpoon on the Niger river was 
nevertheless completed. From these pieces, Actualites 
Franc;;aises made a 35mm blowup (the first black-and-white 
blowup to be made in France) and edited a ten-minute film 
entitled Au Pays des Mages Noirs. 
From this point on there was a split in African cinema 
between two options : 35mm films with commercial and 
technical guarantees, and 16mm films for eventual blowup or 
use in lectures. 6 
Here we must note a single exception to the general rule 
of 16mm's evolution (i.e., shooting in 16mm and then 
enlarging to 35mm). This is the case of Albert Mahuzier, who 
began by making 35mm films on hunting in Chad for 
Actualites Franc;;aises, and later created a sort of family 
enterprise of world travel (including a trip across Africa with 
his wife and nine children) and directed 16mm films for 
lectures. These films have been an enormous popular success 
in France and Belgium, but concern Africa only in a 
secondary manner, as the principal subject was the life of the 
Mahuzier family in the course of their expeditions. 
After 1948 films made in Africa multiplied; it is not 
possible to mention them all; I will nevertheless try to group 
them by types, illustrated by a few titles. 
The first post-war African fiction film seems to be Paysans 
No irs (titled Famoro, le Tyran in Africa) by Georges Regnier; 
the film was shot and produced by the same crew that made 
the Ogooue-Congo films. Despite the na·J·vete of the scenario 
(Voltaic countrymen are terrorized by a Black despot and it 
is only the intervention of the colonial administration that 
brings them happiness and prosperity) this film represents an 
important stage in the development of African cinema. For 
here, alongside the story, a real Africa- its countrysides, its 
peoples, and above all its dialogues- appeared for the first 
time. After Paysans Noirs, all African films shot on studio 
sets appeared singularly null. For example, Le Char des 
Dieux, a film made at about the same time in Cameroon by 
Alfred Chaumel, and then edited using footage from all over 
Africa, was outdated before it reached the screen. 
Another noteworthy pre-1950 effort was Thorold Dicken-
son's Le Sorcier Nair (The Black Witch Doctor). This film 
was shot in a studio near London and was deliberately 
non-documentary, both in terms of framework and char-
acters. Nevertheless, it was the first treatment of the problem 
of the confrontation of White and African civilization. 
Also before 1950, 16mm developed further due to the 
new possibilities of color film and printing 16mm sound 
composite copies. Thus, I myself made three films in 1948: 
Les Magiciens du Wanzerbe, Circoncision , and Initiation a Ia 
Danse des Possedes. These films, like those I made preceding 
them, were attempts to illustrate systematic ethnographic 
studies in the loop of Niger. However, in the course of 
projections limited to professional film people, I realized that 
with a portable 16mm camera an ethnographer-filmmaker 
could bring back documents whose scope could reach 
beyond I imited specialist audiences. After 1948 it was thus 
necessary to envision 16mm to 35mm color blowups, 7 but 
this operation was not technically possible in Europe until 
after 1951. In the United States this experiment had already 
proved possible using the technicolor process. Unfortunately 
this process necessitated printing a great number of copies in 
order to be commercially feasible, and was not applicable to 
films where the maximum demand to be hoped for would 
not exceed ten copies. 
The year 1950 is an important turning point in the 
evolution of African film. The attempts of the preceding 
years marked the end of the cheap exoticism so characteristic 
of the pre-war films, and showed the necessity of discovering 
and understanding African cultures if one wanted to com-
municate about them to members of other cultures. More-
over, 1950 historically marked the opening of the colonial 
crisis and the first independence movements in African 
countries. From this point until present one sees the 
following trends in African films: 
Exotic Africa. Outside of the Tarzan films, for which 
Africa was but a backdrop, a certain number of filmmakers, 
chiefly Americans, continued to exploit the "cannibal" and 
"witch doctor's dance" film genre. Africa, as before the war, 
was no more than scenery, and the Africans themselves 
functioned only as the unfortunate extras that one never 
hesitated to dress up in costumes of materials from the far 
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Atlantic, and paint with dreadful tatoos in order to take 
advantage of "local color." 
As an example one can cite King Solomon's Mines (which 
started the Tutsi dancers of Ruanda-Urundi on their film 
career), whose very first images- a wounded elephant sup-
ported by its cows- are the only ones worth the trouble of 
keeping. Other examples are Nagana, a ghastly gangster film 
made among the Peul of Cameroon, but which could just 
as well have taken place in Marseilles or Chicago, and finally, 
a film made in Gabon by the production crew that made 
Lost Continent, for which a plastic skeleton was brought 
from Rome for the witchcraft scenes. This genre of film is far 
from exhausted, and today, in Kenya or Chad, someone is 
still shooting some new production in which Africa will serve 
as a country of beasts and savages, precisely fitting the White. 
man's standard of adventure. 8 
Ethnographic Africa. Here we find filmmakers and eth-
nographers trying, sometimes rather clumsily, to show the 
most authentic aspects of African cultures. The influence of 
ethnographic film has not been limited to scientific research, 
and has already modified quite a few commercial films made · 
in Africa. 
In the purely ethnographic field, we must first note the 
films of Luc de Heusch, one illustrating an ethnographic 
thesis on Tutsi kinship (Ruanda), another concerning the 
lineage system of the Hamba of the Kasa·,- (Fete Chez les 
Hamba). Here the ethnographer turned filmmaker, and tried 
to use film as a contribution to the techniques of eth-
nographic research. These two unpretentious but very care-
fully made films remain the only authentic documents on 
cultures of the Congo before the troubles of independence. 
And in comparison, the numerous high-budget Belgian films 
made in the Congo, such as Congo, Sp/endeur Sauvage, or 
most of the short films by Gerard de Boe, seem less faithful. 
The case of Henri Brandt is different: he was a filmmaker 
who came to ethnography in order to make a film in Africa. 
After a preparatory mission among the Peul bororo nomads 
of Niger, Professor Gabus, director of the ethnographic 
museum at Neuchatel, sent Brandt out to the field for a year 
alone with these savannah pastoralists. Working in 16mm, 
Brandt brought back an extremely valuable document, 
accompanied by remarkably well recorded location sound. 
Brandt's Les Nomades du Solei/ remains a classic film, even 
though it has never been distributed commercially. 
From the beginning, all of these efforts were not 
particularly well greeted in scientific circles, and when the 
Comite du Film Ethnographique was created at the Musee de 
!'Homme, and charged with the responsibility of initiating 
students of ethnography to the techniques of cinema, a 
certain number of ethnographers reproached us for placing 
the research of an image before ethnographic research itself. 9 
Despite this slight resistance, a true school of Africanist-
filmmakers has developed, some working alone, others 
working with the aid of film technicians. We should mention 
the following. 
Among the ethnographers: Capron, who with filmmaker 
Serge Ricci made Noces d'Eau (fertility rites of the Bobo and 
Bambara in the San region of Mali) and Bobo-Oute (daily life 
of the Bobo-Oule on the border of Upper Volta and Mali; 
Igor de Garine, who alone shot Gourouna, Bergers Sacres and 
Les Hommes du Logone (both concerning daily life and 
religion of peoples in Chad); Claude Millet, who despite 
problems with a bad camera made one of the most disturbing 
films on rites of passage in Equatorial Africa, Rites de Ia 
Circoncision Chez les Mongom; Monique and Robert Gessain, 
who illustrated their work on large initiation ceremonies of 
the Coniagui (Guinea-Senegal border) with the color film Le 
Temps du Came/eon; Guy le Moal, ethnographer and director 
of the Research Institute in Upper Volta, who during the 
many years of re~earch for his thesis on the Bobo-Fing made 
a film on the role of children in religious masking traditions, 
Les Masques des Feuil/es; and Dr. Zahan, anthropology 
professor at the Univers ity of Strasbourg, thanks to whom I 
was able to make a film on the funeral ceremonies of Mossi 
chieftans in Upper Volta, Moro-Naba. 
Among the filmmakers: Jacques Darribehaude, who made 
two 16mm color films in Mali, Pays Mandingue and Saison 
Seche (daily life in Malinke country in the go ldfields of the 
Sigiri region); Georges Bourdelon, who made a 16mm 
documentary on artisans of the Sahara, Forgerons du Desert; 
Pierre lchac, who while out shooting a film on wild animals 
brought back a 16-mm·synthetic d_ocumentary on populations 
-of Chad, En Regardqnt P~sser /e Tchad. 10 
_- · .Even ' professional filmmakers began trying to make truly 
ethnographi-c films. Jacques Dupont, filmmaker of the 1946 
Ogooue-Congo expedition, later made, in 1951, a remarkable 
film, La Grande Case concerning Bamileke, Peul, and 
Bamoun chieftainships in western Cameroon. Pierre-
Dominique Gaisseau (also a former member of the 
Ogooue-Congo mission) made a series of films in Guinea on 
the Toma, Bassari, and Nalou peoples; Foret Sacree (first 
version in 1953), Pays Bassari, and Naloutai. Following these 
first documents Gaisseau went back to Africa with two 
European friends in order to be initiated into the secret 
societies of the Toma. The long version of Foret Sacree is the 
story of their attempt. Little by I ittle they are received by 
members of Toma society, are tattooed, make a retreat into 
the forest for purification rites, but then, at the last moment, 
are not allowed to penetrate into the sacred forest. Sick and 
demoralized, they abandon their attempt. This film, which 
was contested by a number of ethnologists who felt that 
being initiated into another society was the surest way to 
lose the objectivity necessary for scientific study, neverthe-
less brought an entirely new aspect of ethnography to the 
screen. For the first time one is an actual witness to the 
research, which perhaps was hopeless, but nevertheless shows 
an unbounded respect for African culture. For in the end, 
this defeated attempt is a defense of the forest, which 
refused to be violated by unknowns, despite the fact that 
they had made relatively considerable accomplishments. 11 
Evolving Africa. Here filmmakers tried to show the 
problems posed by contact between traditional Africa and 
the modern world. In this instance the cinema is up against 
the same obstacles as African sociology. In both cases the 
principal stumbling block appears to me to be an ignorance 
of traditional cultures in the process of evolution. This fault 
is particularly serious when manifest in films of a propagan-
distic tendency, where the filmmakers preferred to mock 
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traditional African cultures, rather than attempt to under-
stand them. 
We have already mentioned the first film on accultura-
tion - Cou/iba/y a I'Aventure, made in 1936. This topic was 
not dealt with again until 1950, when a young student at 
IDHEC (the French Film Institute), Vautier, clandestinely 
made Afrique 50. This film shows the struggle of the young 
RDA party in the Ivory Coast, which was then under attack 
from the colonial administration. Shot in 16mm, black-and-
white, with a makeshift soundtrack added later, Afrique 50 
was prohibited in Africa and France, and limited to 
cinematheque showings. 
Another banned film was Alain Resnais and Chris 
Marker's Les Statues Meurent Aussi, made in European 
African museums by means of a remarkable montage of 
archive documents from Africa. The thesis was that the 
statues of African art in Western museums are degraded 
because they have lost the meaning of their representations, 
and the new African art that has been influenced by the West 
is already completely decadent. This violent and admirable 
film was censured and has only been seen by a privileged 
few. 12 
At the same time, the first African students at IDHEC, 
unable to obtain administrative permission to film in their 
own countries, turned the situation around and began 
making African films in Europe. If Mamani Toure's 
Mouramani, a story based on Guinean folklore, is only of 
slight interest, Afrique sur Seine, by Paulin Soumanou 
Vieyra, Jacques Melokane, Mamadou Sarr, and cameraman 
Caristan, is truly the first Black film. It is an interesting 
attempt to show the lives of Africans in Paris; unfortunately 
it only remained an experiment since the final editing and 
the sound track were never carried to completion. 
Besides these more or less ill-starred films of the 1950s, a 
great number of films were shot in all countries throughout 
Africa on the subject of acculturation. But as already noted, 
they were made in ignorance- if not contempt- of traditional 
cultures in the process of evolving. In these films, as before in 
Paysans Noirs, L 'Homme du Niger, and even Bozambo, 
African cultures were considered as archaic, and as unworthy 
of surviving contact with Western culture. Their existence 
was simply to be assimilated over time by "progress." In this 
connection I should mention Men of Africa, made in East 
Africa by Grierson and his group. This film treats the rivalry 
of the educated Blacks of the savannah and the primitive 
pygmies of the forest. Also, C'etait le Premier Chant, by 
Carlos Vilardebo, a story of a young French civil servant who 
tries to improve the situation of a Cameroon bush village that 
is impoverished by both dryness and the lack of initiative of 
its inhabitants. Other films are Bongo/a, made in Belgian 
Congo by Andre Cauvin, a story that follows the misad-
ventures of a young Bapende girl who runs away from her 
village to be reunited with her fiance, a sanitary assistant, 
because her parents want her to marry against her will. 1 3 
Finally, The Boy Kumasenu, made by Sean Graham and the 
Ghana Film Unit in 1952, a story of the difficulties of a 
young fisherman who runs away from his village in the 
lagoon and falls into the corrupt city, where he turns from 
justice to delinquency. 
Two films made by Claude Vermorel in Gabon and 
Guinea, Les Conquerants Solitaires, and La Plus Belle des 
Vies, must be put in a somewhat different category. Here the 
author has tried to treat the reverse aspect of acculturation: 
the European who lets himself be taken in by the African 
cultures which he first set out to discover. 
The political struggles for independence have equally 
inspired a certain number of films but, unfortunately, very 
few seem satisfactory. It was singularly the Mau-Mau struggle 
in Kenya that inspired the largest number of films. An 
example is Peter Brooks' Something of Value (1953), which 
tried to show the evolution of a friendship between two 
young students, one White and one Black, who as a result of 
circumstances find themselves in two opposing camps. This 
tremendously narve and quite evidently prejudiced film is 
one more example of the unconscious attack on African 
dignity. Once again the African and his civilization are placed 
on an inferior level. For example, the major scene in the film 
shows the confession of an African nationalist leader who 
betrays his compatriots because he was afraid of a calamity. 
Simba, made by Brias Desmond Huerst in 1955, is an 
incredibly violent expose about an African medical doctor 
whose father is the chief of a Mau-Mau group named Simba; 
the doctor can find no other solution to this drama than 
death. Freedom, an extremely costly film made by Moral 
Rearmament stresses the movement's customary theme of 
redemption of sin by confession. Properly speaking, and 
despite its title, this is not a film about political emanci_pa-
tion, but a propaganda film for the International Moral 
Rearmament Organization. 
A rather similar category includes films made by African 
film units on the occasions of their countries ' independence. 
A typical example is Freedom for Ghana, by Sean Graham, 
concerning the independence of Ghana on March 6, 1957. 
The historical interest of this film helps one forget its slightly 
irritating propaganda angle. 
It is too soon to discuss J oris Ivens' Demain a Nanguila, 
made in Mali during the summer of 1962. This film treats the 
possible evolution of a peasant community supported by the 
government party. 
Outlines of a true African cinema. All of the films just 
discussed were attempts by foreigners using film to convey 
their impressions- or their knowledge- of certain African 
problems. Here again the influence of ethnographic film, 
despite its modesty, is really considerable. Very quickly we 
have filmmakers wanting to reach below the surface, wanting 
to transcend the stage of exoticism, wanting to make the 
spectator enter easily into the African world, be it traditional 
or modern. And these are the first efforts toward a true 
African cinema of tomorrow. 
The first example comes from South Africa, where in 
1948 the Reverend Michael Scott made an extremely violent 
black-and-white film, Civilization on Trial in South Africa, 
which shows the reactions of Black South Africans to 
problems of racial segregation. Also from South Africa came 
the first film with a truly African story, even though it is told 
by a White. The film is Englishman Donald Swanson's Magic 
Garden, based on a ballad by a young Black man from 
johannesburg (Ralph Trewhela, who plays the role of the 
lame flutist). The film recounts the amazing adventures of a 
thief who robs forty pounds from a church, loses it, then 
recovers it, and so on, with someone helped at every turn 
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along the way, until the money is finally returned to the 
church. This little masterpiece has unfortunately passed 
unnoticed in France owing to the fact that its French 
adaptation was particularly difficult. 
In Ghana, Sean Graham followed something of the same 
idea in jaguar (High Life), a ballet based on the theme of a 
popular song making fun of "been to" Africans who had 
studied in Great Britain. 
Other films were already in the works. In South Africa an 
American director, Lionel Rogosin, made Come Back, Africa 
(1959) which presented an even stronger message about the 
victims of South African racism. Undoubtedly, one might 
demand to know whether this film is not more the testimony 
of Rogosin on apartheid, than it is a cry of revolt by the 
victims of segregation themselves. But letting the role of the 
filmmaker be what it may, at some moments it is Africa 
which speaks, and the director is no longer the master of the 
door he has unlocked. 
It is in this same spirit that I, too, have worked over the 
last several years. As far back as the making of my 
conventional ethnographic film Les Fils de I'Eau I tried to 
avoid the traps of exoticism. Flaherty had already shown me 
a way of directing the documentary; by organizing and 
ordering the authentic elements of a culture the filmmaker 
takes them out of their alien framework and renders them 
accessible to a world public. But no one could hope to rival 
Flaherty's achievement of making Nanook the friend of men 
who had never seen an Eskimo. I thus tried another path, 
that of giving a voice to Africans themselves and asking them 
to comment directly on their behavior, actions, and reac-
tions. In 1955 I used this method in jaguar (not yet edited 
with a final sound track),*** giving three young Nigerian 
migrants the opportunity to tell of an imaginary- though 
plausible- voyage to Ghana. In 1957 I had the same 
experience in the Ivory Coast with Moi, un Nair. During the 
shooting I projected the silent film footage tracing the life of 
a poor dock worker from Abidjan to this same docker who 
had acted his own part, and asked him to improvise a 
narration. The result was remarkable: the docker, Robinson, 
stimulated by the projection of his own image improvised an 
astounding monologue in which he not only reconstructed 
the dialogues for the action but explicated and even judged 
his own actions and those of his fellow actors. 14 
African cinema by Africans for Africans. The attempts 
that I have just discussed have arrived at their own limits. For 
when all is said and done, neither Rogosin, Graham, nor I 
will ever be Africans, and the films that we make will always 
be African films by Europeans. This shortcoming is not bad 
in itself, nor does it prevent us from continuing to make 
African films. But it is time that the statement is made, as it 
has been by Georges Sadoul (Ibid.) "that Africans make 
African films using African money." This is starting to 
happen (I will discuss the technical training of African 
filmmakers a bit later) and already Paulin Soumanou Vieyra, 
the earliest of the African students trained at IDHEC, 
teaching in Dakar for several years, has produced a film, 
though perhaps still a bit awkward. Un Homme, Un Ideal, 
Une Vie portrays the misadventures of a fisherman on the 
Senegal shore who violates tradition by putting a motor on 
his canoe. But despite the awkwardness, what ingenuity! 
Here the African tradition is not judged; it is stated and 
exhibited, and if the forest trees speak and join in with the 
counsel of village elders, no one dreams of ridiculing it. 
Owing to lack of funds this film has never been 
completed. But Paulin Soumanou Vieyra has other projects, 
and he is no longer alone. Just to mention French-speaking 
Africa, it is from Vieyra and his comrades, Blaise Senghor, 
Timite Bassari, Thomas Coulibaly, Jean-Paul N'Gassa, and 
others, that we must wait for this film which we all hope 
for- above all, we European directors of African films. 1 5 
NOTES 
1 Europeans go to films on an average of thirty or forty times per 
year; Indians, Middle Easterners, and North Africans one time per 
year; Africans one time every thirty or forty years, and in some 
African countries once per century. 
2 See Georges Sadoul, "Le Marche Africain," Afrique Action, 
Tunis, May 1, 1961. 
3 We should note a film shown in Paris in 1935: Soeurs Noires, a 
religious propaganda film in which the actors spoke Zulu. It is 
mentioned by Georges Sadoul in La Vie Africaine, June 15, 1961: 
"Africa has remained, until now, a country of filmic poverty." 
4 1n the United States, on the other hand, the problem was 
previously studied by Walt Disney Studios. They decided to shoot in 
16mm and then enlarge to 35mm; their celebrated series of films that 
included The Living Desert was done in this fashion. Despite their 
technical ingenuity, these films are of limited scientific interest. 
5 These films were made by Jacques Dupont, assisted by an 
exceptional ethnographic team {Raoul Harweg, Gilbert Rouget, Guy 
de Beauchene) as well as an exceptional film crew {Edmond Sechan, 
Pierre-Dominique Gaisseau, Andre Didier, Nef, Francis Mazieres). All 
of them have continued in these paths since this first experience. 
6 We cannot speak here about lecture "exploration" films as most 
of them have disappeared owing to the absurd lecture circuit system 
that required projecting the original. These lecture circuits began to 
be extraordinarily popular in France in 1946 {the "Connaissance du 
Monde" series held at Salle Pleyel, as well as series in the provinces) 
and in Belgium in 1950 {the" Exploration du Monde" series). Here we 
will simply report the format of these lectures: 16mm color films of 
about one hour in length, with direct narration by the lecturer-
filmmaker. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of these lecture 
circuits Africa was one of the weakest attractions. So the loss of 
African films here is not very serious. The only valuable documents 
were edited elsewhere, had sound added, and were then marketed; we 
will discuss these films shortly. 
7The instigator was filmmaker Rene Clement, who had made a 
16mm color film of a trip to Yemen, around 1939. Titled L 'Arabie 
lnterdite, the film was only shown at lectures. 
8
we should also mention Denis' TV films of safaris in Kenya, 
where one finds some remarkable sequences on wild animals {baboons 
attacking an antelope who is giving birth), but where Africa and 
Africans are merely scenery. 
9 The Comite du Film Ethnographique was founded by the 
permanent advisory committee of the International Congress of 
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences during the Vienna meet-
ings in 1952. Its creation followed the projection of films by the 
author which were presented under the heading of an ethnographic 
contribution. These films were made with the help of Roger Rosfelder 
in Niger in 1951-52. They were all 16mm Kodachrome with original 
sound tracks: Bataille sur /e Grand Fleuve {hippopotamus hunting), 
Cimetiere dans Ia Falaise (funeral rites of the Dogan of the Bandiagara 
cliffs), Yenendi: Les Hommes qui Font Ia Pluie {rainmaking rites 
among the Sonrai and Zerma). These films were later joined together 
and blown up to 35mm- one of the first made in Europe- and retitled 
Les Fils de I'Eau. 
1 0 we should also mention Fran~ois Balsan's L 'Expedition 
Panhard-Capricorne on the Kalahari desert of South Africa, Fievet's 
films on Nigeria, especially Kana, the films now being edited by 
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Father Pairault on Northern Cameroon, and Civatte's films on Niger. 
All of these films are 16mm Kodachrome, unfortunately reserved for 
limited distribution. 
11 Also deserving of mention is Omaru, a film made in 1954 in 
35mm Agfacolor by Quendler, an Austrian filmmaker. Shot among 
the Kirdi and Peul of the Mandara mountains, its subject is a sort of 
African epic about the unhappy loves of a young Kipsiki shepherd. 
Without any scientific pretensions whatsoever, this film offers some 
interesting views of the life of the Kipsiki and the Peul chiefdom of 
Rai Bouba. 
12The commercial release of Statues was an emasculated version 
that has been publicly rejected by the authors. 
13 Andre Cauvin has since made a film on the visit of King 
Badouin to the Congo, and another on Congolese independence. The 
editing of these two films together with a film on present day Congo 
(1961) would make Cauvin's collected work into the most important 
document on the evolution of a single African state. 
14 Finally we should mention the American TV films made in 
Kenya for Time-Life Inc. by Richard Leacock, formerly Flaherty's 
assistant on Louisiana Story. For the first time in Africa, Leacock and 
his crew used a portable camera synchronized to a portable tape 
recorder. I will return to this subject in the third part of this report. 
15 I have not cited the films made in South Africa by local 
companies (particularly the films of Jack and Jamy Ulys) treating 
typically South African subjects. Although the production of these 
films is important and liable to increase given the favorable conditions 
in South Africa, they cannot be considered as African films since they 
are almost exclusively films made by Afrikanders, in Afrikaans, and 
dealing only with subjects of interest to Afrikanders. 
TRANSLATOR'S NOTES 
* English translation of "Situation et tendances du cmema en 
Afrique" which appeared as an appendix, pp. 374-408, of the Premier 
Catalogue Selectif International de Films Ethnographiques sur 
/'Afrique Nair, Paris, UNESCO, 1967. Rouch's paper was first written 
and presented to a UNESCO symposium in 1961. A translation of the 
1961 original was prepared by UNESCO for limited distribution. 
Portions of the first third of the article, slightly edited and modified, 
formed the basis of a short article, "The Awakening African Cinema" 
published in the UNESCO Courier, March 1962. Otherwise, Rouch's 
ex tensive knowledge of African cinema has not previously been 
accessible to an English-reading public. The translation is by Steve 
Feld, Anthropology Film Center, Santa Fe; special thanks are again 
due Ms. Marielle Delorme of the Comite International des Films de 
!'Homme in Paris for review and for locating a copy of the 1961 
UNESCO translation. Due to the unusual length of the article it will 
appear in two parts. Rouch's own footnotes are numbered through 
the text; asterisks refer to translation notes. 
**" ... le courage et Ia bonne humeur du tirailleur 'senegalais' 
favoriserent Ia creation du stereotype du Nair bon enfant, style 'Y a 
bon Banania.' " The Senegalese sharpshooter is a common West 
African stereotype. Marielle Delorme informs me that "Y a bon " is a 
publicity slogan for Banania, a commercial breakfast cocoa with 
bananas. The picture illustrating the product shows a smiling Black 
brandishing bananas and speaking pidgin French. The image of the 
happy banana-eating African is perhaps most similar to the "Uncle 
Tom" and" Aunt Jemima" stereotype of Black Americans. 
***jaguar was finished in 1967. The catalog to which Rouch's 
paper is appended lists a French version of 130 minutes. A 90-minute 
version with English subtitles has been available in the United States 
since 1972. 
EDITOR'S NOTE. My apologies to Marie/le Delorme, translation con-
sultant on this series, whose name was inadvertently transformed to 
"Delorine " in th e Editor's Introduction to the first issue of Studies 
(Vol. 7 No. 7, p. 2). - SW 
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The Old Ones of New Mexico. Robert Coles. Ph otographs by 
Alex Harris. Albuquerque: University of New Mex ico 
Press, 1973. 74 pp., 40 photographs. $7.95. 
Reviewed by Edward T. Ha/1 1 
Northwestern University 
To the Spanish Americans of New Mexico, there are two 
kinds of books: those by insiders and those by outsiders. The 
Old Ones is by an outsider. However, an unwary reader could 
be misled into believing that the people Coles interviewed-
an old woman, a storekeeper, an ex-janitor-farmer, and a 
priest- are really presenting an inside view of Spanish Ameri-
can village life in New Mexico, for on first perusal one is left 
with the impression that Coles learned something. As a 
matter of fact, this impression prevailed among the outsiders 
(predominantly Anglo) whom I interviewed about The Old 
Ones. Almost without exception they liked the book and 
said something to the effect that "this was a true to life 
picture." They then commented on how well the book was 
written. It seems, therefore, that if you are a liberal middle-
class Anglo, the chances are that you will find yourself re-
sponding as many such do, and will accept this book at face 
value. 
As to Coles' proficiency as a writer, judging writing is like 
judging art. One hesitates to criticize a "Pulitzer Prize" 
winner for his writing, but this reviewer, having subjected 
Coles' book to an old but reliable test, found the writing 
wanting. The test is simplicity itself- does the writing im-
prove or appear to deteriorate with each reading? Most slick 
writing must stand up through at least the first reading, and 
may stand a second, while only exceptional writing reveals 
new insights, subtleties, and discoveries with each successive 
reading. Some of the problem stems from the fact that Coles 
was translating from Spanish to English, and Coles himself 
admits to "broken or at best passable" Spanish (p. xv). 
Several of my informants, the ones who really know New 
Mexico, had never heard anyone talk the way Coles has his 
subjects talking. 
I do not want to give the impression that I am simply 
"out to get Coles." Far from it. His stated intentions are 
good, and I laud his concern for children and old people. I 
agree with his introductory observations that the "gente" are 
"strong, proud, vigorous, independent." I am not taking issue 
with Coles personally or even with his manifest goals. Mine is 
a deeper, subtler, more insidious target. I want to speak for 
people everywhere against the kind of cultural imperalism-
the naive meddling- the unstated sense of superiority, and 
the condescension of the American intellectual establishment 
whenever they discover something different which they think 
they understand when quite clearly they do not. As a resi-
dent of New Mexico for over 50 years, I have found much to 
object to in the traditional Anglo intellectual's view of our 
Southwestern ethnic groups- be they Indian or Spanish. 
These outside experts all too often distort their data and, 
through unconscious selection of their material, reinforce the 
very stereotypes they seek to break down. Books like this 
one mislead the public about the complexity of interethnic 
research, and at best they appear to condescend. Grantsman-
ship and status all too often involve treating one's data and 
one's subjects as pawns on the chessboard of success. This 
point is not lost on our Indian and Spanish friends when they 
talk about these "rip-offs" by instant experts. 
Admittedly, many of the outsiders who have written 
about the cultures of the southwest were not consciously 
putting us down; they were simply using the procedural, 
analytic, and literary models bequeathed to them by their 
elders and popular with their peers. It is these unconscious, 
unevaluated, unquestioned models that should be unmasked. 
This is not an easy task, for, as Einstein once said, ways of 
thinking that one takes most for granted are imbibed 
"practically with the mother's milk" and are reinforced from 
that moment on. 
The principal problem I face in criticizing Coles' book is 
that those who know Spanish American culture well will 
immediately recognize what I am tal king about, while others 
will not. Let us therefore begin with a few questions, exam-
ples, and tests that might be applied to the book. Perhaps in 
that way at least the outlines of my objections to much of 
modern social science will begin to emerge. 
Question 7. If one removed all the references that fix the 
scene in a particular space/time frame (Northern New 
Mexico, late twentieth century) would it be possible to dis-
tinguish the people Coles describes from any others in similar 
circumstances in another part of the world? I think not. 
They could be poor Greek or Asian villagers who are strug-
gling with life and death and a marginal subsistence economy 
in a rapidly changing world. All over the world people 's 
problems are exacerbated by an encroaching complex tech-
nology controlled by other groups. This control may rest 
with another class, caste, political, religious, or ethnic group. 
What, then, is unique? In other words, where are the New 
Mexico Spanish Americans in this book? Who paid enough 
attention, who cared enough to find out who they really are? 
What we see is reporting by cookie cutter. Find a people who 
are living marginal lives and let them tell their stories in their 
own words. How simple, yet how deceptive. What gets left 
out is the core of their culture. Such decontexting omissions 
by a psychiatrist of Coles' background are incomprehensible 
to me. 
Question 2. How does this conscious and unconscious 
structuring of data distort the picture he presents? Coles fre-
quently hides the identity of his villages (a social science 
device designed ostensibly to "protect" one's subjects). If 
there is one critical piece of information one needs to know 
before anything else when evaluating a report about New 
Mexico it is the identity of the particular village one is re-
porting about. Northern New Mexico villages may look alike 
to outsiders, but they are not. Truchas is different from 
Pojoaque, Pojoaque from Nambe and J acona, Trampas from 
Ojo Sarco and Penasco. Each has a distinctive character that 
leaves its stamp on its residents. Villages near Santa Fe and 
Albuquerque are different from those in Rio Arriba, and 
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mountain villages from those in the valley. Each produces its 
own characteristic gestalts for dealing with the environment. 
Coles does name Cordova where Mrs. Garcia lives, but hides 
the identity of the other three. Another point to understand 
is that what impresses one the most about village life is that 
it is made up of a complex web of strong personalities and 
their relationships to each other set in the unconscious 
matrix of Spanish culture. Yet there is no feeling in Coles' 
book for the interplay of either personalities or culture at the 
deeper levels. In fact, one is left with the impression that 
these do not exist. These relationships are not discovered 
overnight, and the Spanish, like every other ethnic group, 
cannot describe the structure of the paradigms by which they 
live. The observer has to be around long enough and be 
involved enough to recognize and define these paradigms. 
Unfortunately most research in social science is geared to 
one- to five-year time spans, and the investigators must 
"produce" within these times frames because that is the way 
their work is funded. How can the results be anything but 
superficial? 
Question 3. How about the "facts" related to the people 
Coles writes about. On page 16, he notes, "boredom or in-
difference" ... to "politics"!! Why this conclusion? Because 
the Garcias don't listen to Walter Cronkite and John Chancel-
lor. Why should they? Cronkite and Chancellor live in Coles' 
world, not the world of the Garcias. The fact that it is a 
different world does not make it less valid, involving, or 
rewarding to live in. Politics in New Mexico are local- charac-
teristically personal and intense. To give the impression that 
indigenous New Mexicans are apolitical is a distortion of the 
worst kind. 
The importance of the church in New Mexican life comes 
through and, if anything, is overemphasized, but I suspect 
that the emphasis on God, church, and priest may be simply 
an artifact of Coles' methodology. Coles (p. 14) seems sur-
prised that the people are philosophers. What does he expect 
when an Anglo outsider comes in and wants to immortalize 
his subject's speech by putting it in a book? These people are 
tal king for the record when Coles is not tal king for them, and 
there is no way to tell which is which. However, what I 
object to is not a particular sentence or word attributed to 
his subjects but the totality of these texts and commentaries. 
This book is like a Norman Rockwell painting or a portrait 
by Bachrach, designed to appear more like the idealized 
image than to convey a sense of reality. In this connection, 
when I questioned individuals who have I ived in New Mexico 
all their lives and who have worked at the interface between 
Anglo and Spanish American culture, their first comments 
were how improbable the conversation sounded as reported 
by Coles. "He is silent because he understands the world" (p. 
23). Who ever heard "No habla porque entiende el mundo" 
coming from the mouth of a Truchas villager? 
For years, recording people's speech and juggling 
sentences and situations to hide identities has been a popular 
device of social science. Given the mass of raw data this 
technique generates, it is an easy method for fieldworkers. 
Yet the very convenience of the system obscures its defects 
and pitfalls, of which there are a number. Unless one is extra-
ordinarily gifted and has a deep feeling for pattern, the 
people lose their dimensionality and become flat, pasteboard 
figures, colorless and devoid of the juice of life and of all 
human frailty. The people in The Old Ones are unreal. The 
Spanish Americans of New Mexico have blood in their veins 
and are subject to the same negative human emotions, greed, 
envy, lust, anger, and hate as the rest of humanity. None of 
this comes out. 
Some mention of Alex Harris (Coles' photographic col-
laborator and friend) is in order. Coles calls him a "pioneer." 
He states that Harris's photographs are the first real efforts to 
document the life of the people. All other photographers are 
supposed to have been captivated by the country. Clearly, 
Irving Rusinow's Camera Report on El Cerrito was over-
looked, but no doubt the 1942 publication date had some-
thing to do with this. In discussing photographs it is very 
important to remember that man does not see passively. He 
paints his own picture of the world with his eyes, and even 
more so with a camera. Harris's photographs are no excep-
tion. Another photographer would have told a different 
story, and if the reader takes this to heart he will not be 
misled. The Old Ones is a story by Coles and Harris. It is 
their story, and a much better picture of what they see, 
think, and value than it is of the people who mouth the 
sentiments that Coles chose to include in the text. People are 
always looking at things through their own eyes, which 
would be all right if only they would realize that what they 
see is not always what is there. We see this most graphically 
in Harris's photographs- he repeats all of Coles' cliches and 
thereby reinforces the middle-class stereotyped distortions. 
One returns to the fact that one does not see passively. What 
Harris sees, the Spanish do not like, which is one of the ways 
we know that their visual models are different from ours. 
Behind these differences one sees two cultures struggling to 
reach each other with little or no awareness on the part of 
either the social scientist or the photographer that cultural 
differences are far from abstract, but are instead very real, 
very deep, and extraordinarily subtle. 
Note 
1This review is a slightly revised version of a review appearing in 
the Rio Grande Sun (Santa Fe, New Mexico) , Vol. 1, No.4 , Septem-
ber5 , 1974. 
CANCIAN REPLIES TO COLLIER 
Frank Cancian 
Stanford University 
I thank the Book Review Editor for inviting me to reply 
to John Collier's review of my Another Place: Photographs 
of a Maya Community (Scrimshaw Press, 1974) which ap-
pears in the first number of this journal (Studies 1 :60-61, 
1974). 
I would like to respond to: (1) Collier's comment on the 
message of the book; (2) his comments on the organization 
of the book; (3) his speculations about my intent as a person 
and an anthropologist; and (4) his exploration of the proper 
nature of visual anthropology. First, I want to say that Col-
lier has not really reviewed my book. He begins by stating 
that "it offers a starting point for reasoning and exploring 
further the contribution of visual communication for anthro-
pology, for it places focus on the intellectual and creative 
role of the anthropologist." In what follows, I serve as his 
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straw anthropologist and the book serves as the foil against 
which he expounds his conception of orthodoxy for visual 
anthropology. 
Collier ridicules the title and principal message of the 
book by comparing it to the logically suspect "People have 
to live somewhere, so everywhere there are some people." 
"Zinacantan is another place where people live" (the final 
line of my introduction) is clearly, in the context given it, a 
phrasing of the standard message: despite their differences, 
people share a common humanity. Anthropologists and 
many other people are constantly struggling in life and work 
with the distance between humans created by cultural differ-
ence. The fact that one more statement about common 
humanity will not solve the problem does not justify Collier's 
refusal to see it for what it is. 
I believe it is useful to portray people in other cui tures in 
a way that will permit the viewer to see commonalities. To 
take some obvious examples from Another Place : young 
people at the courtship age (pp. 11, 49), a young girl playing 
at women's work (p. 25), a boy tightening and expanding his 
body with his slingshot (pp. 87, 89). If Collier cannot feel 
with these experiences, and/or can see no value in showing 
them to occur among "exotic" people, I am at a loss to 
respond. He is quite right that "the qualities of eyes and the 
fluency and composure of bodies ... cannot be found in 
Liberal, Kansas, or Sleepy Falls, Iowa." But, I hope the 
message of commonality gets through often enough to the 
viewer to make him or her identify with some Zinacanteco 
experiences, and, thus, try to look through the cultural dif-
ferences masking others. 
The book also pictures the material and political realities 
of Zinacanteco life; and a part of the introduction Collier 
does not quote makes explicit the position of subjugation 
they share with other Chiapas Indians and the positive ways 
they use ethnic identity and community boundaries to build 
their own world. Certainly Collier could see the contradic-
tion between children living in the situation the book shows 
and the message on the school blackboard. He might have 
seen a similar message in the Coca Cola sign or in the 
Mexican wedding in the city. And he could have picked up 
the self-confidence and positive feeling in the religious of-
ficials, the farmers, and the judges, or the tension of people 
in Mexican dominated situations. 
These contradictory realities- human commonalities, 
specific material and political superordination/subordination, 
and construction of a bounded more tolerable ingroup- are 
omnipresent, and showing them in the life of Zinacantecos is 
simply another reminder that life is not simple. Collier's 
search for further meaning (paragraph 4 of his review) is 
unrewarded in part, I suppose, because I intended no further 
meaning. 
Collier also charges that "the book has no layout, no 
sequential relationships; pictures tumble one upon the other 
with little association." This is not so. Collier spots the intro-
ductory (pp. 7-15) and concluding (pp. 85-93) photographs 
for what they are. He misses the interplay between photo-
graphs of specific activities outside the home, on the one 
hand, and portraits and domestic scenes on the other. 1 
The transitions from outside to inside are not marked 
(except by content of the photographs), and the viewer 
could easily miss them. It was not my purpose to have them 
noticed, and that may have been a mistake in design of the 
book, for many readers may want more structure than I give. 
It is, however, characteristic of Collier's gratuitous negativism 
that he fails to mention, and apparently fails to notice, that 
each "outside" section begins with a full page devoted to a 
short introductory paragraph. 
The book is also organized, visually, in terms of self-con-
scious use sequences of righthand pages, and repeated use of 
walking and weaving pictures. The layout is not hung on a 
scientific framework, to be sure. 
I will now go on to Collier's speculation about my intent 
as a person and an anthropologist. He is concerned about 
"doubt in the author's mind about photography's place in 
anthropological research" (paragraph 5); "But as an anthro-
pologist, what is he trying to explore in this book?" (para-
graph 7, emphasis in original); and "why did Cancian want to 
retreat from anthropology?" (paragraph 8). 
Collier does not recognize the simple fact that I am a 
photographer who is also an anthropologist. If I, or other 
anthropologists who are also photographers, had to be one 
"thing," and that was the thing he or she was "best" at, most 
of us would probably be anthropologists. But, roles are not 
that mutually exclusive. People do live with internal contra-
dictions and conflicts, and across categories. 
For me, Another Place is a coherent book. I say this as a 
photographer who did not leave his anthropological role 
behind when working on the book. I saw no point in separa-
ting the roles as long as the academic anthropologist did not 
try to take over. As a consequence, it is hard to know clearly 
in what sense the book is anthropology; but that is important 
only if you have a high investment in the boundaries of 
anthropology. In the academic world it is common to eschew 
confusion and conflict and erect rigid intellectual boundaries. 
I did not intend an academic book. 
Finally, what about the contributions of visual com-
munication for anthropology that Collier sets out to "ex-
plore"? They are complicated and apt to be very diverse, I 
think. And they will range from pictures of artifacts used as 
records, to stills and film used as a basis for behavioral analy-
sis, to photographs used as interview aids, to photos, essays 
and films that give people the "feel" of people and places. 
The photograph as data, the photograph as illustration, and 
the photograph as communication are all included. 
I support Collier's exploration of the issues of the subjec-
tive and the objective, the humanistic and the scientific, the 
nature of photography as assertion and description. But he 
seems tired of the debate and determined to impose a unique 
and fairly restricted solution. He seems ready for rules, not 
exploration. Just as many people have begun to fully under-
stand the limitations of "objective" science, to which Collier 
refers, he seems ready to close up shop. In many ways he has 
led visual anthropology to the edge of flourishing by his hard 
work during the difficult times. I hope he agrees that if suc-
cess is transformed into conformity, failure will be just 
around the corner. 
Note 
10utside activities are school (pp. 17-21), fiestas (pp. 27-35), the 
market city (pp. 41-45), men's agricultural work (pp. 51-59), the 
Zinacantan political-legal system (pp. 65-71 ), and Zinacanteco curing 
(pp. 77-83). The contrasting portraits and inside scenes fill pages 
22-25, 36-39, 46-49, 60-63, and 72-75. 
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DUNLOP REPLIES TO ROUCH 
fan Dunlop 
Film Australia 
Lindfield, New South Wales 
I am puzzled by Jean Rouch's references to my films in 
"Man and the Camera" (SAVICOM 1:37-44, 1974). I know 
that Rouch does not much care for Towards Baruya 
Manhood. He has told me so in his frank, honest and 
constructive manner. However, in this article he makes a 
serious and unsubstantiated moral judgment, when he says, 
"the Eskimo films of Asen Balikci, and lan Dunlop's recent 
series on the New Guinea Baruya are for me examples of 
what should never happen again- the intrusion of a group of 
first rate technicians into a difficult field situation, even with 
the aid of an anthropologist" (my italics). 
Rouch is arguing for the one man anthropologist/ 
filmmaker concept. I agree that for many field situations this 
is the ideal; but it is certainly not the only way to make 
ethnographic films as Rouch himself concedes. He states his 
approval of Hadza, Emu Ritual at Ruguri, and The Feast. 
What he does not exp lain is why in one case intrusion is 
acceptable and in another reprehensible. 
We all know, as Rouch says, that filmmaking causes 
cultural disruption, but this app lies to any anthropological 
study, not just fi lm . The degree of that disruption depends 
not on ly upon the quantity, but also the quality of the 
intruders, and on the f ield situation. Why does Rouch stand 
in moral judgment on the intruders into Netsilik and Baruya 
life in particular? 
The Netsilik Eskimo films are a recreation of a bygone 
way of life. Their makers did not intrude into an actual 
situation at all. It is inconceivable that such films could have 
been made without the willing, and, judging by the pictures, 
happy cooperation of the actors. Rouch gives no evidence at 
all to support his contention that morally these films should 
not have been made. 
The Baruya films portray an actual situation. There was 
an intrusion of three film technicians into a valley com-
munity of about eight hundred tough, proud, resilient 
Baruya. Anthropologist Maurice Godelier had been living 
with the Baruya for three years. In consultation with them 
he invited me to work with him. Godelier took responsibility 
for our introduction into Baruya life. Thereafter the Baruya 
judged us for themselves. Rouch implies that this intrusion 
was so gross that the awkwardness of the film crew's 
presence comes through. As evidence he cites only one 
sequence, where a lecture to initiates turns into an address to 
the anthropologist. During this the Baruya say that the films 
may be shown in Australia but not in New Guinea. Rouch 
claims this is an a posteriori rejection of the films by the 
Baruya. I think he has misinterpreted this scene. The Baruya 
are publicly accepting the presence of the anthropologist and 
the film crew among them, and the film documents this. 
Furthermore, when we screened the series back to the 
ceremonial leaders of the Baruya there was no rejection. 
They wholeheartedly approved of the films. Their only regret 
was that we had not managed to film all the ceremonial 
activity (it was physically impossible to do this). They still 
maintained that the films could be screened in Australia, but 
not, at the present time, publicly in New Guinea because of 
their secret nature. They have given me an open invitation to 
return to their valley for further film work in collaboration 
with Maurice Godelier. 
My confusion is compounded when Rouch goes on to say 
"This ambiguity [what ambiguity?) doesn't appear in Dun-
lop's earlier Desert People series, owing no doubt to the 
'piece of trail' shared by the filmmakers and the aboriginal 
family they met." This sounds like wishful thinking. To 
descend upon a single, fragile, isolated, nomadic family with 
two landrovers and a ton of gear is going to cause a 
monumental cultural disruption however sensitively you may 
try to do it. I am still haunted by fears and doubts about 
whether I had any right to do what I did then or not. 
Walking into a large New Guinea village was less trau-
matic ... for everyone. 
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NOTES AND NEWS 
D INTENSIVE FILM STUDIES of the Bushmen, the 
Yanomamo Indians, and the Pittsburgh Police. Docu-
mentary Educational Resources is devoted to producing 
large numbers of films and study guides on single cultures, 
to be used for teaching anthropology. Under the direction 
of Timothy Asch and John Marshall, DER (formerly the 
Center for Documentary Anthropology) now distributes 
18 films and 9 study guides on the Bushmen, 12 films on 
the Yanomamo Indians of southern Venezuela, and 16 
films on the Pittsburgh police. About 12 new films are in 
production (see below for partial listing of DER films). 
DER films, for the most part, center on a single series 
of actions; they are straightforwardly edited and lightly 
narrated. These short "sequences,, are excellent for 
helping to teach students the ability to perceive unstruc-
tured data and to make sense of it through theory. DER 
films attempt to create in students the experience of the 
anthropologist in the field. 
In addition, DE R publishes a complete series of study 
guides to its films. Each study guide reviews a film in 
detail, providing background information, and answers 
important questions which the film raises. Study guides-
which can be used by both students and teachers-also 
include maps, bibliographies, and a pronunciation guide. 
Nine study guides, totaling 186 pages, are now available; 
write DER for more information: 
Partial List of DER Films and Study Guides 
A. Bushman Series 
1. An Argument About a Marriage 
2. Bitter Melons 
3. A Joking Relationship 
4. Melon Tossing 
5. N/um Tchai 
6. The Wasp Nest 
7. The Meat Fight 
B. Yanomamo Series 
1. A Man Called "Bee": 
Studying the Yanomamo 
2. Magical Death 













A Multi-Disciplinary Study 44 
C. Pittsburgh Police Series 
1. Three Domestics 36yj 
2. Vagrant Woman 8 
3. After the Game 9 
Study Guide 
yes (33 pp.) 
yes (46 pp.) 
yes (34 pp.) 
yes (16 pp.) 
yes (28 pp.) 
yes* 
*Napoleon Chagnon, Studying the Yanomamo (Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1974). 
4. Twenty-one Dollars or 
Twenty-one Days 7yj 
5. Inside Outside Station Nine 90 
For further information on DER films and study guides, 
telephone (617) 666-1750 or write to DER, 24 Dane 
Street, Somerville, MA 02143. 
D THE DANCE NOTATION BUREAU (19 Union Square 
West, New York, NY 1 0003), who feel that application of 
Laban movement analysis and notation might be of value 
in their research, would like to offer a seminar for re-
searchers conducting specific projects in non-verbal com-
munications. Anyone interested should write for their 
questionnaire. 
D KALANI MEINECKE, Department of Anthropology, 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 4 7401, is compiling 
a bibliography on non-verbal communication studies done 
on Pacific cultures. Your contributions and suggestions 
are welcome. 
D 1976 CONFERENCE ON VISUAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
ANNOUNCED Temple University, in conjunction with 
the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communica-
tion, will sponsor its sixth Conference on Visual Anthro-
pology on March 10-13, 1976. Persons interested in organ-
izing symposia, workshops, discussion groups and/or sub-
mitting 16mm, Super-8 films, videotapes, or photographic 
essays should write for submission forms. The deadline for 
contributions is November 10, 1975. For further informa-
tion write: Jay Ruby, COV A, Department of Anthropol-
ogy, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. 
D IBM has developed a "Selectric" typing element which 
prints Labanotation symbols. The element was developed 
in conjunction with the Dance Notation Bureau. The 
Bureau has designed a chart showing the position of the 
Labanotation symbols on the Selectric keyboard. The 
element is available from any IBM supplier. 
D THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
has established a Task Force on Environment and Be-
havior. Its goals are (1) to bring to the attention of APA 
members the research and scholarly potential in the area 
of environment and behavior; (2) to provide information 
about alternative educational models and courses of in-
struction in environment and behavior; (3) to develop 
interdisciplinary contacts, and (4) to promote application 
and policy oriented research. For further information con-
tact: Willo P. White, Office of Scientific Affairs, American 
Psychological Association, 1200 17th St., N.W., Washing-
ton, DC 20036. 
D THE EAST-WEST CENTER has published Selected 
Abstracts of japanese Research on Mass Communication 
(Hidetoshi Kato, editor). For a copy write to University 
of Hawaii Press, 535 Ward Ave., Honolulu, HI 96814. 
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0 THE FOLLOWING PERIODICALS are of interest to 
scholars working in communication research in the Third 
World: 
Communications in Africa ($6.00/year; quarterly) 
Publications Department, Rhodes University, Box 
184, Grahamstown, 6140 South Africa 
The African journalist ($2.00; quarterly) International 
Press Institute, Munstergasse 9, Zurich, Switzerland 
Leader: Malaysian journalism Review ( $12.00/year; 
quarterly) South East Press Center, 57 Klang Road, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Media ($1.80/year; monthly) Press Foundation of Asia, 
1Oth Floor Magsaysay Blvd., Roxas Building, 
Manila, Philippines 
Indian Press ($5.00/year; monthly) Box 69 New Delhi 
11001, India 
Media Asia: an Asian Mass Communication Quarterly, 
AMIC, Newton Road, Singapore 11 
(Compiled by Sam G. Riley, Temple University) 
0 SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE ON THE ARTS 
AND PHOTO EXHIBIT The combined departments of 
Sociology at the State Universities of New York at 
Fredonia and Oswego, sponsored an informal conference 
focusing on the relationship of Art and Sociology and on 
the possible contributions of the Arts to theoretical and 
empirical Sociology. SOCIAL THEORY AND THE ARTS 
was held April 25-27. 
In conjunction with the conference, the Michael C. 
Rockefeller Arts Center Gallery, located at the State 
University of New York at Fredonia will sponsor THE 
HUMAN IMAGE: SOCIOLOGY AND PHOTOGRAPHY. 
This exhibition of photographs by professional sociolo-
gists and photographers is an attempt to expand and ex-
plore visual sociology and the sociological imagination 
through photography. The exhibit which ran from April 
13 to May 7, will travel from July 1975 until August 
1977. 
For information on the conference and exhibit con-
tact: A. Derral Cheatwood (Department of Sociology) or 
Therold Lindquist (Department of Art), SUNY, Fredonia, 
NY 14063. 
FILMMAKERS 
How would you like to have the use of a 16mm. Eclair NPR and double 
system sound capabilities for 25 days a year each of 5 consecutive years for the 
total cost of $3,000.00?* 
The Institute for the Study of Man, Inc. (ISM I), the founder and owner of 
the journal URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY is forming an anthropological film-
makers rental cooperative in order to provide Anthropologists with the 
equipment they need for 16mm. double system cine sound filmmaking. 
If you are interested please write for further information. 
Before 1 May 1975 
After 1 May 1975 
Dr. Jack R. Rollwagen 
Apartado Postal C-95 
Cuernavaca, Morelos 
Mexico 
Dr. Jack R. Rollwagen 
ISM I 
113 Utica Street 
Brockport, N.Y. 14420 
Pass this information on to your friends. 
*Value of equipment and services in this package totals $25,000.00. 
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PUBLICATIONS 
The following publications are available from SAVICOM, 1703 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20009. Payment must 
accompany orders. 
Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication 
Studies is a publication of the Society. It is published two or three times a year and contains verbal and visual material describing and 
analyzing research in the areas of interest described under the purposes of the Society. Studies also publishes reviews of relevant books and 
larger review articles of groups of related books and other publications. It contains a section of correspondence and brief communication. 
The publication committee encourages members as well as non-members to submit written and visual materials for publication. Write to the 
Studies editor for additional instructions for submission. 
From time to time SAVICOM will publish special publications related to the interests of its members. The following is a list of current 
publications: 
Films for Anthropological Teaching 
The fifth edition of Karl Heider's Films for Anthropological Teaching lists over 500 films together with their distributors, bibliographic 
references and has subject, distributor and author indices. The cost is $3.00 for Society members and $5.00 for non-members and 
institutions. 
Handbook for Proxemic Research 
Edward T. Hall, author of the Silent Language, The Hidden Dimension and other works, is allowing SAVICOM to publish this new 
handbook detailing his methodology for proxemic research. The Handbook includes computer programs, illustrations about the placement 
of cameras and observers, and an extensive bibliography. It is available to members at $3.00 per copy and to non-members and institutions 
at $5.00. In order to keep the price down for teachers, students and active workers in proxemic research, Hall is not accepting royalties on 
sales to SA VICOM members. Bookstores, teachers and others wishing to place bulk orders should write to Sol Worth for ~pecial instructions. 
All others wishing to obtain copies should write directly to SA VI COM. 
News, Notes, Correspondence and Brief Communications 
In addition to the section of correspondence and brief communications which appears in Studies, the Society is responsible for a 
section of news and notes in the Anthropology Newsletter of the American Anthropological Association. All interested persons are 
encouraged to contribute news of fieldwork, announcements of conferences, festivals, training opportunities and any other pertinent news 
and notes to Jay Ruby, News and Notes Editor, Temple University, Department of Anthropology, Philadelphia, PA 19122. Members of the 
Society who are not already members of AAA will regularly receive the Anthropology Newsletter without additional charge as· part of their 
membership dues. 
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